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This dissertation puts forward a series of arguments and theoretical proposals 
concerning institutional authority—particularly, governmental authority. I attend to 
conceptual debates regarding the function of legal systems and the nature of 
authority. Moreover, I cover a normative debate regarding the permissible use of 
political power. The overall view that I build is that governmental institutions have a 
decision-making authority over the status of certain normative relations in society, 
and they were designed to have this decision-making authority to serve the need of 
making group decisions, despite persistent disagreements about policy outcomes, in 
order to solve practical problems. 
 Chapter 1, “My Overall Perspective,” provides a guide to my overall view 
regarding the nature of governmental authority. This PhD dissertation takes the form 
of the three-paper model, and a reader may not see the conceptual links between these 
papers. In this chapter, I present the view on the nature of governmental authority that 
comes out of these papers. 
  
 Chapter 2, “The Presumption of Liberty and the Coerciveness of the State,” 
presents a challenge to skeptics who think that nearly all uses of political power is 
impermissible. I argue that a state can engage in permissible uses of political power 
over a broad range of domains without possessing any entitlements.   
 Chapter 3, “What Authority Is, What It Is Not,” argues against the orthodoxy 
that authority is a species of power over others. I then build and defend the view that 
authority is a status that authorizes a person or entity to change one’s normative 
status. 
 Chapter 4, “Law’s Function as a Decision-Procedure” provides an analysis of 
how we can determine the law’s essential function. I use this analysis to argue that the 
law’s essential function is a decision-making one. 
 Each of these chapters is a standalone paper. None of these papers 
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Chapter 1: My Overall Perspective 
 
This dissertation is comprised of three core papers on the nature of governmental 
authority. Chapter 2 discusses the conditions governing the permissible use of 
political power. Chapter 3 develops a definition for the concept “authority”. Chapter 4 
defends the view that the law’s essential function is a decision-making function. This 
PhD dissertation consists of the three-paper model; hence, each paper is standalone 
paper that can be read individually. I believe that these papers position me to provide 
a unique perspective about why human groups create governmental institutions. In 
this chapter, I discuss how each paper serves as a core component of my broader 
perspective on the nature of governmental authority. What results is a view that 
places a different emphasis on the way that governments are often viewed among 
philosophers. 
 A dominant view about governmental authority among philosophers is the 
following. 
 
 Orthodoxy: Government is a coercive entity. 
 
I do not disagree with this view—albeit, I firmly reject a strong formulation of it that 
states that governments are necessarily coercive.1 But I think that political and legal 
philosophers often place too much scholarly importance on this claim. The Dominant 
                                               




View is an emphasis on a perspective of government—it has us view governments as 
primarily coercive entities.  
 The problem with an emphasis on this perspective of government is that it 
obscures the government’s essential role. The following is my view of a 
government’s essential role. 
  
My View: Governmental institutions have a decision-making authority over 
the status of certain normative relations in society, and they were intentionally 
designed to have this decision-making authority to serve the need of making 
group decisions, despite persistent disagreements about policy outcomes, in 
order to solve practical problems. 
 
This view provides a different perspective on government. As I take it, human groups 
create governments for a certain reason, and this reason tells us what the essential 
function of government is—and its essential function tells us what its nature is. 
Governmental institutions are intentionally designed to have decision-making 
authority over certain normative relations in society, and this decision-making 
authority serves the human group need of making decisions about important issues as 
a group.  
An emphasis on a different view of government has importance implications. 
For the standard theorists, a government’s justification for existence must be based on 




because it is a morally problematic type of thing—i.e., it is a coercive entity.2 In 
contrast, in my view, a government’s justification for existence is based purely on 
instrumental facts.3 And since it is only contingently true that governments authorize 
the use of coercion against their citizens, its justification for existence need not 
reference moral facts. My three papers support and contribute to this view.  
 
   Chapter 2 provides a response to a skeptical view of government. A 
skeptical view of government holds that government is primarily a coercive entity 
because it commits wide-scope violations of our liberty-rights. As a result, according 
to this view, nearly all uses of political power is impermissible. This view also holds 
that governments must be entitled to authorize the use of coercion in order to 
justifiably coerce its subjects. In addition, the proponents of this view have an 
impossibly high standard for the permissible use of political power—i.e., the receipt 
of unanimous consent. The result is that no governments is legitimate according to 
this skeptical position. 
In response, I argue that the kind of liberty violations that need to be justified 
are much more limited in scope. And, importantly, they need to be justified on only a 
case-by-case basis; a compelling moral justification must be given in these cases. The 
result is that the governmental authority itself doesn’t need to be morally justified; 
instead, a government must give a compelling moral justification for violating certain 
liberties (e.g., freedom of speech) on a case-by-case basis or else its acting 
                                               
2 To note, John Simmons (1999) makes a distinction between “justification” and “legitimacy”.  




impermissibly in that particular situation. As a result, I am able to set aside strong 
moral constraints that entail that governments are nearly always acting impermissibly 
because the kind of thing that government is. 
Chapter 3 argues against the common view that “authority” is a control 
concept. The standard theorists think that the possession of authority, by its nature, is 
about controlling people’s conduct. They think that governments have authority over 
people. In contrast, I argue that, more precisely, authorities have control over 
normative relations, such as permissions, duties, immunities, disabilities, etc. This 
difference is important. Chapter 3 shows that authority is not about having power 
over people, regardless of whether that power is de jure or de facto, rather it is about 
having the requisite authorization to control certain normative relations.4  
Chapter 4 attends to an analysis of the law’s essential function. I argue that its 
essential function is a decision-making function. There are certain highly 
controversial normative relations in society—e.g., the right for same-sex couples to 
get married—and human groups must come to a decision about these normative 
relations despite their persistent disagreements. I argue that legal systems are 
intentionally designed to be a common framework where persistently disagreeing 
individuals can make decisions as a group. A government’s possession of authority 
entails that its decisions about these normative relations are immune to change from 
competing institutions, such as religious institutions. This thesis has us view 
governments as things that are intentionally designed to serve the human group need 
                                               
4 In this chapter, I also conceive of a counterexample, an ultra-libertarian government, against the 
strong formulation of the view that states that governments are necessarily coercive. An ultra-
libertarian government distributes only immunities against the use of governmental power to its 




of making decisions about important issues, despite persistent disagreements, in order 
to solve practical problems.5 
In sum, I have shown how these chapters fit into my broader view regarding 
the nature of governmental authority. 
  
                                               
5 This authority includes the decision about whether citizens have an immunity against the imposition 












This paper discusses the permissible use of political power. More specifically, I 
discuss the ethics of the governmental activities of making laws and enforcing them, 
activities that restrict people’s liberties in practice. I defend a certain context-
dependent position: a government must provide a compelling justification for 
restricting certain liberties, a justification that is sensitive to the relevant facts that 
govern the permissible restriction of a particular liberty within the particular context 
that the government proposes a restriction of that liberty, or else the government acts 
unethically. 
To defend this view, in section 6, I argue that the following two premises are 
true. 
(1) A government provides a compelling justification for restricting certain 
liberties only if it addresses relevant facts for the permissible restriction of 
that liberty.  
(2) What determines which facts are relevant depends, in part, upon 






My view has two significant conclusions. First, facts governing what counts 
as a compelling justification for restricting certain liberties is dependent upon facts 
about the context for restricting a particular liberty. Second, a compelling justification 
for restricting certain liberties can only be given in a contingent manner.  
On my view, given the context-sensitive nature of what counts as a 
compelling justification, the position that I defend entails that a government can only 
provide a compelling justification for permissibly restricting a liberty on a contingent 
basis. In contrast, an a priori justification for restricting a liberty fails to be sensitive 
to the relevant facts for restricting a person’s liberty in particular contexts. 
The significance of my position is that it runs directly counter to a dominant 
view in political philosophy. A dominant view in political philosophy is that a state 
must be entitled to make laws or be entitled to enforce them coercively in order to 
justifiably coerce its subjects.6 Call this view the “entitlement view.” On this view, 
for a state to justifiably coerce its subjects, a necessary condition is that it is entitled 
(or has a right) to authorize the use of coercion or a right to enforce its laws 
coercively.  
Notable skeptics of state power hold the entitlement view.7 These skeptics 
also deny that states have the requisite entitlement(s) to make laws and to enforce 
                                               
6 To note, the “or” in this statement is an inclusive “or”. For particular examples of these views, see, e.g. 
Grant Lamond,  ‘Coercion and The Nature of Law’ 7(1) (2001) Legal theory 35 at 1, 6; Arthur 
Ripstein, ‘Authority and Coercion’ 32(1) (2004), Philosophy and Public Affairs 2. For discussions of 
different variations of entitlement views and views on state coercion, see Robert Hughes, “Law and 
Coercion” 8(3) (2013) Philosophy Compass 231-240; and Christopher Morris, ‘State Coercion and 
Force’ Social Philosophy and Policy 29(1) (2012) 28-49.  
7 The term “power” in this statement is in reference to “political power” loosely defined in order to 
account for various views. See, Robert Paul Wolff, In Defense of Anarchism ( University of California 
Press 1970); John Simmons, Moral Principles and Political Obligations ( Princeton University Press 
1979), ch. 1. They believe that states must have a right to rule and a right to be obeyed in order to have 




them since (actual) states fail to satisfy the conditions for possessing the requisite 
entitlement.8 This denial informs their views regarding the permissible use of political 
power. An implication of their denial is that all (actual) states make and enforce laws 
impermissibly since they lack the requisite entitlement.9 
The position that I defend provides an important contrast to the entitlement 
view. On the entitlement view, either a government has the requisite entitlement to 
justifiably restrict its subjects’ liberties or it does not. My complaint is that the 
entitlement view creates a standard for the permissible use of political power that is 
too general in scope. It is implausible to think that the one-and-the-same entitlement 
provides a permission for restricting a range of liberties in a range of contexts so long 
as the restriction falls under the permissible limits of state power.10  
For instance, the same entitlement that grounds a state’s use of political 
power, e.g., a right to rule (Simmons) or a right to authorize the use of coercion 
(Ripstein), presumably provides that state a permission to enforce tax laws as well as 
                                               
8 Wolff believes that it is conceptually impossible for a person to permissibly be under the authority of 
another person since following the commands of another person violates certain obligations to act on 
one’s own critical assessment about what to do, Wolff (1970), ch. 2-3. Hence, Wolff thinks it is 
impossible to for a state to have the requisite permission to make laws and to enforce them. Other 
skeptics believe that the conditions for the requisite entitlement is satisfied on empirical grounds (e.g., 
whether a state has received unanimous consent from its subjects) and that no actual state has satisfied 
these empirical conditions. My criticism covers both kinds of anarchists. 
9 Simmons’s view has certain important complications that I must address. Simmons makes a 
distinction between legitimacy and justification. See John Simmons, ‘Justification and 
Legitimacy’109(4) (1999) Ethics, 739-771. On Simmons’s view, a state lacks legitimacy where it lacks 
unanimous consent from its subjects to govern over them. However, Simmons acknowledges that these 
states still might to be justified to govern on other grounds. Simmons writes, “I suggest, we can justify 
the state by showing that some realizable type of state is on balance morally permissible (or ideal) and 
that is rationally preferable to all feasible non-state alternatives,” (Ibid, 742). I address this distinction 
fully in section 7. 
10 For an excellent discussion about the limits of state power, see John Simmons, On The Edge of 
Anarchy: Locke, Consent, and the Limits of Society. (Cambridge University Press 1993). A right to 




a permission to enforce laws against jay-walking. I argue that, at first blush, this 
conclusion seems plausible enough, but it is implausible upon closer inspection. 
Nonetheless, what we have in common is that we are all providing an account 
of the source of the permission that governs permissible uses of political power—
specifically, when it comes to the governmental activities of making laws and 
enforcing them. I am providing an alternate view to the entitlement view. My 
alternate view allows me to demonstrate that a state can engage in permissible uses of 
political power over a broad range of domains without possessing any entitlements.11 
Entitlement theorists are skeptics of state power to the extent that they do not 
think that (actual) states have satisfied (or can satisfy) the conditions for acquiring the 
requisite entitlement in order to have the requisite permission to make laws and to 
enforce them. That is, they are anarchists to the extent that they think that no state has 
the requisite permission, i.e., legitimate authority, to use political power. Yet, another 
kind of skeptic of state power, a more extreme kind of anarchist than the entitlement 
                                               
11 In many respects, I have a view that falls under the Hobbesian tradition, one that is laid out in a 
series of separate papers. For instance, in Chapter 4 of this dissertation, I defend the view that the 
purpose for which legal institutions exist is grounded on purely instrumental facts in addition to natural 
facts about human psychology instead of moral facts. It is important to these later arguments that I 
show that neither the permissible use of political power—when it comes to making laws and enforcing 
them—nor the authority of legal institutions need to be grounded in a moral entitlement, or a moral 
fact. What we have in common is that we both (to a large extent at least) ground the authority of legal 




theorist, denies that any state can be morally justified.12 A central argument for this 
belief comes from the presumption of liberty.13 
For both these skeptical views of the state, it is wrong to restrict a person’s 
liberties without sufficient justification.14 The extreme variant of the skeptical view 
claims that uses of state power is morally indefensible because liberty is the supreme 
moral value governing our relations with others and use of state power necessarily 
violates respecting liberty as the supreme moral value.15  The first part of my paper 
                                               
12 A main reason that Simmons makes a distinction between legitimacy and justification is that the 
distinction allows Lockeans to address this type of skeptic. According to Simmons, the Lockean 
position is that a limited state can be prudentially rational or comparatively justified to living in the 
state of nature, (Ibid, 741-742). Simmons writes, “The background objection against which such 
attempts to justify the state are intended to be mounted must be understood to come from the anarchist, 
who denies that any state can be morally and prudentially justified. A common anarchist view, of 
course, is that anything that is sufficiently coercive to count as a state is also necessarily, and for that 
reason, morally indefensible and prudentially irrational,” (Ibid, 743). Since I do not recognize a 
distinction between justification and legitimacy in the same way that Locke (or Simmons’s explanation 
of Locke’s view) does, I must have another way of addressing these more extreme skeptics of state 
power. I address these kinds of skeptics by way of challenging a main underlying premise of their 
view: liberty is the supreme moral value governing our relations with others. This premise allows them 
to defend the claim that states are morally indefensible.   
13 For a discussion of the presumption of liberty, see William Edmundson, Three Anarchical Fallacies: 
An Essay on Political Authority (Cambridge University Press 2007). 
14 Isaiah Berlin, Liberty: Incorporating Four Essays on Liberty (Oxford University Press 2002). See 
esp. chapter “Two Concepts of Liberty” at 166-217; Eric Mack and Gerald F. Gaus, “Classical 
Liberalism and Libertarianism: The Liberty Tradition” in Gerald F. Gaus and Chandran Kukathas 
(eds), Handbook of Political Theory (SAGE Publications Ltd 2004) 115-130; Robert Nozick, Anarchy, 
State, and Utopia (Basic Books 1974); Matt Zwolinski, “The Separateness of Persons and Liberal 
Theory” 42(2) (2008), The Journal of Value Inquiry 147. 
15 One objection considers the value of addressing this extreme anarchist position given that the 
entitlement view is a significantly more plausible skeptical view of state power. In defense, I note that 
discussions of the presumption of liberty has received attention from notable constitutional law lawyers. 
For example, Randy Barnett, the director of the Georgetown Center for the Constitution, dedicates a full 
book on the presumption of liberty—see Randy Barnett, Restoring the Lost Constitution: The 
Presumption of Liberty (2013)—where he argues that an unprincipled judiciary poses a threat to 
constitutionalism given the original intent of the writers of the American Constitution. To note, Barnett 
is not an anarchist, but he demonstrates that the presumption of liberty is a very intuitive position that 
many people hold. In addition, significant legal philosophers have also commented on the widespread 
intuitive appeal of the presumption of liberty. See William Edmundson, Three Anarchical Fallacies: 
An Essay on Political Authority (Cambridge University Press 2007), ch 6. An important contribution 
to the literature, from addressing the presumption of liberty in depth, comes from showing that the 
presumption of liberty is not intuitive when examined in closer detail. If my arguments against the 
presumption of liberty are correct, the appropriate conclusion is that the extreme anarchist position, i.e., 




argues against the extreme variant of the skeptical view. This task is important 
because the extreme variant of the skeptical view opposes my positive view on the 
grounds that no compelling justification for restricting a liberty exists other than the 
receipt of consent. The second part of my paper lays out my positive view regarding 
the permissible use of political power. My positive view provides a direct response to 
the entitlement theorists.  
I organize this paper as follows. In section 2, I provide some preliminary 
remarks on certain themes that play a continuing role throughout this paper. In section 
3, I provide a general overview of the skeptical view of state power. I discuss the 
main defense for the extreme variant of the skeptical view, the presumption of liberty. 
In section 4, I lay out possible defenses for the presumption of liberty. In section 5, I 
then provide counterexamples to each defense. These counterexamples aim to show 
that a justification is not needed to restrict certain liberties. I then show how this 
result undermines this more extreme anarchist view of state power. 
In section 6, I then develop an account in which states may engage in 
permissible uses of political power without having an entitlement to make laws or to 
enforce them coercively. On my view, the exercise of political power is morally 
problematic in the following two cases:16 (1) when a state restricts (what I call) 
“protected liberties”, liberties that are protected by a corresponding right against 
interference, without a compelling moral justification, and (2) when a state arbitrarily 
                                               
liberty because it really rests on a view of liberty that is implausibly extreme—i.e., liberty is the supreme 
moral value governing our relations with others—or as I shall argue in section 5. 
16 In what follows, for sake of brevity, when I refer to uses of political power, I mean to constrict my 




restricts “unprotected liberties”, liberties that aren’t protected by a corresponding 
right against interference. 
On my view, a state needs an entitlement to neither make laws nor to enforce 
them. To permissibly restrict a protected liberty, a state must merely give a 
compelling justification for such a restriction that is appropriately sensitive to the 
relevant facts governing the particular context in which a specific protected liberty 
may be permissibly restricted. And to permissibly restrict an unprotected liberty, a 
state must do so for the reason that it promotes some public good or furthers its 
subjects’ interests.  
In section 7, I conclude this paper with the following observation. My positive 
view demonstrates why the entitlement view is implausible. A compelling 
justification for restricting a protected liberty can only come from a state official that 
has appropriately evaluated and weighed the relevant reasons and facts at hand—
namely, the reasons and facts that ought to be considered when restricting a protected 
liberty within a specific context. As a result, an a priori justification, such as a right 
to rule, cannot be the source of the requisite permission for restricting any liberties 
because a compelling justification can only be given on a contingent basis once the 
relevant reasons and facts are appropriately assessed and that assessment is 
appropriately promulgated to the relevant parties. 
 





To begin, I must make some preliminary remarks on certain themes that play a 
continuing role in the rest of this paper. 
One broad strategy for analyzing the connection between the use of political 
power and state coercion is to analyze the semantics of the concept “coercion.” 
According to this strategy, all coercive acts are pro tanto morally wrong.17 It is also 
widely thought that all uses of political power are coercive.18 Hence, it is further 
widely thought that each use of political power is pro tanto morally wrong. The 
literature on this topic has digressed into a discussion regarding the proper semantics 
of the concept “coercion.” The motivation behind this digression is the belief that the 
truth of the statement “the law is coercive” depends on the proper understanding of 
the meaning of “coercion.” However, this literature has not generated a consensus on 
the meaning of “coercion”, and this topic proves to be very controversial. 
I do not follow this strategy. Rather, I think much progress can be made with a 
very superficial understanding of the term “coercion.” I think we may make 
significant progress by examining the skeptics’ complaint for thinking nearly all uses 
of political power are impermissible.  
Some skeptics think that nearly all uses of political power are impermissible 
because they unjustifiably violate our liberties. The challenge that they present is that 
each use of political power must be justified and that each use of political power 
should be presumed to be impermissible until it is justified.19 I believe that this 
                                               
17 See William Edmundson, Three Anarchical Fallacies: An Essay on Political Authority (Cambridge 
University Press 2007). 
18 For a discussion, see Edmundson (n 17) Chaps. 4-5. 
19 This challenge runs parallel to the challenge that the claim “law is coercive” poses. William 
Edmundson writes, “the slogan ‘law is coercive’ is supposed to tell us why state action stands in special 




challenge is compelling, and we need not digress into a discussion of the semantics of 
“coercion” to understand or to answer this challenge. 
It is also important for me to be explicit about the definition of “liberty” that I 
endorse.  On my view, liberty should be understood as non-domination.20 A 
dominates B if and only if A has a power of interference over B on an arbitrary 
basis.21 And an act is perpetuated on an arbitrary basis if that act is chosen or not 
chosen at A’s pleasure.22  
Whereas many others have argued against skeptics on the grounds that these 
skeptics have the wrong view of liberty, it is beyond the purview of this paper to 
argue which definition of liberty is more plausible.23 I present my preferred account 
of liberty mainly to bar any objections that take cases in which one arbitrarily 
dominates the will of another as a counter-objection to anything that I say, for it is my 
view that it is morally objectionable for an individual or institution to arbitrarily 
dominate the will of another. 
Finally, I must make the following note. Exercises of political power include 
the following actions or activities: making laws, threatening people with sanctions, 
creating obligations, imposing sanctions or punishments, forcing people to submit 
(e.g., putting people in handcuffs), committing violence (e.g., shooting people). 
Skeptics believe that states are not entitled to perform any of these actions; hence, for 
                                               
20 Philip Pettit Republicanism: A Theory of Freedom and Government (Oxford University Press 1997); 
Ibid, On the people’s terms: A Republican Theory and Model of Democracy (Cambridge University 
Press 2012).   
21 Pettit, Republicanism (n 20) at 52.  
22 Ibid, 55.  
23 Although the definition of liberty that I adopt has some implications for my views concerning the 
permissibility of exercising political power, it doesn’t play nearly as much a central role in shaping my 




them, no state has the authority to commit any of these actions. If one wants to 
vindicate the use of political power, one must address each of these uses of political 
power. However, the subject matter of this paper concerns only the permissibility of 
making laws and threatening people with sanctions.24 Although, what I say here lays 
some of the groundwork for addressing the rest of the uses of political power, they 
must be fully addressed in separate papers. 
 
3. The Skeptics’ Challenge Against the Use of Political Power 
 
 
Skeptics of the state range from radical anti-statists to less anti-statist libertarians. 
They hold a suspicious attitude towards each use of political power.25 They don’t 
simply defer to the state’s authority on each legislation because they believe that 
states are neither entitled to make laws that restrict behavior nor entitled to authorize 
the use of coercion. Hence, for skeptics, each use of political power must be justified 
on grounds other than entitlements. 
The skeptics’ challenge is that each use of political power must be justified 
and that each use of political power should be presumed to be impermissible until it is 
justified.26 Many of them conclude that nearly all uses of political power are 
                                               
24 Although, I lay part of the groundwork for an account that explains why states can permissibly create 
obligations, a full defense is the subject matter of a separate paper on political legitimacy. 
25 In contrast, for example, some statists believe that there is an obligation to obey even unjust laws. See, 
e.g., Thomas Hobbes, Leviathan, chap 26 [131-150] (Cambridge University Press 1991 [1651]).  
26 Bruce Ackerman states a view called “Principle of Rationality,” according to which all power 
including political power is presumptively illegitimate until the powerholder supplies a reason for having 
the power while other people do not. Bruce Ackerman, Social justice in the Liberal State (Yale 




impermissible. In this section, I present the skeptics’ background views for 
surmounting this challenge. I first discuss the definition of liberty that many skeptics 
commonly hold. I then discuss the importance that they place on the value of liberty. 
Finally, I show how their commitments on these two issues inform their views on the 
permissibility of exercising political power. 
Many of these skeptics endorse a view of liberty as non-interference. On this 
definition of liberty, Isaiah Berlin writes, 
 
I am normally said to be free to the degree to which no man or body of men 
interferes with my activity. Political liberty in this sense is simply the area 
within which a man can act unobstructed by others. If I am prevented by 
others from doing what I could otherwise do, I am to that degree unfree; and if 
this area is contracted by other men beyond a certain minimum, I can be 
described as being coerced, or, it may be enslaved...Coercion implies the 
deliberate interference of other human beings within the area in which I could 
otherwise act. You lack political liberty or freedom only if you are prevented 
from attaining a goal by human beings.27 
 
On this definition of liberty, A is unfree with respect to B to the extent that A 
deliberately makes a course of action, which B could otherwise do, substantially 
practically less eligible.28 According to these skeptics, making laws that restrict 
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Press. New ed. in Berlin 2002. at 169. 
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behavior are deemed to be coercive since it makes certain courses of actions, which 
some people would otherwise do, substantially practically less eligible. A core feature 
of skeptics’ position is that each of us has a general negative right against 
interference. That is, all others have a duty to refrain from interfering with the ends 
that we want to obtain. 
Moreover, skeptics converge, in sufficiently similar ways, on the importance 
that they place on liberty. Gaus and Mack claim that “individual liberty is what each 
individual may legitimately demand of each other individual”.29 They continue, 
Part of the reason that liberty is the only thing—or at least the primary thing—
that may be demanded of others as a political right is that the demand for liberty is 
uniquely modest; to demand liberty is merely to insist that one be left alone in one’s 
solitary activities or in one’s joint activities with other consenting individuals. Liberty 
as non-interference by others is thus a good that everyone with aims, goals or projects 
has an interest of demanding from all others, it can only be supplied by others, and it 
can be universally supplied at modest costs, unlike demands to be benefited or served 
at the expense of others.30 
Skeptics take liberty to be the supreme moral value governing our relations 
with others. They believe that liberty should be the most extensively respected moral 
value. The implications of this statement are far-reaching. 
First, each liberty-violation must be justified. As Douglas Husak states, “The 
objectionable feature that attaches to each instance of coercion persists even after a 
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demonstration that the particular deprivation of freedom is justified”.31 Moreover, the 
justification must be a moral justification since coercion is ordinarily regarded as 
something that stands in need of a moral justification.32 
Second, the only adequate justification for restricting one’s liberty is the 
receipt of personal consent. As John Simmons writes, “attempts by others to govern 
us will require some special justification—a justification consistent with and 
respectful of our natural freedom...Consent is an act only a free person can perform; it 
is a use, not a breach, of one’s freedom”.33 
Third, a government must have the consent of all for the legitimate use of 
political power. Simmons writes, “a legitimate government must have the unanimous 
consent of its citizens”.34 The reason being a person who has not given his consent 
would be bound to a government that he has not consented to.35 
Skeptics make one exception or limitation on the general negative right 
against interference: we have a right not to be interfered with—except when we 
violate another person’s rights or harm that person. Following J.S. Mill’s formula,36 
they argue that an individual or institution may subject A to force if and only if that 
force will prevent A from harming B or nullify some harm that A has already 
inflicted upon B. These cases would justify the use of political force. But, this 
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32 Lamond (n 14) 36. 
33 Simmons (On the Edge of Anarchy, n 10) at 74. 
34 Simmons (Moral Principles and Political Obligations, n 7) at 71. 
35 Ibid, 72. 





justification doesn’t account for much because anyone would be justified in using 
force to prevent harm to others. 
For example, a state is justified in using force to prevent Stephen from 
committing a mass shooting on campus.  But any person would be justified in 
preventing Stephen from harming others. Mark, another student on campus, for 
instance, would be justified in tackling Stephen to the ground. Since any individual 
would also be justified in preventing Stephen from harming others, the prevention of 
harm to others would not uniquely justify a state’s exercise of force. 
Hence, in what follows, I focus strictly on cases in which a state restricts a 
person from doing something that is morally permissible because these are the more 
controversial cases regarding the permissible use of political power.  For a concrete 
example, consider the following case. 
No Jaywalking: The pedestrian crosswalk light is red.  However, since no cars 
are approaching in either direction, Bert decides to jaywalk knowingly against the 
law.  Bert is not putting anyone in harms way by jaywalking on this occasion. 
However, a cop sees Bert jaywalking and administers a fine to Bert without Bert’s 
consent. 
In this case, a state is restricting Bert from committing a morally permissible 
action. Skeptics view this use of political power to be impermissible. The state, on 
their view, is wrongly obstructing a goal that Bert wants to obtain. 
These considerations greatly restrict the range of permissible uses of political 
power. Skeptics deny that states are entitled to make laws that restrict behavior and 




exercises of political power must be justified on other grounds. But, for them, 
preventing harms or possessing unanimous consent is the only acceptable grounds to 
permissibly use political power. However, it’s safe to assume that the vast majority of 
actual laws do not prevent harms or receive unanimous consent. This position entails 
that nearly all uses of political power are impermissible.  
The skeptics’ challenge rests on two pillars. (Claim 1): Liberty is the supreme 
moral value governing our relations with others. For them, liberty should be the most 
extensively respected moral value. But why should we believe that (Claim 1) is true? 
I challenge the truth of (Claim 1) over the course of the next two sections (i.e., 
sections 4 and 5). (Claim 2): The only justifiable use of political power without 
consent is to prevent or to nullify a harm. After presenting my positive account on the 
permissible use of political power, I demonstrate that (Claim 2) is false.  This is the 
subject-matter of section 6. 
 
4. The Presumption of Liberty 
 
In this section, I present a central argument for the claim that liberty is the supreme 
value governing our relations with others: the presumption of liberty. Simply put, the 
presumption of liberty states that any restriction of one’s liberties requires adequate 






Presumption of Liberty: It is wrong to restrict a person’s liberty without 
sufficient justification. 
 
The presumption of liberty is a burden-shifting type argument. It sets a state of 
affairs as a normative default position (i.e., the non-violation of liberties). Defenders 
of the presumption of liberty then argue that others must justify venturing away from 
this normative default position.37 On this view, it is presumed that the violation of a 
person’s liberty is morally impermissible until it is justified. 
To fully understand the issues at stake, let’s breakdown the presumption of 
liberty and analyze its components. The presumption of liberty has two components: 
(a) the existence of liberty-rights and (b) a feature of liberties that explains the 
justification- demanding force behind liberty-violations. I explain each in turn. 
A liberty-right is a Hohfeldian term.38 Hohfeld analyzes a liberty- right to be 
the mere absence of an obligation. Since morally permissible actions are simply those 
actions that one has the absence of an obligation to perform, the set of actions that 
one has a liberty-right to perform is equal to the set of actions that is morally 
permissible. Hence, people have a corresponding liberty-right to perform any morally 
permissible action. In particular, we have a liberty-right to jaywalk since jaywalking 
is morally permissible. 
                                               
37 Randy Barnett also puts the idea this way: “A presumption of liberty would place the burden on the 
government to show why its interference with liberty is both necessary and proper rather than…imposing 
a burden on the citizen to show why the exercise of a particular liberty is a “fundamental right,”. Randy 
Barnett, Restoring the lost constitution: The presumption of liberty (Princeton University Press 
2013) at 260. 
38Wesley Newcomb Hohfeld, ‘Some Fundamental Legal Conceptions as applied in Judicial 





We should note that the existence of a liberty-right alone doesn’t explain the 
justification-demanding force behind the presumption of liberty since a liberty-right is 
simply the absence of an obligation. Nothing more is said about how we ought to treat 
liberty-rights, for (again) it is simply the absence of an obligation. Let me put this 
point rhetorically: Why do we need to demand a justification for restricting a 
movement or an action that we have an absence of an obligation to do? 
There must be a feature that humans place on liberties that explains the 
justification demanding force behind liberty-violations. We should remind ourselves, 
however, that skeptics owe an argument that explains why this feature generates a 
requirement for a justification in order to permissibly restrict a liberty. 
In fact, there must be two different kinds of defenses given the differing 
contexts of liberty-violations. In one context, we are told that we ought to prefer the 
action that promotes a person’s liberty as opposed to the action that violates a 
person’s liberty. That is, we should prefer X (i.e., liberty) as opposed to not-X (i.e., 
not-liberty). Moreover, in cases of conflict among goods, we are told that we ought to 
prefer liberty over other goods (e.g., social coordination, equality, etc.) when the 
promotion of the other good conflicts with the promotion of liberty. That is, we 
should prefer X to Y in cases where the promotion of Y entails not-X. What defense 
can skeptics give for each context? 
Skeptics have a very intuitive defense for why we should prefer liberty as 
opposed to not-liberty. It is the observation that the non-violation of liberty simply 
enjoys a presumption of correctness, as opposed to the violation of people’s liberties. 




liberty-violations. Joel Feinberg expresses the idea this way: “If a strong general 
presumption of freedom has been established, the burden of proof rests on the 
shoulders of the advocate of coercion”.39 I call this the “presumption of correctness” 
defense. 
How about cases of conflict among goods? How can skeptics defend the claim 
that we ought to prefer liberty over other goods when they conflict? William 
Edmundson states one bad defense: the defense that simply consists of the statement 
“because liberty is good”.40 Edmundson states that there are many goods (e.g., 
security, happiness, a good night’s sleep). The defense “because liberty is good” 
wouldn’t tell us which situation is to be preferred in cases of conflict among goods.  
Another defense claims that there is a hierarchy of political goods and that 
liberty is at the top of that hierarchy. This defense explains why we should favor 
liberty over all other goods. However, Edmundson states that this defense is also 
unsatisfactory because “not since the heyday of G.E. Moore’s Principia Ethica have 
philosophers felt at ease ranking the goods”.41 
But Mack and Gaus supply a good reason for ranking liberty at top, “Liberty 
as non-interference by others is thus a good that everyone with aims, goals or projects 
has an interest of demanding from all others, it can only be supplied by others, and it 
can be universally supplied at modest costs”.42 The argument is that everyone has an 
interest to be “left alone” in one’s activities, and the good of being left alone can be 
universally supplied by all others at modest costs. Mack and Gaus can argue that a 
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hierarchy of goods ought to be ranked on these criteria. And no other good, perhaps, 
satisfies these criteria (or, at least, does not as well as liberty does). I call this 
argument the “universally supplied at modest costs” defense. 
Moreover, skeptics don’t have to claim that a hierarchy of goods exists. They 
merely may insist that liberty always outweighs these other goods. This defense 
would suffice to show that a presumption favoring liberty over all other goods exists. 
Moreover, this defense could be combined with the presumption of correctness 
defense in a compelling way. Suppose that John gave an argument about the value of 
promoting social coordination; hence, John concludes that imposing a law that 
restricts jaywalking is justifiable. A skeptic may simply respond that, even though 
promoting social coordination is valuable, it can never outweigh the value of liberty. 
And since John has the burden of proof because the non-violation of liberties enjoys a 
presumption of correctness, John must defend the claim that the good of social 
coordination outweighs the good of liberty. Since the success of John’s critique is 
conditional upon his ability to meet this burden, justifiably or not, skeptics can resist 
John’s critique by insisting no other values can outweigh the value of liberty.43 I call 
this the “liberty always outweighs all other values” defense. 
Another defense asserts that people have a certain inviolability. Jason Brennan 
writes, 
[L]ibertarians advocate radical freedom. Each person may decide how her life 
will go. We need not justify ourselves to others. Each of us possesses an 
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inviolability, founded on justice, that forbids others from sacrificing us to 
achieve greater social stability, economic efficiency, or desirable cultural 
ends.44 
 
On this view, it is not a matter of whether liberty is at the top of a hierarchy of 
goods. It is also not a matter of whether liberty outweighs other goods. Rather, what 
matters is that we have a certain inviolability that disallows others to promote some 
other good over our liberty. As Matt Zwolinski writes, “respecting the moral status of 
individuals, such critics argue, entails giving them a certain primacy or inviolability 
in a theory, refusing to subordinate them for the sake of the greater good”.45 For these 
critics, restricting one’s liberty for the sake of some public good disrespects that 
person’s inviolable moral status. I call this the “inviolability” defense. 
In the next section, I present counterexamples that show that all the defenses 
for the justification-demanding force behind liberty-violations fail. These 
counterexamples show that all four defenses don’t support the claim that liberty is the 
supreme value governing our relations with others. 
 
5. Counterexamples to the Presumption of Liberty 
 
In this section, I offer counterexamples to the presumption of liberty. These 
counterexamples undermine the presumption of liberty in two ways. First, they show 
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that none of the defenses for the justification-demanding force behind liberty-
violations works. Second, if we agree that a justification is not needed in certain 
liberty-violation cases, yet it is needed in other liberty-violation cases (i.e., when a 
state violates our freedom of speech), then we need a principled way to distinguish 
when a justification is needed and when it is not. This result shows that we can no 
longer operate on presumptions; instead, we must have a principled way for 
adjudicating the need for a justification. 
I proceed in the following manner: First, I assess what a counterexample 
needs to show to undermine these defenses for the presumption of liberty. Next, I 
identify all the ways in which A violates B’s liberties. Finally, I present 
counterexamples that undermine the defenses for the presumption of liberty. 
The defenses for the presumption of liberty are as follows. 
 
(d1) the non-violation of liberty enjoys a presumption of correctness 
(d2) liberty can be universally supplied at modest costs 
(d3) liberty simply always outweighs all other goods 
(d4) persons possess a certain inviolability against liberty-violations 
 
What does a counterexample need to show to demonstrate that each of these 
defenses for the presumption of liberty is implausible? 
In response to (d1), it needs to show that a justification is not needed to 
permissibly violate B’s liberty. If the non-violation of B’s liberties enjoys a 




a justification. But if a justification is not needed to permissibly violate B’s liberties, 
then the non-violation of B ’s liberties doesn’t enjoy a presumption of correctness. 
In response to (d2), it needs to show that A must give up something of equal 
or more value to refrain from violating B’s liberty. If A must give up something of 
equal or more value to refrain from violating a liberty, then the good of leaving 
people alone could not be universally supplied at modest costs. 
In response to (d3), it needs to show that A does not wrong B by violating B’s 
liberty without receiving B’s consent. If the good of liberty simply outweighs all 
other goods, then A could not promote some other good over B’s liberty without 
wronging B. But if A may promote some other good without wronging B, then the 
good of liberty does not simply outweigh all other goods. 
In response to (d4), it needs to show that A does not wrong B by violating B’s 
liberty without receiving B’s consent. If each of us possesses a certain inviolability 
that forbids others from promoting some other good at the expense of our liberty, then 
other people wrong us by restricting our liberty without our consent. But if A may 
restrict B’s liberties without wronging B, then B doesn’t possess a certain 
inviolability against liberty-violations. 
In sum, assuming that A did not receive B’s consent, a counterexample shows 
that each of these defenses for the presumption of liberty fails if it demonstrates that 
either (a) A may permissibly restrict B’s liberty without giving B a justification or (b) 
A may restrict B ’s liberties without wronging B. 
To strengthen the plausibility of my counter-objection, I identify all the ways 




when A renders a morally eligible course of conduct substantially less practically 
eligible.46 The following are ways in which A may violate B ’s liberties:47 
 
(r1) A commands B not to perform a morally permissible action. 
(r2) A deliberately interferes with B ’s performance of a morally permissible 
action. 
(r3) A credibly threatens to withhold a benefit from B if B performs a certain 
morally permissible action. 
(r4) A credibly threatens to impose a cost on B if B performs a certain morally 
permissible action. 
 
Consider an example in which we intuitively don’t believe that a justification 
is needed for violating our liberties in each of these ways. 
 
(r1) A commands B not to perform a morally permissible action. 
 
The Priest Commands: One religion requires its members to eat only blessed 
meat of a certain cut. A priest from this religion commands that all others 
(members and nonmembers alike) to eat only blessed meat and warns that 
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uses the term “prevent”, and I use the term “substantially less practically eligible.” I also add “morally 
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47 There are more ways in which A can violate B’s liberties (e.g., A arbitrarily punishes B). However, 
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they will go to purgatory otherwise. In full-faith, the priest believes that he is 
fulfilling his moral duty by making such commands. 
 
Assuming eating meat is morally permissible, the priest is restricting others 
from committing a morally permissible action—that is, eating non-blessed meat.48 
However, the priest doesn’t owe people a justification for commanding them to eat 
blessed meat. Moreover, if the priest refrains from commanding people to eat blessed 
meat, it would not be at modest costs given his belief in the weight of his moral 
obligation to make such commands. This example shows that liberty cannot be 
universally supplied at modest costs. 
Skeptics might object that they aren’t concerned with cases in which people 
simply command others not to do a morally permissible action. They are concerned 
only with cases in which people back their commands with credible threats. (I inspect 
more coercive type cases below.) However, skeptics are indeed concerned with 
simple command cases since many of them believe that states cannot command 
anybody what to do without violating that person’s liberty. 
In response, skeptics may argue that states are subject to a higher moral 
standard than ordinary citizens. While ordinary citizens make occasional commands, 
states systematically command people what to do, and skeptics may argue that this 
difference sets a higher moral standard for states to satisfy. I answer this objection in 
section 5 when I give my positive account. 
 
                                               




(r2) A deliberately interferes with B ’s performance of a morally 
permissible action. 
 
Missed the Train: Jeffery sees the train at the platform and bolts towards its 
open doors. However, before Jeffery is able to reach the doorway, a beggar 
stops Jeffery to ask for some change. This action delays Jeffery long enough 
that he misses his window of opportunity to get on the train. The train whizzes 
off. 
It is morally permissible for Jeffery to get on the train on time. However, I 
think that most of us would agree that the beggar doesn’t owe Jeffery a justification 
for deliberately interfering with Jeffery’s ability to get on the train. Moreover, the 
beggar doesn’t wrong Jeffery for asking Jeffery for some change. And finally, the 
beggar relies on each handout to survive. The beggar cannot refrain from deliberately 
interfering with people at modest costs. 
One might object that if the beggar adamantly stood and refused to get out of 
Jeffery’s way without Jeffery’s consent, then the beggar acts impermissibly. 
However, this case would be different than the previous example. In the previous 
case, the beggar merely interferes with Jeffery’s ability to get on the train long 
enough to ask for some change. In this case, the beggar arbitrarily dominates Jeffery’s 
will. And, as I have stated previously, I believe that all cases in which a person or 





(r3) A credibly threatens to withhold a benefit from B if B performs a 
certain morally permissible action. 
 
No Soup For You: George is banned from purchasing soup from a certain 
soup stand with an eccentric owner. George begs (and begs) Jerry to purchase 
the soup for him to get around the ban. Jerry finally agrees to buy soup for 
George but threatens that George can’t flirt with any of Jerry’s love interests, 
as George has a habit of doing, otherwise Jerry won’t purchase soup for 
George.49 
 
It is morally permissible for George to flirt with Jerry’s love interests. 
However, Jerry doesn’t owe George a justification for threatening to withhold a 
benefit if George flirts with one of Jerry’s love interests. Moreover, Jerry doesn’t 
wrong George for making such a threat. 
One objection is that Jerry has the liberty-right to state conditions under which 
he will provide benefits for George. Hence, this is simply a case of a conflict of 
liberty- rights between Jerry and George. Nevertheless, the presumption of liberty 
states that it is wrong to restrict a person’s liberty-right without sufficient 
justification. If we take this claim seriously, notwithstanding Jerry’s liberty-rights, 
Jerry still owes George a justification for threatening to withhold a benefit against 
George for performing a morally permissible action otherwise Jerry acts 
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impermissibly. And I think that most of us would agree that Jerry doesn’t act 
impermissibly in this case. 
 
(r4) A credibly threatens to impose a cost on B if B performs a certain 
morally permissible action. 
 
Frivolous Lawsuit: Harris attempts to burglarize Jessica’s house. However, 
as he breaks in through the window, he slips on a banana peel and has a 
serious concussion.  Harris demands that Jessica pay his hospital bills, and she 
refuses. In response, Harris threatens to sue Jessica unless she pays his 
hospital bills. 
 
It is morally permissible for Jessica not to pay Harris’s medical bills. Harris is 
at fault for his accident. However, Harris doesn’t owe Jessica a justification for 
threatening litigation if she doesn’t pay his medical bills. 
One might object that Harris does owe Jessica a justification for threatening to 
sue since he is clearly in the wrong. This frivolous lawsuit would cost Jessica undue 
burden on her time and money.  However, I don’t think that this conclusion is 
warranted. The presumption of liberty entails that, in this case, Harris must receive 
Jessica’s consent to threaten to sue her otherwise he acts impermissibly. But it is 
counterintuitive to think that a threat of lawsuit is morally impermissible unless one 




I believe that we sometimes must give a justification to permissibly restrict a 
liberty (e.g., freedom of speech). However, these counterexamples demonstrate that 
not all liberties have a justification-demanding feature, since we may sometimes 
permissibly violate a person’s liberties without a justification and without wronging 
that person. This result demonstrates that we need a principled way to adjudicate 
when a justification is needed and when it is not. I offer my positive account in the 
next section. 
6. When We Are Owed a Justification 
 
Sometimes we do need to give a justification to permissibly restrict a liberty and 
sometimes we do not. Given this fact, we need a principled way for adjudicating 
when a justification is needed and when it is not. In this section, I explain the type of 
justification that is needed to permissibly restrict a liberty. Then, I explain when a 
justification is needed to permissibly restrict a liberty. Finally, I show that, on this 
account, states do not need to be entitled to authorize the use of coercion in order to 
permissibly restrict people’s liberties. 
What kind of justification is needed to permissibly restrict a liberty? Skeptics 
give one answer. They argue that the only adequate justification for permissibly 
restricting a liberty is the receipt of personal consent.50 And if a state hasn’t received 
unanimous consent to impose a general law, according to skeptics, then that state 
cannot permissibly impose or enforce that law. 
                                               




On my account, a state simply needs to promulgate a compelling justification 
to permissibly restrict certain liberties. To give a compelling justification, an official 
must engage in moral reasoning to analyze the relevant facts for permissibly 
restricting a protected liberty. In moral reasoning, they weigh the reasons for 
regulating the liberty under question against the reasons for not regulating that liberty. 
A compelling moral justification, in this case, is a reason for regulating the liberty 
under question and is the stronger reason on the balance of reasons. 
Consider a concrete example. In Schenck v. United States,51 for instance, the 
Supreme Court held that speech that is directed to incite “clear and present danger” is 
outside the scope of protected speech. One cannot shout “Fire!” in a crowded theater. 
In this case, legal officials concluded that causing “clear and present danger” is a 
reason for regulating free speech and is the stronger reason on the balance of reasons. 
To permissibly restrict certain liberties, I now argue that supplying a 
compelling moral justification is more appropriate than receiving personal consent. 
Consider the regulation of hate speech. Suppose that a society, Munta, doesn’t have a 
legal institution, and it uses severe moral censure to regulate behavior. There is a fact 
of the matter as to whether hate speech should be meet with moral condemnation. To 
justify imposing moral censure, the inhabitants of Munta must engage in moral 
argumentation to inspect the reasons for and the reasons against condemning hate 
speech. If they find a reason for censuring hate speech is the stronger reason on the 
balance of reasons, it seems that they are justified in censuring hate speech. 
Moreover, not having the consent of a person who wants to engage in hate speech is 
                                               




not relevant to the grounds for condemning hate speech.  Rather, the more appropriate 
justification for applying moral condemnation is the existence of a compelling moral 
justification. 
I argue that the reasoning that applies to the justification for moral 
condemnation also applies to the justification for legal prohibitions. But to finish this 
argument, I must first present my account of when a justification is needed to 
permissibly restrict a liberty. 
I propose that a justification is needed to restrict peoples’ liberties when a 
certain deontic constraint exists. That deontic constraint is as follows: X ’s liberty to 
perform y is protected by a certain corresponding claim-right. Call these liberties 
“protected liberties”. (On the other hand, call liberties that aren’t protected by a 
corresponding claim-right “unprotected liberties.”) The corresponding claim-right has 
the following form: if X has a claim-right to perform y, then all others have a duty not 
to interfere with X’s performance of y.52 
For instance, John’s liberty-right to say whatever he wants is protected by a 
corresponding claim-right (i.e., John’s claim-right to say whatever he wants). Given 
that John has a protected liberty to say whatever he wants, all others have a duty not 
to interfere with John’s exercise of free speech. 
Moreover, this duty of non-interference is defeasible. A defeasible duty is one 
that, under certain circumstances, reasons to not perform the duty are sufficiently 
compelling such that the non-performance of the duty is permissible. To deduce 
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whether a duty of non-interference is defeasible under certain circumstances, we must 
engage in moral argumentation and deduce whether, on the balance of reasons, the 
reasons for interfering are sufficiently compelling such that the nonperformance of 
that duty is permissible. 
Suppose that people have a moral duty not to interfere with the parenting of 
others. To deduce whether this duty is defeasible under certain circumstances, we 
must engage in moral argumentation and inspect whether sufficiently compelling 
reasons exists such that interfering with the parenting of others under certain 
circumstances is permissible. Say, for example, caring about the wellbeing of children 
is a sufficiently compelling reason to interfere with certain antiquated parenting 
practices (e.g., using a belt to enforce discipline). In this case, a person has a 
compelling moral justification to interfere with a parent who uses a belt to discipline 
his children. Moreover, having the consent of the parent to interfere is immaterial to 
the grounds of whether one should interfere or not. 
I may now finish my argument regarding my claim that issuing a compelling 
justification is more appropriate than receiving consent to permissibly restrict a 
liberty. It is due to the fact that a duty of noninterference is a defeasible duty. To 
decide whether this duty is defeated under the circumstances in question, we engage 
in moral argumentation to find sufficiently compelling reasons to interfere such that, 
on the balance of reasons, they make the non-performance of the duty permissible. 
And having the consent of the interferee, the person who is to be interfered with, is 





On my account, a person may have a compelling justification to interfere with 
X’s performance of y. Given this analysis, a person, Z, owes X a compelling 
justification, if Z has a duty of non-interference, and if Z interferes with X’s 
performance of y. Hence, Z must give X a compelling justification for interfering 
with X’s performance of y, otherwise Z commits a moral wrong. Hence, for instance, 
a state owes John a compelling justification for limiting John’s exercise of free 
speech (e.g., shouting “Fire!” in a crowded theater causes clear and present danger) 
otherwise it commits a moral wrong. 
On the other hand, unprotected liberties, or liberties that are not protected by a 
corresponding claim-right of non-interference, cannot explain why someone owes a 
compelling moral justification for interfering with that liberty. These liberties are 
simply morally permissible actions. They are equivalent to the absence of a moral 
obligation. A corresponding claim-right is needed to explain when a compelling 
moral justification is owed since someone must have violated a duty of non-
interference to owe a compelling moral justification for interfering. And since (again) 
mere liberties are simply the absence of an obligation, there is nothing about them 
that explains why someone owes a justification for violating them. 
The counterexamples that I have given in section 5 were examples of 
unprotected liberties. I gave cases in which a person may restrict the liberty of 
another without justification and without wronging the other person. The reason is 





Even so, skeptics may respond, states still must justify restricting unprotected 
liberties because states systematically restrict unprotected liberties while the cases I 
gave were of ordinary citizens restricting the liberties of others in one-off situations. 
To justify systematic restrictions of people’s unprotected liberties, I argue that 
states must create such restrictions for the reason that it promotes some public good 
or furthers its subjects’ interests. For example, to justify systematically restricting 
people from jaywalking, on my account, a state must enact a law against jaywalking 
for the reason that it promotes public wellbeing or social coordination or etc.  Since a 
state isn’t violating a duty when restricting an unprotected liberty, a state does not 
need a moral justification to restrict unprotected liberties. It simply must have its 
subjects’ interests in mind to create systematic restrictions of unprotected liberties. 
Recall that skeptics claim that the only justificatory grounds for the uses of 
political power without consent is to prevent or nullify a harm. I have defended an 
account in which states can permissibly use political power to make laws and to 
threaten the use of sanctions without consent in non-preventing-harm cases. On my 
account, to permissibly restrict a protected liberty, a state must give a compelling 
moral justification; and to permissibly restrict an unprotected liberty, a state must 
create such a restriction for the reason that it promotes some public good or furthers 
its subject’s interests—it cannot enact restrictions just to satisfy its own whims 
because that would be a case of arbitrary domination. 
I present the deficiency of the skeptics’ view with the following views 





Wide-scope view of protected liberties: All liberties are protected by a cor- 
responding claim-right against others not to interfere with the performance of 
the action specified under that liberty. 
 
Narrow-scope view of protected liberties: Some liberties are protected by a 
corresponding claim-right against others not to interfere with the performance 
of the action specified under that liberty. 
 
Skeptics must hold the wide-scope view because they think that a state acts 
impermissibly when it violates any liberty. Recall also that they believe that each 
person has a general negative right against interference. They believe that each legal 
restriction and each liberty-violation must be morally justified. 
However, I argue that the more modest view, the narrow-scope view, is true. 
All of the examples that I gave in section 5 are counterexamples to the wide-scope 
view. However, Missed the Train is an especially crippling counterexample to the 
wide- scope view. It clearly shows that certain liberties such as getting on the train on 
time aren’t protected by a corresponding claim-right. If getting on the train on time is 
a protected liberty, the stranger owes Jeffrey a compelling moral justification for 
deliberately getting in his way and asking for some change. However, this result 
would be absurd. Hence, we should reject the wide scope view in favour of the 





The implications of my view are that states can permissibly use political 
power when making laws or enforcing them. Skeptics state a challenge which entails 
that most exercises of state power are impermissible. In contrast, I offer a view that 
requires us to look at certain contingent factors to decide when a state impermissibly 
uses political power (i.e., the kind of liberty that was violated, whether a compelling 
moral justification was given, etc.). 
 
7. Why the Entitlement View is Implausible 
 
Entitlement theorists, such as Lockeans, distance themselves considerably from the 
extreme skeptics, or anarchists, that I have addressed in section 5. In this section, I 
show how the Lockean skeptical position on the permissible use of state power is 
distinguished from the extreme skeptic. Finally, I address the Lockean skeptic. 
 The extreme anarchist holds that governments always wield morally 
indefensible political power, and she uses the presumption of liberty as the basis of 
her defense. The Lockean position is distinct from the extreme anarchist in that 
Lockeans hold that states can be justified on rational grounds. In the following 
paragraph, Simmons begins to distance the Lockean skeptic from the extreme 
anarchist, 
 
The background objection against which such attempts to justify the state are 
intended to be mounted must be understood to come from the anarchist, who 




anarchist view, of course, is that anything that is sufficiently coercive 
(hierarchial, inegalitarian, etc.) to count as a state is also necessarily, and for 
that reason, morally indefensible and prudentially irrational.53      
 
Lockeans think that limited states, states that are sufficiently just, are a good bargain 
to non-state alternatives. According to Lockeans, limited states are rationally 
preferable to the state of nature, for a person in the state of nature is subject to all the 
incommodities of insecurity, lawlessness, and vulnerability that living in such a state 
could be expected to involve.”54 In addition, Lockeans recognize that states perform 
many important functions that improve people’s lives. Simmons writes, 
 
[S]tates have the salience and the power to solve various coordination and 
assurance problems, to resolve “Prisoners’ Dilemmas,” to institutionalize and 
enforce rights and justice, to empower the suppression of violence, and so 
on.55 
 
Lockeans are able to distinguish themselves from the extreme skeptic because the 
former makes a distinction between justification and legitimacy. Justification and 
legitimacy are different kinds of moral evaluations of states. For Lockeans, justifying 
a state involves a comparative moral evaluation between states and all feasible non-
state alternatives. Simmons writes, 
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So, I suggest, we can justify the state by showing that some realizable type of 
state is on balance morally permissible (or ideal) and that it is rationally 
preferable to all feasible non-state alternatives. In the course of such a 
justification we will typically argue that certain virtues that states may possess 
or goods they may supply—such as justice or the rule of law—make it a good 
thing to have such states in the world.56  
 
On this analysis, a state could be justified but still be illegitimate. This is because, on 
their view, the requirement to be legitimate involves the satisfaction of a different set 
of conditions. A morally legitimate state has received the unanimous consent from its 
subjects to wield political power.57 Simmons writes, 
 
Political power is morally legitimate, and those subject to it are morally 
obligated to obey, only where the subjects have freely consented to the 
exercise of such power and only where that power continues to be exercised 
within the terms of the consent given.58 
 
A conclusion from this analysis is that a state can wield political power that is 
justified but illegitimate. This is a very poignant point. The upshot is that illegitimate 
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uses of political power lacks legitimate authority. As a result, they are still 
impermissible uses of political power even if they are justified.59  
 On the Lockean view, they lack authority because the source of state authority 
comes from a transfer of rights from the subjects to the state, and that transfer of 
rights occurs only via the receipt of unanimous consent from the governed.60 I have 
already provided an argument that the receipt of consent is immaterial to the 
permissible use of political power. What I now focus on is the part of the Lockean 
view which claims that an entitlement, a right to rule, can be an adequate justification 
for restricting people’s liberties. I argue that it cannot be an adequate justification. To 
begin, let’s take a closer look at the Lockean description of this right. Simmons 
writes, 
A state’s (or government’s) legitimacy is the complex moral right it possesses 
to be the exclusive imposer of binding duties on its subjects, to have its 
subjects comply with these duties, and to use coercion to enforce the duties.61 
 
If Simmons is correct, a state’s possession of this complex moral right would allow it 
to impose binding duties that restrict people’s liberties. What’s at stake is whether 
such a complex moral right can be the source of an appropriate justification to 
permissibly restrict people’s protected liberties.  
 My criticism is that a right to rule lacks the properties of a compelling 
justification to restrict a person’s liberties within a specific context. Those properties 
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include referencing relevant facts and reasons that can only be determined within the 
particular context in which a government proposes a restriction to a protected liberty. 
This conclusion entails that a compelling justification can only be given on a 
contingent basis by an actual legal official who is in the position to weigh competing 
concerns within that particular case.  
To help illuminate and justify my claim, I provide a closer examination of 
Schenck v. United States. In this case, the justices were considering whether the 
defendant’s actions were punishable crimes that violated the Espionage Act of 1917. 
The context of their decision included the fact that United States was fighting in 
World War I at the time.  
The defendants in the case were distributing fliers to draft-aged men, urging 
resistance to induction, which is a criminal offense; in their defense, they stated that 
were exercising their First Amendment rights. A unanimous court, in an opinion 
written by Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes Jr, concluded that the defendants could be 
convicted of an attempt to obstruct the draft because the First Amendment did not 
cover their situation. The court’s justification was that the circumstances of wartime 
allow greater restrictions on free speech than would be allowed during peacetime 
because new and greater dangers are present. Holmes writes, “when a nation is at 
war, many things that might be said in time of peace are such hindrance to its effort 
that their utterance will not be endured so long as men fight, and that no Court could 
regard them as protected by any constitutional right.”62 
 I use Schenck to provide support for the following argument. 
                                               





Premise 1: A compelling justification for restricting a protected liberty must 
reference relevant facts and reasons.63 
 
Premise 1 stipulates criteria for what counts as a compelling justification. 
Since a compelling justification is essentially the conclusion of an argument, critical 
reasoning has us build an argument that consists of relevant facts and reasons as 
premises to develop a compelling justification.  
As a result, a compelling justification must be developed and delivered from a 
legal official who in the appropriate standpoint to assess which facts and reasons are 
relevant within a specific context, the one that is currently under consideration. A 
compelling justification can be given only on a contingent basis because it must be 
built and promulgated to the relevant parties from someone that has judged the 
particular case of a particular defendant. 
 Imagine instead that the defendant in Schenck wanted to seek the counsel of a 
philosopher and asked the philosopher whether the government’s use of political 
power, punishing him for distributing flyers, was permissible. Suppose that the 
philosopher responded that the government has the right to rule, which it obtained 
from the defendant’s free consent on an earlier occasion. Suppose that the defendant 
responds that he didn’t expect the government to enter World War I, a governmental 
action that the defendant disapproves, when he provided his free consent. Suppose 
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that the philosopher responds that what’s relevant is the fact that the government has 
the right to rule, which includes the ability to enter wars and punish people from 
attempting to avoid the draft.64 
 To provide a compelling justification, this philosopher develops an argument 
with the premise that the government as a right to rule; subsequent premises would 
only consider what that right entails; and whether that right applied to this case or not. 
But a right to rule is insensitive to the particular facts that we find in Schenck. This is 
unfortunate because it seems that substantive reasoning requires us to be sensitive to 
relevant facts.  
 
Premise 2: Facts that govern the relevance of a reason are context-sensitive to 
particular facts about the situation in which a government proposes a restriction to a 
protected liberty.65 
 
The facts that govern the relevance of Holmes’s reason are facts that qualify 
as important considerations when assigning proper weight to competing values. When 
a restriction to a protected liberty is proposed, a compelling justification consists of 
an assessment of whether the promotion of a competing value requires a restriction of 
that liberty.  
In Schenck, Holmes’s reason for restricting the defendant’s liberty of free 
speech is that the circumstances of war allow for greater restrictions of a person’s 
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freedom of speech than would be allowable during times of peace. To give a 
compelling justification, Holmes assigned a certain weight to the value of safety in 
comparison to the value of exercising free speech within the very specific context of 
this case.  
  
Conclusion: Facts about the particular context in which a government proposes a 
restriction to a particular liberty governs what counts as a compelling justification for 
restricting that particular liberty within that specific context. 
 
 Holmes would concur with this conclusion. The most often cited passage of 
Holmes’s opinion in Schenck is the following paragraph.  
 
The most stringent protection of free speech would not protect a man in 
falsely shouting fire in a theater and causing a panic. … The question in every 
case is whether the words used are used in such circumstances and are of such 
a nature as to create a clear and present danger that they will bring about the 
substantive evils that Congress has a right to prevent. It is a question of 
proximity and degree.66  
 
It seems that many people agree that the value of exercising one’s freedom of speech 
in certain cases jeopardizes people’s safety to a degree where one is justified in 
assigning greater weight towards protecting people’s safety over protecting one’s 
                                               




exercise of free speech. In the written opinion for Schenck, Holmes gives us his now 
famous example of falsely shouting “Fire!” in a crowded theater.  
Moreover, a proper assignment of weight, as Holmes states, involves the 
considerations of proximity and degree. And the relevance of these considerations is 
context-dependent. If Holmes followed Simmons’s reasoning, in Schenck, all Holmes 
would need to cite in his written opinion is the United States’ right to rule. 
This conclusion entails that a “right to rule” is too general to serve as a 
compelling justification for restricting protected liberties. A general “right to rule” 
cannot settle a conflict between competing values within specific contexts. 
A response from the entitlement theorist is that Holmes has a right to rule, 
which provides him the legitimate authority to settle the conflict between values.67 
For the sake of argument, suppose that Simmons’s is correct about the fact that a right 
to rule confers legitimate authority to a government. Simmons has provided the 
poignant position that a state could be justified but still be illegitimate. An implication 
of my discussion is that a government could be legitimate, on Simmons’s terms, but 
still be unjustified. It uses political power in an unjustified, i.e., impermissible, 
manner where it lacks a compelling justification for restricting a protected liberty. 
This conclusion is unfortunate for Simmons because he claims that people are 
morally bound to obey the laws of a legitimate state authority. But Simmons’s 
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position entails that citizens are morally bound to obey laws that lack a compelling 
justification.  
 
8. Conclusion  
 
In this paper, I address central complaints that skeptics have regarding the 
permissibility of exercising political power. I have argued that it is not wrong for the 
state to restrict any morally permissible actions without a compelling moral 
justification; it is problematic only if the state restricts a special class of liberties 
without a compelling moral justification. And it is a contingent matter whether a legal 












This essay is on what authority is, and what authority is not. Orthodoxy has it that 
authority is a species of power over others, regardless of whether that power is de 
facto or de jure. I argue that the orthodoxy is false. Instead, I argue that authority is a 
status that authorizes a person to change one’s normative situation. 
 Two questions frame the discussion of this paper. 
 (1) What is “authority”?68 
Question (1) is a conceptual question. In this paper, I explore what this question is 
asking prior to answering it. 
 (2) What is a proper method for deriving a correct answer to the first 
question? 
Question (2) asks us to figure out a proper method for answering the conceptual 
question. A method is a technique that theorists use to explain, study, or develop 
accurate findings about some phenomenon. Question (2) is just as important as 
question (1). In my perspective, most theorists have not given enough consideration 






to the method that they use towards answering the first question, and this result is 
detrimental to their argument, or so I argue. 
 This paper is structured as follows. In section 2, I establish certain important 
constraints that a good method for conceptual analysis observes. In section 3, I 
describe a simple method that a theorist might use for discovering conceptual truths 
about a concept. In section 4, I show why the simple method is unreliable. In section 
5, I describe the paradigmatic method, a method that I claim is the dominant method 
for understanding “authority” among theorists who study the concept “authority”. 
Note that any theorist who appeals to our intuitions about what counts as a “clear” or 
“paradigm” case of authority as a premise in her argument is a user of the 
paradigmatic method. In section 6, I demonstrate that the paradigmatic method is 
unreliable for the same reason that the simple method is unreliable. In section 7, I 
provide counterexamples that show that the control model of authority, which is the 
result of using the paradigmatic method, is incorrect. This conclusion should be 
unsurprising if the paradigmatic method is unreliable at producing a correct answer. 
In section 8, I present an objection that the standard theorist may give and provide a 
reply. In section 9, I present my definition for “authority” and explain the method that 
I use to develop it. In addition, I discuss the implications of my account and respond 
to some objections. In section 10, I conclude the paper. 
2. Some constraints for a good method 
 
 





 I begin with a modest proposal that any good method ought to observe. A 
good method is, at minimum, reliable at producing a correct answer. 
A1: A good method reliably produces a correct answer. 
 The next constraint tells us what kind of object forms a correct answer in 
conceptual analysis. This question delves into major debates that form some of the 
deepest divides concerning the status of conceptual analysis and the nature of 
philosophy itself (Chalmers 1996, Jackson 1998, DePaul & Ramsey 1998, Block & 
Stalnaker 1999), where the study of concepts is at center of these disputes. I take the 
classical approach, which states that concepts have a definitional structure (Margolis 
& Laurence 1999). For the classical approach, a correct answer takes the form of an 
accurate definition.  
A2: A good method is reliable at producing an accurate definition for the 
concept under study. 
The next constraint tells us what an accurate definition of a concept helps us 
understand. For theorists who study the concept “authority”, it widely assumed that it 
is the task of a philosopher to discover and explain what the nature of that 
phenomenon is—i.e., what the nature of the concept under study is (Dickson 2001, ch 
1, Schauer 2010).69 
A3: A good method is reliable at producing an accurate definition that helps us 
understand the nature of the concept under study. 





This task, explaining the nature of a concept, requires a philosopher to explain 
what it is for some phenomenon—e.g., law, coercion, authority—to have a nature, 
and what it is for a theorist to attempt to ascertain the nature of that concept. This 
topic is very controversial (See Dickson 2001, p.17, Green 2008, p.1036, Ehrenberg 
2009, p. 91, Raz 1994, 1996, 2005). But, again, I take the standard view governing 
what a theorist is doing when she attempts to ascertain the nature of a concept.70 The 
standard view is that understanding the nature of a concept requires discovering its 
necessary and essential properties. A necessary property is a proposition about the 
concept under study that is necessarily true, as opposed to being contingently true. An 
essential property is a proposition about the concept under study that is not only a 
necessarily true proposition about the concept but is also one that is a constitutive 
feature of that concept (Dickson 2001, ch 1). It makes the concept is what it is. On 
this view, the task of explaining the nature of a concept consists of describing its 
essential properties. Thus, we may derive another constraint governing a good method 
for conceptual analysis. 
A4: A good method is reliable at determining the essential properties of the 
concept under study. 
Finally, since an essential property is also a necessary property, another constraint 
governing a good method for conceptual analysis is as follows. 





A5: A good method is reliable at determining which properties are necessary 
truths about the concept under study. 
These constraints have the following relationship among them. If a method 
violates constraint A5, it also violates A4. If a property is not a necessary property, it 
cannot be an essential property. If a method violates constraint A4, it also violates 
constraint A3. We need to know which properties are the essential elements of the 
concept under study in order to understand its nature. Finally, due to certain standard 
assumptions regarding conceptual analysis, if a method violates constraint A2, it also 
violates constraint A1. This result would be unfortunate. If a method violates A1, then 
we should reject its use. We shouldn’t use any method that is less than reliable at 
producing a correct answer.  
 In sum, in this section, I have established certain constraints governing a good 
method for conceptual analysis.  
 
3. A simple method 
 
 
In this section, I describe a simple method that a theorist might use to discover 
necessary and essential properties of a concept.  
In conceptual analysis, philosophers take themselves to be discovering 
objective truths about a concept, i.e., truths that are observer-independent. This aim 




observer-independent truths, about the concept that they are studying? A simple 
method provides a solution via four general major steps. 
 The first step of this method is as follows. 
 Step 1: Pick cases of that concept. 
For the concept “bird”, on this method, we start with an examination of what we take 
to be cases of the concept “bird”. For instance, we might examine penguins, eagles, 
hawks, humming birds, and so on. The following diagram is a representation of this 
examination. 
 Examining Cases of a Concept 
Suppose that each box represents a case of the concept “bird”. Suppose further 
that each lower-case letter represents a feature of that case.  
	
	 	
The next step is used to deduce necessary truths about the concept under study from 
our examination of cases. 











From the above diagram, all the examined cases of the concept “bird” share features 
“j” and “k”. Suppose that “j” is the feature of “having feathers” and that k is the 
feature of “being warm-blooded”. We reach the following proposition.  
B1: All the examined cases of the concept “bird” share the features of having 
feathers and being warm-blooded. 
According to the simple method, we can infer that our examination has produced a 
necessary truth about the concept under study if we make the following inference.   
Step 3: Make the inference that one’s examination from Step 2 has produced 
necessary truths about the concept. 
Continuing the example of the concept “bird”, for this step, a theorist makes the 
inference that having feathers and being warm-blooded are necessary truths of the 
concept “bird”. From B1, this theorist asserts the following proposition. 
B2: Having feathers and being warm-blooded are necessary properties of the 
concept “bird”. 
This statement, B2, becomes a premise in an argument that a theorist makes regarding 
the essential properties of the concept “bird” when she takes the next step. 
Step 4: Make a sound argument about the essential features of the concept 





Our theorist might reason that, since other mammals are also warm-blooded, what 
demarcates birds from other mammals is that birds have feathers. As a result, this 
theorist might reason that having feathers is an essential feature of the concept “bird”. 
That is, having feathers is what makes a bird is what it is. Hence, this theorist reaches 
the following conclusion. 
 B3: Having feathers is the essential property of the concept “bird”. 
At this point, from using the simple method, a theorist has derived a conclusion that 
allows her to produce a theory about the nature of the concept “bird”. She may then 
build a definition for the concept “bird” from her conclusion. 
 In sum, the simple method is ambitious in that it attempts to derive a true fact, 
an observer independent truth, about a concept through an examination of cases of 
that concept. 
4.  Why is the simple method unreliable? 
 
 
In this section, I argue that the simple method is unreliable and discuss the main 
reason for this criticism. 
 On the simple method, to make a sound argument in Step 4, a theorist must 
use true premises. The premises that a theorist uses ultimately come from the 
examined cases that a theorist studies in order to deduce necessary truths about the 
concept under study. To deduce that her examination has produced necessary truths, a 





Representative Sample: If all our examined cases of the concept C have 
feature j, and our examined cases is a representative sample of the population, 
i.e., all the cases of the C, then feature j is a necessary truth about C. 
Representative Sample tells us that, for a theorist to succeed, she must appeal to a 
constraint in statistical reasoning: the cases that we examine are a good representation 
of the phenomenon that we are studying. The population, on this analysis, consists of 
all the cases of a concept. This set of cases is an observer-independent fact. What 
counts as a representative sample of the population is an observer-independent fact as 
well.  
We can put Representative Sample in the form of a question. 
Are the examined cases a good representative sample of the population such 
that we can deduce necessary truths about the concept under study? 
The following counterexample shows why examining a representative sample is 
needed to reliably produce necessary truths from our examination. 
The Penguin Counterexample 
Suppose that the following suppositions are true. 




We live on a continent that is native to only birds that have an ability to fly 
and have no access to continents that is native to birds that do not have the 
ability to fly. 
The boxes are cases of the concept “bird”.  
Feature “j” represents the feature “ability to fly”. 
We examined only the cases in Set A for discovering the essential elements of 
the concept “bird”. 






If we examined only the cases in Set A, we could reasonably infer that the ability to 
fly is a necessary truth about the concept “bird”. Nevertheless, our inference would 
still be invalid due to the fact that not all birds have the ability to fly. Possessing the 
ability to fly is not a necessary truth about the concept “bird”. This analysis shows 
that examining an unrepresentative sample is unreliable at deducing necessary truths 
because there are scenarios where we may reasonably infer that a contingently true 
proposition is a necessary truth.  
j, 












This analysis supports the conclusion that a theorist cannot reliably determine 
which properties are necessary truths about a concept without examining a 
representative sample of the population. The simple method tells a theorist to simply 
choose cases. But simply choosing cases does not guarantee that a theorist is 
examining a representative sample. The upshot is that the simple method violates 
constraint A5—i.e., it does not reliably determine which properties constitute 
necessary truths about the concept under study. This result entails that it is also 
unreliable at producing true claims about which properties are essential to the concept 
under examination, and this result is a violation of constraint A4. Thus, the simple 
method also violates constraint A3—i.e., it does not reliably produce a definition that 
tells us the nature of the concept under study. Hence, it also violates A2—i.e., it does 
not reliably produce an accurate definition. As a final result, it also violates constraint 
A1—i.e., it is not reliable at producing a correct answer. And this principal is a very 
modest constraint that any method that is used in an attempt to obtain a correct 
answer to a question should observe. 
 In sum, the simple method is unreliable because it provides a poor 
justification for determining which cases count as a representative set of the concept 
under study. It tells us to simply pick some cases. As a result, the simple method 
assumes away the very problem that it is supposed to diagnosis—i.e., do the cases 





5. The paradigmatic method  
 
 
In this section, I describe the paradigmatic method, a method that I claim is the 
dominant method for understanding “authority” among theorists who study the 
concept “authority”. Note that any theorist who appeals to our intuitions about what 
counts as a “clear” or “paradigm” case of authority as a premise in her argument is a 
user of the paradigmatic method.  
I present two approaches towards describing the underlying reasoning process 
of the paradigmatic method. The first way consists of presenting a simplified model 
of the paradigmatic method. The simplified model of the paradigmatic method is the 
subject matter of section 4.1. The second approach to presenting the paradigmatic 
method consists of stipulating the unique turns in reasoning that a user of the 
paradigmatic method takes. This presentation of the paradigmatic method is the 
subject matter of section 4.2.  
In section 4.3, I provide a flow chart that shows how the distinctions about 
“authority” and positions on legitimate authority all share the same underlying 
premise: “authority” is a species of power over others. I call this position “the control 
model of authority” (hereafter, “control model” for shorter reference). The control 
model is the result of using the paradigmatic method. 
 





In this section, I provide a model of the paradigmatic method. This model is supposed 
to be a representation of the core steps of the underlying reasoning process of 
theorists who use the paradigmatic method. 
Before I begin discussing this model in detail, I provide the following note: 
This model is a simple representation of the general steps in reasoning of theorists 
who use the paradigmatic method. The details of each theorist’s conclusions differ, 
but this model tells us something important about the core of their underlying 
reasoning: how is that they can persuasively appeal to what counts as a “clear” or 
“paradigm” case of the concept “authority” in their argument when it is unknown 
what constraints determine membership to the population of the concept “authority”.  
 
 A Simple Model of the Paradigmatic Method 
 The stipulations of this model are as follows: 
(1) A theorist examines potential cases of the concept “authority”. 
(2) The boxes represent potential cases of the concept “authority”. 
(3) The theorist demarcates the cases into two sets: Set A and Set B. 
(4) Each letter, “j” and “k”, represents a feature of each case. 
(5) The letter “k” is the feature “telling someone else what to do”. 
(6) Feature “j” is unknown, at first, but discoverable from examining what 




(7) The theorist makes an appeal to our intuitions about which cases test 
“positive” as bona fide cases of the concept “authority”. 
(8) For cases in Set A, the theorist forecasts that our intuition will test 
“positive”, and she uses this forecast as part of her argument. 
(9) For cases in Set B, the theorist forecasts that our intuition will test 






This model’s core attribute is how it picks cases for further examination for 
understanding the nature of the concept “authority”. It exclusively picks cases that 
have the feature of “telling someone else what to do”.  This core attribute comes from 
the reasoning that “paradigmatic” or “clear” cases of the concept “authority” are cases 
where a person is giving another person or group of people directives, rules, or 
commands to follow. This core attribute is the defining feature of the paradigmatic 
method. 
 The following points are the rest of the core steps in the reasoning process of a 
theorist who uses the paradigmatic method: 
j, 













Each theorist rejects that feature “k”, telling someone else what to do, is the 
essential feature of the concept “authority”—albeit, it remains as a necessary 
property of the concept “authority”.  
Each theorist believes that it is important to explain how feature “k”, telling someone 
else what to do, is distinguished in authority cases from non-authority cases. To 
perform this examination, she discovers a feature that cases that test positive for 
“authority” have that cases that test negative for “authority” do not have. 
Each theorist concludes that cases in Set A have feature “j” and that cases in 
Set B do not have feature “j”.  
For each theorist, feature “j” explains why feature “k”, telling someone else what to 
do, is different in authority cases from non-authority cases. Often, they assume that 
the difference has to do with the fact that telling someone what to do is justified or 
successful in the authority case but not justified or successful in the non-authority 
case. 
Each theorist provides an argument that feature “j” is an essential feature of 
the concept “authority”. 
At this point, the theorist ends with a theory about the concept “authority”. The theory 
is usually a definition about some aspect about the concept “authority”71 or a 






definition for the concept “authority” (Anscombe 1978, Enoch 2014, Friedman 1973, 
Hobbes 1991[2003], Ladenson 1980, Simmons 1979, 1993, 2001, Raz 1979[2002], 
1985, Ripstein 2003, Wolff 1970). 
 The following excerpt from Robert Paul Wolff (1970) demonstrates how 
closely this model fits his study of the concept “authority”. Wolff writes, 
Authority is the right to command, and correlatively, the right to be obeyed. It 
must be distinguished from power, which is the ability to compel compliance, 
either through the use of the threat of force. When I turn over my wallet to a 
thief who is holding me at gunpoint, I do so because the fate with which he 
threatens me is worse than the loss of money which I am made to suffer. I 
grant that he has power over me, but I would hardly suppose that he has 
authority, that is, that he has a right to demand my money and that I have an 
obligation to give it to him. When the government presents me with a bill for 
taxes, on the other hand, I pay it (normally) even though I do not wish to, and 
even if I think I can get away with not paying. It is, after all, the duly 
constituted government, and hence it has a right to tax me. It has authority 
over me. Sometimes, of course, I cheat the government, but even so, I 
acknowledge its authority, for who would speak of “cheating” a thief? (Ibid, 
20-21). 
In the first sentence, Wolff starts with a definition for the concept “authority”. 
This definition tells us what, according to Wolff, are the essential features of the 




be obeyed. The rest of the paragraph shows us how Wolff has reasoned to this 
definition for “authority”. 
Wolff argues for his definition for “authority” from examining two types of 
cases: robbers and governments. For each case, an entity is telling Wolff to hand over 
his money to the respective entity. In referring to these two types of cases, Wolff is 
appealing to our intuitions, and his own, about which type of case tests “positive” for 
being a case of the concept “authority”. Wolff forecasts that our intuitions will test 
“positive” for government cases and test “negative” for robber cases, or else his 
argument is a non-starter. Wolff reinforces this intuition with the reason that it doesn’t 
make sense to cheat a thief while it makes sense to cheat one’s government. 
Furthermore, Wolff argues that what distinguishes government cases from 
robber cases—that is, with respect to the feature of telling people to hand over their 
money—is that governments have a right to rule—or, more specifically, in this case, a 
right to tax—that robbers do not have. The possession of this right is the essential 
property of “authority”, according to Wolff’s analysis, because it demarcates 
governments from robbers. Finally, Wolff’s reasoning process concludes with a 
definition for the concept “authority”—i.e., a right to rule and a right to be obeyed.  
This exegesis of Wolff’s argument shows how well the simplified model of 
the paradigmatic method fits Wolff’s reasoning process. Moreover, I have chosen to 




premise in his argument for the existence of a dilemma, “the problem of authority”.72 
Wolff’s version of the problem of authority questions how it can be rational to 
surrender one’s judgment to another? Wolff’s dilemma, the problem of authority, has 
been one of the most influential discussions on authority in contemporary 
philosophical literature. One could easily argue that the literature on authority has 
grown as a response to Wolff’s dilemma.73 The literature on authority has largely 
grown in response to Wolff’s analysis that is perhaps a paradigm case of a theorist 
who uses the paradigmatic method. 
In this section, I have explained the underlying reasoning process of theorists 
who appeal to our intuitions of what counts as a case of the concept “authority” as 
premises in their argument that develops a definition for “authority”. 
 
5.2 The paradigmatic method with more context 
 
 
In this section, I provide more substantive context of the reasoning of theorists who 
use the paradigmatic method than what the simplified model of the paradigmatic 
method provides.  












 The paradigmatic method uniquely determines which turns in reasoning that a 
theorist who uses it takes—albeit, theorists reach different conclusions about 
“authority” from using it. Although they reach different conclusions, philosophers 
who use the paradigmatic method uniformly reach the same broad conclusion: the 
conditions that make an authority legitimate or justified are the same elements that 
constitute the essential features of the concept “authority”.  
As we shall see, the theorists who conclude with a definition for “authority”, 
or a definition for an aspect about “authority”, provide a definition that refers to the 
grounds for authority—i.e., the conditions that make authority legitimate or justified. 
For instance, as we have already seen, Wolff defines “authority” as a right to rule and 
a right to be obeyed. For a number of important theorists, the actual receipt of this 
correlative right makes the authority in question legitimate (Wolff 1970, Simmons 
1979, 2001). 
The point of this section is to examine why this uniformity exists—i.e., why 
do philosophers, who use the paradigmatic method, uniformly think that the 
conditions for legitimacy are the same elements that define the concept “authority”. 
The existence of this uniformity can be attributed to the following three general major 
steps.  
Step 1: A theorist takes some action or feature of a clear case of authority to 





What kinds of cases that a theorist uses is important, for the theorist attempts to 
discover which elements are essential to the concept “authority” from the cases that 
she examines. The standard theorists use exclusively examples of someone telling 
another person what to do or an example of a type of entity that is usually known for 
telling other people what to do (e.g., governmental authorities). These types of cases 
are supposed to be clear cases of the concept “authority”. 
For instance, in “Authority and Reason-Giving”, David Enoch (2014) opens 
his paper with a case of parental authority. He writes,  
Arguably, you have authority over your 7 year-old son. This means, perhaps 
among other things, that you can, by your mere say-so, create duties for your 
son. You just have to tell him to go to his room, and suddenly he is under a 
duty to go to his room, a duty that just until a minute ago he did not have. 
Suddenly, by not going to his room—something that until just a minute ago 
was perfectly permissible for him to do—he will be acting wrongly? How did 
this magic happen? (Enoch 2014, 296). 
Enoch uses a case of parental authority where you are telling your 7 year-old son to 
go to his room. What Enoch takes significant for further analysis is the fact that your 
mere say-so creates a duty for your son. Other standard theorists have a similar 
analysis. What each theorist takes to be significant about her case presupposes the 




To verify the truth of this observation, I provide a sample of the type of cases 
that theorist cite for discovering the essential elements for the concept “authority”. 
The following list is such a sample. 
Wolff: robber, governmental entity (1970). 
Ladenson: governmental entity (Ladenson 1980). 
Raz: arbitrator, court judge, legislative entity (Raz 1985) 
Green: governmental entity (Green 1988).  
Enoch: parental authority, governmental entity, dean, emergency 
situations, a dictator’s son (Enoch 2014).74 
All these cases fit a certain type. I call them “authority over conduct” cases.75 
“Authority over conduct” cases all share the feature of telling another person what to 
do. All these cases have the feature of a person or entity giving commands, directives, 
or rules for other people to follow. Moreover, in all these cases, “authority” results in 
controlling another person’s actions or behaviors. For telling another person what to 
do is a mechanism used to control another person’s actions or behaviors.  
Step 2: A theorist provides an argument that develops the conditions for that 
feature to be justified or legitimate. 










 When someone, Person A, commands or directs another person, Person B, to 
perform some action in an authoritative manner, it is widely agreed that Person A 
requires Person B to surrender to Person A’s judgement. Most theorists concede that it 
is problematic for Person A to require the “surrendering of private judgment”, 
“deference”, and “submission” to Person A’s commands or directives. How authority 
can be justified in requiring the surrender of one’s judgment has been called one of 
the “foremost puzzles” on authority (Raz 1979 [2002], Murphy 1997).76 
 This issue has been called the “problem of authority”, and responding to it has 
been the starting point for discovering the essential elements that make up the concept 
“authority” for nearly all theorists who attempt to define “authority”. The result is that 
a theorist provides an argument that stipulates the conditions for when telling another 
person what to do is justified or legitimate. 
 The standard theorists think that the conditions that make an authority 
legitimate or justified are the same elements that constitute the essential features of 
the concept “authority”. I demonstrate that the reason for this result is due to the cases 
that they examine. 
 The types of cases that the standard theorists examine suggest that the 
conditions that give Person A authority are the very same conditions that ground 
Person A’s authority over Person B’s conduct. Let’s examine these cases in detail. 
  






Robber: A robber tells a victim to hand over her wallet. 
 
Parent: Jack tells his son to pick up his toys. 
 
Stranger: John tells a passerby to mow his lawn. 
 
State: A government tells a citizen what to do. 
 
Most people agree that robbers do not have authority over their victims and that 
strangers do not have authority over other strangers. In addition, barring exceptional 
circumstances, most agree that parents have authority over their children. However, it 
is controversial whether governments have authority over their subjects.  
 
In the table below, I summarize the intuitions that people, theorists and 
laypeople alike, would probably have about these cases. My claim is that theorists 






                                               
77	Theorist	forecasts	and	appeals	to	common	intuitions	about	these	type	of	cases.		
Figure 1: Appeal to Our Common 









The question “Case of Authority?” asks if people often have a positive 
intuition that the respective case counts as a case of authority. If the response is “yes”, 
the case tests positive for the variable “authority”. If the response is “no”, the case 
tests negative for the variable “authority”.  If the response is “controversial”, it is 
controversial what people think about the case. 
The question “Legitimate?” asks if people often have a positive intuition that 
the respective case counts as a case of a legitimate authority. If the response is “yes”, 
the case tests positive for the variable “legitimate”. If the response is “no”, the case 
tests negative for the variable “legitimate”. If the response is “controversial”, it is 
controversial what people think about the case.78 
The reason that I talk about “authority” and “legitimate” in terms of variables 
is that we do not know exactly what reference they have—e.g., what element that 
each variable refers to. Nonetheless, we usually think that there is some relationship 
between them. 








 The table shows that, among these cases, “authority” has a co-extensive 
relationship with the variable “legitimate”: the cases that test positive for “authority” 
also test positive for “legitimate”. A co-extensive relationship suggests that 
“legitimate” is a necessary variable for “authority”. A case is not a case of “authority” 
unless it is “legitimate”. 
 The table also shows that, among these cases, “authority” has a dependent 
relationship upon “legitimate”. The cases that test positive for “authority” test 
positive because it also tests positive for “legitimate”. The cases that test negative for 
“authority” test negative because it also tests negative for “legitimate”. A dependent 
relationship suggests that “legitimate” is an essential variable to “authority”.  
 Moreover, in the controversial case, Government, people often think that if a 
government has authority, it is because it legitimate. Thus, our intuitions in the 
Government only confirms the above results. 
 From examining these types of cases, people often come to the following 
conclusion: 
 
Legitimacy is a necessary and an essential element to authority. 
 







Step 3: A theorist provides a definition for “authority” that is identical to the 
conditions for legitimacy that she has identified in the previous step. 
Below are some examples. 
G.E.M. Anscombe: “Authority on the part of those who give orders and make 
regulations is: a right to be obeyed. More amply, we may say: authority is a 
regular right to be obeyed in a domain of decision,” (Anscombe 1978, 144).  
Robert Paul Wolff: “Authority is the right to command, and correlatively, the 
right to be obeyed,” (Wolff 1970, 20).  
Joseph Raz: “Authority is ability to change reasons. Power is ability to 
change a special type of reasons, namely protected ones...we should regard 
authority basically as a species of power,” (Raz 1979 [2002], 19).  
David Enoch: “So authority is an instance of the power to give reasons 
robustly,” (Enoch 2014, 300). “And so we get that authority consists in the 
Hohfeldian power to create duties or something close enough to duties (some 
suitably delineated quasi-protected reasons),” (Enoch 2014, 322). 
Each theorist provides a definition for authority that is identical to what the theorist 
takes to be the conditions for the authority to be justified or legitimate.  
 In sum, I have shown why theorists uniformly think that the conditions for 





5.3 The control model 
 
 
In this section, I discuss how the control model is the result of using the paradigmatic 
method. Moreover, I show how distinctions about authority and positions on 
legitimate authority all share the premise that “authority” is a species of power over. 
 The following claim from Steven Lukes presents the general consensus on the 
topic of authority: “authority appears to be part of that network of control concepts 
that includes power, coercion, force, manipulation, and persuasion, etc,” (Lukes 1987 
[1990], 206). In my view, the reason for this consensus is due to the cases that they 
examine. They only examine cases that corroborate the idea that authority is 
necessarily tied to controlling another person’s behaviors. 
As a result, the standard theorists exclusively examine “authority over 
conduct” cases.  “Authority over conduct” is about having some (normative) power 
that allows one to (legitimately) control another’s behaviors. This kind of authority is 
exercised over other people. It is also usually thought that only certain types of 
authorities have this kind of authority—e.g., state authorities, parents, etc.79  
“Authority over conduct” is synonymous with “power over”: To have 
authority over someone is to have power over that person’s conduct. And if the 
concept “authority” refers to what gives someone power over the conduct of others, 
the following claim holds. 








Authority is a species of “power over”. 
 The above statement is not precise enough to be an adequate definition for 
“authority”, but it offers a theorist a clear direction towards developing one. To be 
more precise, a theorist would need to specify which species of “power over” that 
“authority” is. And that is exactly what the standard theorists do to develop a 
definition for “authority”.  I call this model of developing a definition for the concept 
“authority” the “control model”. On the control model, to develop a definition for 
“authority”, a theorist specifies which species of “power over” that the concept 
“authority” is. 
 The control model is the result of using the paradigmatic method. A user of 
the paradigmatic method exclusively uses “authority over conduct” cases for 
discovering the essential properties of the concept “authority” because these cases 
count as clear cases of the concept “authority”. 
The literature on authority has largely developed on a major distinction 
between de jure authority and de facto authority. This distinction usually comes first 
in an exegesis about major debates on authority or the literature of authority in 
general. For instance, in the first major section of his entry “Authority” in the 





Let us start with the distinctions between political authority as a normative 
notion (or morally legitimate authority) and political authority as a non-
normative notion (or de facto authority) and between political authority in 
either of these senses and political power. To say that a state has authority in 
the normative sense is to say something normative about the relationship 
between the state and its subjects. This is the relationship that we will 
concentrate on in what follows.  
As Christiano’s quote points out, philosophers make the distinction between de facto 
and de jure authority because they that we should distinguish “authority” from the de 
facto use of power over people. For philosophers, “authority” is the use of a 
normative power over people’s behaviors. This distinction is usually the accepted 
starting point of a theory on authority.  
 Notice, however, that the de jure and de facto distinction presupposes the 
proposition that authority is a species of power over. De jure power is a species of a 
normative power over people’s conduct. De facto power is a species of an effective 
power over people’s conduct. In other words, de jure power and de facto power are 
the broadest types of “power over”. 
 Philosophers usually think that “authority” is a type of de jure power (for e.g., 
Raz 1985, Enoch 2014). In contrast, social scientists usually think that “authority” is a 
type of de facto power (Weber 1918[1970]). In the development of their view, 
philosophers often quickly reject the position that social scientists hold on authority 




“authority” is. The end result is that the standard theorists develop a definition for 
“authority” that references a species of a normative power over others. The three most 
basic accounts define “authority” as a “right to rule” (Hobbes 1991[2003], Wolff 
1970, Simmons 1979, 1993, 2001),80 “ability to impose duties” (Enoch 2014),81 and 
“justified coercion” (Ladenson 1980).  And Raz’s (1979[2002], 1985) influential 
account defines “authority” as the “ability to change reasons”. 
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The upshot is that the literature on “authority” has developed upon one major 
underlying premise: “authority” is a species of power over. The substantive result is 
that nearly all theorists who study “authority” have a theory of authority that fits the 
control model, one that assumes that “authority” is a species of power over. I have 
argued that this result isn’t surprising because nearly all theorists use the paradigmatic 
method to discover the essential elements of the concept “authority”. Nonetheless, all 
these theories of authority stand and fall upon one major underlying premise—i.e., 
“authority” is a species of power over. 
 
6. The problem of the existence of a pattern of false negative cases 
 
 
In this section, I describe the problem of the existence of a pattern of false negative 
cases. I argue that the mere possible existence of a pattern of false negative cases 
show that the paradigmatic method is unreliable at producing a correct answer. 
 The paradigmatic method makes an improvement upon the simple method in 
that it provides a justification for choosing which cases are further examined for 
discovering which elements constitute the essential properties of the concept 
“authority”. It tells us to pick “clear” or “paradigm” cases of the concept “authority”. 
In contrast, the simple method tells us to simply pick cases. As a result, the simple 
method provides no guidance of how to choose a representative sample of the 
population. On the other hand, the paradigmatic method tells us that a representative 




 Perhaps, the reason why the paradigmatic prescribes a theorist to choose 
“clear” or “paradigm” cases of the concept “authority” is that choosing “clear” or 
“paradigm” cases guarantees that the theorist is choosing true positive cases. True 
positive cases, on this analysis, are cases that are correctly identified as true cases of 
the concept under study. For the concept “authority”, these cases are the cases that are 
correctly identified to be true cases of the concept “authority”. For instance, parent 
cases are often treated as true positive cases of the concept “authority”.82 Hence, a 
charitable reading of the paradigmatic method states that choosing true positive cases 
allows a theorist to examine cases that are a representative sample of the 
population—i.e., all of cases of the concept “authority”. 
  Nonetheless, I argue that choosing only true positive cases is insufficient 
toward reasonably inferring that a theorist is examining a sample that is representative 
of the population. There could be a pattern of false negative cases, ones that show that 
a feature that a theorist takes to be essential property of the concept under study is 
only contingently true. False negative cases, on this analysis, are cases that are 
incorrectly identified to be false cases of the concept under study.  
 A Pattern of False Negative Cases 
 Suppose that the following suppositions are true. 








(1) The boxes represent cases of the concept “authority”. 
(2) The letter “j” represents the feature of “being legitimate”. 
(3) The letter “k” represents an unknown feature of the case. 
(4) Clear cases of the concept “authority”, ones that fit the control model, are 
cases in Set A. 
(5) Unexamined cases of the concept “authority”, ones that do not fit the 
control model, are the cases in Set B. 





From these suppositions, the first observation to make is that choosing “clear” 
cases creates a selection effect. A selection effect, on this analysis, is the event where 
a theorist selects a collection of cases due to a feature that all the cases share. On the 
control model, all the cases share the feature of exhibiting “authority over conduct”. 
A selection effect causes a selection bias.83 A selection bias occurs when one’s 
selection of cases is not representative of the population. A selection bias is 










problematic when the unexamined cases shows that a feature that we take to be 
essential to a concept is more particular to the kinds of cases that we are examining—
mainly due to another particular feature that these kinds of cases share.84  
In our situation, the selection effect of choosing “clear” cases governs which 
cases are further examined for discovering the essential elements that make up the 
concept “authority”. However, if there is a selection bias, there may be a pattern of 
false negative cases, which shows that feature j is only a contingently true proposition 
about the concept “authority”. That is, feature j is true for only a subset of cases of the 
concept “authority”. Yet, the selection effect of choosing “clear” cases has us 
reasonably infer that j is not only a necessary feature but also a candidate for being an 
essential property of the concept “authority”.  
A Pattern of False Negative Cases suggests that the following conclusion is 
true: Since concerns about legitimacy are only applicable to “authority over conduct” 
cases, the feature of “being legitimate” may be a feature that is more particular to 
“authority over conduct” cases rather than being a necessarily true proposition about 
the concept “authority”. 
 I return to the Penguin Counterexample as an analogical counterargument to 
argue for this result. In the Penguin Counterexample, we have a bias towards 
thinking that all birds have the ability to fly. This bias results in the inference that 







there are no non-flying cases of the concept “bird”, such as penguins. However, if we 
examined penguins, we would see that the following results are true. 
(1) Flying cases are only a subset of all the cases of the concept “bird”. 
Thus, 
(2) The feature of “having the ability to fly” is only a contingently true 
element about the concept “bird”. (This conclusion follows from (1).) 
Thus, 
(3) Some other element, other than the ability to fly, must be the essential 
element of the concept “bird”. (This conclusion follows from (2).) 
 
The following case is the equivalent of the Penguin Counterexample with 
respect to the concept “authority”. (Many more similar cases will be examined at the 
end of section 7.) 
 
Sex Refusal: John pressures Jane to have sex with him, but Jane refuses. 
 
In this situation, Jane does not exert power over John’s conduct when she 




also does not hold pervasive authority over a body of people or spheres of activity. 
Yet, Jane has the authority to refuse giving John her permission to have sex with her.  
A theorist may have a bias towards thinking that Sex Refusal does not count as 
a case of the concept “authority” because it is unclear whether it counts as a case or 
not. But, if it did count as a case, we would reach the following conclusions. 
(1’) Legitimacy cases are only a subset of all the cases of the concept 
“authority”. 
An examination of whether Jane is a legitimate authority does not apply in her 
case. She simply has the authority to refuse to have sex with John. As we can see, 
examining what makes an authority legitimate is only applicable to “authority over 
conduct” cases. In contrast, Sex Refusal is an example of an “authority to” case. 
Thus, 
(2’) The feature of possessing legitimacy is only contingently true element 
about the concept “authority” (follows from 1’). 
The possession of legitimacy is only a contingently true element because it is only 
applicable to “authority over conduct” cases, which is a only subset of all cases of the 
concept “authority”. Thus, 
(3’) Some other element, other than the element that makes an authority 






An element that is true for only a subset of cases cannot be the element that is 
essential to the concept “authority”. 
So far, what I have argued is that the above conclusions would follow if there 
were an existing pattern of false negatives cases. I now argue that it is likely that there 
is an existing pattern of false negatives from choosing “clear” cases. However, just 
the mere existence of this possibility entails that we cannot reasonably infer that 
examining only “clear” cases (or “authority over conduct” cases) provides a 
representative sample.  
In turn, this result entails that we cannot reasonably infer that the paradigmatic 
method is reliable at producing conceptual truths about the concept “authority”.  This 
result is a violation of A5. Given a violation of A5, the final conclusion is that we 
ought to reject using the paradigmatic method because it is unreliable at producing a 
correct answer. To note, this rejection of the paradigmatic method is the same reason 
that we ought to reject the simple method. 
I now make good on this final argument for this section. If we leave “authority 
to” cases unexamined, just like if we left non-flying birds unexamined, we would 
have a blind spot from seeing that “authority to” cases count as cases of the concept 
“authority” just like how we have a blind spot from seeing that non-flying cases of 
birds count as cases of the concept “bird” in the Penguin Counterexample. And we 
could easily see how the criterion of choosing only clear case would create such a 




cases exists, ones that show that facts about “authority over conduct” cases are only 
contingently true. 
In sum, in this section, I have described the problem of a pattern of false 
negative cases. It shows that the paradigmatic method fails for the same reason that 
the simple method fails—i.e., we cannot reliably determine whether our examination 
has yielded conceptual truths about the concept “authority”. 
 
7. Correlated Fact 
 
 
In this section, I argue that the control model’s core underlying claim—i.e., 
“authority” is a species of power over—is false. The upshot is that not only is the 
paradigmatic method unreliable but it also produces invariably incorrect results. 
  The standard theorists are committed to the following claim: 
“Authority” is a species of “power over”. 
This statement serves as the core underlying assumption for every position on 
legitimate authority where the respective theorist defines “authority” with the 
elements of “legitimate authority”. These include the following accounts: right to rule 
(Wolff 1970, Simmons 2000), power to impose duties (Enoch 2014), justification to 
coerce (Ladenson 1980), and power to change reasons (Raz 1979, 1985). They all 










For Necessary Fact, some non-authority cases are also a species of “power 
over”. For example, Robber is an example of such a case. Robber fits in the area 
labeled “A” in Necessary Fact.  
Moreover, for Necessary Fact, all cases of authority are species of power 
over. For instance, Parent is an example of such a case. Parent fits in the area 
labeled “B” in Necessary Fact. 
Notice that if you examine only cases where someone is telling another person 
what to do, you are examining only cases that fit inside the entire circle “power over”. 
Examining only these type of cases—i.e., “authority over conduct” cases—
corroborates the position that authority is essentially about controlling another 
person’s behavior or conduct. But, to put it colloquially, use of the paradigmatic 
method prevents a theorist from thinking outside the control model box.85 Many 











standard theorists have not examined any cases outside the “power over” circle.86 
Moreover, if Necessary Fact is false, then the paradigmatic method has invariably 
produced incorrect results for the standard theorists who use it. 
Correlated Fact represents the situation where the standard theorists are 







	 Each category has the following respective description. 
  
 A: Non-authority cases that exhibit power over others—e.g. Robber. 
B: Cases of “authority” that exhibit a species of power over others—e.g., 
Parent. 
 C: Cases of “authority” that do not exhibit a species of power over others. 
 
To argue for Correlated Fact, I show that there is a reason why there is a correlation 
between “authority” and “power over” and their correlation depends on an element 














that isn’t essential to “authority”. In addition, I present some cases that fit area “C” in 
Correlated Fact. 
I must introduce a term to provide this counterargument. Scope of authority is 
the domain or area that a person has authority over. For instance, a pilot’s scope of 
authority includes the power to command customers to put on their seatbelts, but 
commanding customers to stay at a certain hotel franchise is outside that pilot’s scope 
of authority.  
The variable “scope of authority” provides depth to our understanding of 
“authority” because it helps us understand a dimension about “authority”. But we 
ought to be clear about a critical issue: it only tells us something about the domain or 
scope that a person has authority over rather than whether that person has authority or 
not. 
The cases that fit category “B” in Correlated Fact are cases of authority 
where the authority’s scope of authority includes power over people’s conduct—e.g., 
Parent. The cases that fit category “C” in Correlated Fact are cases of authority 
where the authority’s scope of authority does not include power over people’s 
conduct. Hence, whether a case of authority exhibits power over another person’s 
conduct is dependent upon a dimension of “authority” rather than an essential element 
of “authority”.  





Self-determination: Mei has the authority to determine what her life goals 
are. 
Mei’s scope of authority extends to determining what her own life goals are. In 
Parent, Jack’s scope of authority extends to commanding his son to pick up his toys. 
These cases present examples of different scopes of authority, but they both still have 
authority over a certain domain. The variable “scope of authority” provides us more 
information about each case, information that is more particular to the case in 
question. It tells us a dimension about a person’s authority rather than an essential 
element of it, an element that tells us what makes “authority” is what it is. 
 A response from the standard theorists is that “power over” is not dependent 
on the variable “scope of authority”. They might argue that existence of “power over” 
is dependent upon the type of authority it is—e.g., government, parents, arbitrators. 
These authorities are the ones that have “relatively permanent and pervasive authority 
over persons, that is, either authority over a large group of people or with respect to 
various spheres of activity, or both,” (Raz 1979[2002], 19).87 This objection 
continues: It is nature of these type of authorities to have power over others. And we 
must examine these types of cases to discover what the nature of “authority” is. 
To argue that “power over” is dependent upon “scope of authority” rather than 
the type of authority it is, I present an example of where the paradigm “power over” 





case of authority—i.e., governmental authority—does not include “power over”. 
Consider the following case. 
Ultra-Libertarian Government: An ultra-libertarian government creates 
only immunities for its citizens against the governmental use of power.88 
This ultra-libertarian government creates disabilities against governmental actors 
from exerting power over citizens. For example, in this ultra-libertarian government, 
governmental officials have a disability against declaring a national emergency to tax 
people in order to build a wall. In addition, they also have a disability against making 
laws that tax citizens for wealth redistribution schemes or for funding a foreign war. 
 This government’s scope of authority includes the ability to create disabilities 
and immunities in society. From its distribution of disabilities and immunities among 
members in society, it has no power over the citizen’s behaviors or conduct. It has 
created constraints against only its own actors. 
 This example shows that power over is dependent on the variable “scope of 
authority” rather than the type of authority it is.  In addition, Ultra-Libertarian 
Government does require its citizens to surrender their judgment to its rules because 
it is granting them an immunity rather than directing them to a requirement. As a 
result, the problem of authority doesn’t apply to this case of government.  
 In sum, in this section, I have argued that Correlated Fact is true. If so, 
“authority” is not a species of “power over”. As a result, the control model’s core 






claim is false. This result shouldn’t be surprising. In the previous section, I have 
argued that the paradigmatic method is unreliable, and the control model is the result 
of using the paradigmatic method. 
 
8. An Objection Against Necessary Features 
 
 
In this section, I provide an objection that comes from a charitable reading of the 
standard position.  
 An objection that a standard theorist may give is that A4 does not entail A5. 
That is, we need not reliably determine which properties are necessary in order to 
determine which properties are essential elements to the concept “authority”.  
According to this objection, we determine a concept’s essential elements or its nature 
through identifying what features are important or fundamental to the concept under 
study. Hence, according to this objection, a violation of A5 does not entail a violation 
of A1.  
Schauer provides this kind of argument for the concept “bird”. He writes, 
[W]e should ask whether there is not something about flying that will help us 
to “understand” the “nature” (in the non-technical sense) of birds. It is true 
that penguins and emus are birds and do not fly, and that bats fly but are not 
birds, so flying is neither necessary nor a sufficient condition for birdness. But 
it is surely of great interest that almost all birds fly and almost all nonbird 




we are likely to learn something of great interest about birds. Moreover, what 
we learn may increase knowledge for its own sake, but may also have 
practical importance for understanding birds and understanding the physics of 
flight, (Schauer 2013, 25). 
Schauer argues that having the ability to fly is not necessary to be a bird, but it is still 
an element that tells us something essential about the nature of the concept “bird”. 
For Schauer, it is surely of great importance that almost all birds fly. 
 The standard theorists may provide a counter-objection that has the same 
structure as Schauer’s argument. They may argue that the conditions that make an 
authority legitimate are fundamental to the concept “authority”. And what’s 
fundamental to the concept “authority” tells us about the nature of authority. 
 A charitable reading of the standard position replies as follows: A theorist 
need examine only a fundamental case. After examining that fundamental case, a 
theorist may correctly reason about what element is essential to understanding the 
nature of the concept “authority”. 
 Indeed, the standard theorists seem to be making this kind of argument. For 
instance, Raz writes, 
The advantage of the power analysis of authority is that is successfully meets 
the objection to the simple explanation and dissolves the paradoxes of 




Raz states that a power analysis of authority successfully replies to important 
objections and solves important puzzles. Philosophers often pose important objections 
and puzzles that need to be resolved in order to figure out a fundamental aspect about 
the concept that they are studying. On this method, the philosopher makes no claim 
about examining a representative sample of cases of the concept that they are 
studying. How conceptual analysis is carried out, on this method, is through figuring 
out some issue that is important to the concept under study. And, through resolving 
that important objection or puzzle, we come to an understanding about the nature of 
that concept.  
 More precisely, the standard theorists think that a theory of authority must 
resolve an issue posed by the problem of authority. Raz puts the “problem of 
authority” most succinctly in the following quote: “How can it ever be that one has a 
duty to subject one’s will and judgment to those of another?” (Raz, 2006, 1012). And 
the problem of authority, according to the standard theorists, requires us to determine 
what makes an authority’s claim upon our conduct justified or legitimate?  
The problem with this reply, however, is that these theorists are still 
attempting to provide a definition for the concept “authority”. If they were simply 
giving a theory about legitimate authority, one that stipulates necessary and sufficient 
conditions for legitimacy, their results would be limited to a subset of cases. I concede 
that the standard theorists are providing a theory about legitimate authority but deny 




This result shows that an essential property is indeed a necessary property. For 
if what’s essential is just what’s considered to be important or fundamental, even if 
only contingently true, then the result would be a definition that doesn’t apply to all 
cases of the concept “authority”, such as Sex Refusal, Self-Determination, and 
Ultra-Libertarian Government.  
In sum, in this section, I argue that the standard position on “authority” is 
more limited in scope than they claim. They can’t claim to be giving a definition for 
the concept “authority”. 
 
9. Authority as Authorization  
 
 
In this section, I present my theory regarding the nature of authority. I first stipulate 
what my definition is. In section 9.2, I discuss the method that I use to develop it. In 
section 9.3, I discuss the implications of my view. In section 9.4 and 9.5, I respond to 
two different set of objections. In 9.6, I provide some final remarks about my view. 
My definition for the concept “authority” is as follows: 
 Authority as Authorization 






In the following sections, I discuss the method that I use to build this definition, the 
meaning of each component, and the implications of my view.  
 
9.1 The Tree of Elements Method 
 
In this section, I discuss the method that I use to build my definition for “authority”. 
To build a definition for “authority”, I start with figuring out the best evidence 
for determining the essential and necessary properties of the concept “authority”: 
roots of authority. Roots of authority are pairings between the concept “authority” 
with a preposition that modifies the meaning of “authority” in order to address a 
relevant context at hand.89 For example, we might pair “authority” with the 
preposition “over” to apply “authority over” to a context in which the concept 
“authority” is applicable. 
Roots of authority provide the best evidence for discovering the essential and 
necessary elements of the concept “authority”. The reason is because they are 
modifications of the concept “authority” as it applies to a particular context. As a 
result, they are just one notch less abstract than the concept “authority”.  
On the other hand, examining types (or cases) of authorities has proven to be 
ineffective in allowing us to reasonably determine whether we are examining features 
that are more particular to the case at hand or facts about the concept “authority”. In 
                                               
89 Other theorists who extensively examine (what I call) “roots of authority” are Friedman (1973) and 




contrast, roots of authority allow us to determine facts about “authority” from 
examining its structural properties as we modify its meaning simply with the addition 
of a preposition. 
The following list includes all the roots of authority.  
in authority 
 authority to 
 authority over 
 
In my view, the roots of authority are the essential elements that make up the 
concept “authority”.  I structure the essential elements of the concept “authority” with 
a method that I call the “Tree of Elements Method”. On this method, I stay truer to 
the classical approach of conceptual analysis, one that examines a concept through its 
definitional structure. This method consists of breaking down the elements of a 
concept into smaller components. For example, the term “bachelor” breaks down into 
the components “unmarried” and “male. I present the full breakdown of my analysis 
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At the top of the tree is the concept “authority”, I then identify the closest 
element to the concept “authority”: in authority. This root, in authority, does not refer 
to an object external to the concept “authority” like how the roots authority over and 
authority to do. The root in authority indicates that there is a fact about the concept 
“authority” that has us understand “authority” to be in relation to a status that the 
person or entity in authority holds.  
The root at the top of the tree constitutes the essential element of the genus of 
the definition for “authority”. The genus of a definition tells us the type of thing that 
the object being defined is.  
 
Authority is a certain status. 
 
The next level of the tree consists of the roots authority over and authority to. 
The root authority over indicates that there is a fact about the concept “authority” that 
has us understand “authority” to have a relation over something else, an external 
object. The root authority to indicates that there is a fact about the concept “authority” 
that has us understand “authority” to be in relation to performing a certain action.  
I place authority over and authority to at the same level because together they 
carve out a really special status that persons or entities in authority have. That is, the 
roots authority to and authority over, together, constitute the essential properties of 
the genus. In combination, they demarcate “authority” from other types of statuses. 




authorization that the person in authority has. I discuss this authorization more 
thoroughly in the sections that follow. 
The next level of the tree consists of the objects that, I claim, authority over 
and authority to stand in relation to. The root authority over stands in relation to a 
normative state of affairs. The root authority to stands in relation to a change to a 
person’s normative situation. I make a distinction between a change to another 
person’s normative situation and a change to one’s own normative situation. 
The last level of the tree consists of the components that form one’s normative 
state of affairs or normative situation: specific normative relations. Normative 
relations consist of both Hohfeldian relations and deontic relations. A Hohfeldian 
relation is an element from the following set: {claim-right, duty, liberty, no-right, 
power, liability, immunity, disability}.90 A deontic relation is an element from the 
following set: {permitted, prohibited, required}.  
Normative relations have two parts: persons that the normative relation 
applies to and the content of that normative relation. Examples of specific normative 
relations include the following: Jane has a duty to drive slower than 55 mph; U.S. 
residents have a liberty to camp on BLM land for 14 days maximum; movie-goers 
have a prohibition against shouting “FIRE!” in a movie theater; John has a permission 
to go to Jane’s party. 
                                               




The last level corresponds to four different outcomes, which I label “1”, “2”, 
“3”, and “4”. They correspond to different types of cases of the concept “authority” 
on my framework. In the next section, I explain each type in detail. 
Each type follows from my theoretical view of authority. An argumentative 
task that I hold is to provide the theoretical underpinnings of why each type counts as 
a case of the concept “authority”. This task is the subject of the next section. 
 
9.2 Meaning of The Elements of “Authority” 
  
In the previous section, I layout the elements that constitutes my definition for 
“authority”. I also provide a diagram of how they are structured. In this section, I 
discuss the meaning of each element. 
 I start with a discussion of the essential element “authority to”. To perform 
certain actions, a person needs to have the authority to perform them. There are many 
kinds of actions that a person is able to perform through just possessing a mere 
physical ability to perform them. For instance, the ability to drive my car can be 
explained through physics alone. However, the performance of certain types of 
actions cannot be explain through physics. Consider the following example. 
 
The Refund 
Suppose Paul wants a refund of his money because he is unhappy with his 




However, Evelyn declines Paul’s request for a refund because she lacks the 
requisite authorization to do so. Paul then approaches Abigail, another worker 
at the restaurant, and requests a refund. Abigail responds that she has the 
ability to give Paul a refund but declines his request for one. 
 
Suppose that, instead of declining Paul’s request, Evelyn opens the cash 
register and gives Paul a refund without the requisite authorization. In this scenario, 
Evelyn lacks the requisite authority to give Paul a refund. Instead, Evelyn is simply 
stealing cash from the register to give Paul a “refund”.  
In contrast, what explains Abigail’s ability to give Paul a refund is not 
explained purely through what physics tells us. Abigail has the deontic ability, a 
power, rather than a mere physical ability to give a refund. 
Moreover, what occurs if Paul gets a refund from Abigail is that his 
prohibition from taking money from the cash register turns into a permission. On the 
other hand, Evelyn does not have the ability to change Paul’s prohibition into a 
permission—only Abigail has the authority to do so. 
As we can see from this analysis, the authority to perform certain actions 
pertains to actions that change a person’s normative situation. A change to a person’s 
normative situation occurs where there is a change to a normative relation that the 
person holds.  
 Furthermore, only a power can change a normative relation into another 




to change a normative relation entails having the Hohfeldian power to change that 
normative relation. 
 The next essential element to explain is “authority over”. Abigail has authority 
over who gets a refund. And if getting a refund entails a change from a prohibition 
against taking money from the cash register into a permission to take the money, 
another way of understanding what Abigail has authority over is as follows: Abigail 
has authority over a change to a normative relation. 
 Having authority over a change to a normative relation entails two further 
conditions. Consider the following example to see what they are.  
 
 It’s My Car 
I have the authority to determine who uses my car. This situation entails that I 
have the power to determine who uses my car. However, I also have the 
authority over the use of my car. For it is only me who has the authority to 
determine who uses it.  
 
This situation entails two further conditions.  
First, other people have a disability against exercising my power to determine 
who uses my car. If Karen decides that she wants to loan my car out to Jack, she still 
couldn’t do so without my permission. For Karen has a disability against exercising 




Second, I have an immunity against other people exercising my power to 
determine who uses my car. This conclusion entails that my governance of the 
normative state of affairs over the use of my car is immune to change from others. 
That is, my prohibition against Karen using my car cannot be changed by another 
person, such as Karen. I retain control over who has a permission to use my car.  
 The essential elements authority to and authority over combine to form a 
species of an authorization. Let’s list the components below. 
 
  Authority as Authorization 
Person A exercises authority if and only if  
(a) Person A has a power to change a certain normative relation 
(b) Person A has an immunity to others exercising Person A’s power to 
change that normative relation. 
(c) Others have disability against exercising Person A’s power to 
change that normative relation. 
 
It’s My Car provides a context to better understand these conditions. 
 In It’s My Car, I exercise authority, in this situation, if and only if 
(a’) I have the power to determine who uses my car, which changes 




(b’) I have an immunity against other people exercising my power to 
determine who uses my car. 
(c’) Others, including Karen, have a disability against exercising my 
power to determine who uses my car. 
It is these conditions combined that provide me a certain authoritative status over the 
normative state of affairs that govern the use of my car. 
Suppose that Karen makes a request to borrow my car, but I decline her 
request. In this situation, I fail to exercise a power to change Karen’s prohibition 
against using my car into a permission. That is, I do not exercise a power at all. 
Nonetheless, I still exercise authority through my refusal of letting Karen use my car. 
Karen cannot exercise my power since I maintain control over it. 
  This example demonstrates that an exercise of authority does not amount to an 
exercise of a power, as the standard theorists have us think, but rather it is an exercise 
of a certain authorization, one that is formed through a combination of the essential 
elements authority to and authority over. 
 I have explained each component of my tree except for the four outcomes at 
the bottom. For easy reference, I list them again here. 
A person in authority has authority over 
1:  a change to a normative relation that oneself has 





A person in authority has authority to 
3: change a normative relation that another person has and is liable to being 
changed from the person in authority 
4: change a normative relation that oneself has and is immune to change from 
others 
These outcomes correspond to instances of an authorization that amounts to an 
exercise of authority (1 combines with 4, and 2 combines with 3). I provide an 
example for each combination. 
 The following is an example of an authorization to change another person’s 
normative situation that amounts to an exercise of authority (2+3). 
 
Funding: A graduate department rescinds Jane’s funding offer based on a 
poor teaching evaluation. 
 
Upon acceptance to graduate school, a graduate department extends a funding 
offer to Jane. The funding offer provides Jane a claim-right to receive funding for 
attending graduate school. Nonetheless, the department retains control over Jane’s 
claim-right to receive funding. After a terrible display of teaching a class, the 
department decides to rescind Jane’s funding offer. In this situation, it changes Jane’s 




In this situation, the department exercises a status that it has which authorizes 
it to change Jane’s normative situation. Jane has a disability against exercising the 
department’s power to reinstate her funding offer. Moreover, the department’s 
decision is immune to change from others. Hence, it exercises authority when it 
rescinds Jane’s funding offer. 
 The following situation is an example of an authorization to change one’s own 
normative situation that amounts to an exercise of authority (1+4).91 
 
It’s My New Car: John uses his car as a down payment towards a new car at 
the dealership. 
 
In this situation, John changes his claim-right to exclude others from using his 
car into a no-right to exclude others from using it when he sells his car to the 
dealership. John exercises authority, in this case, because he is exercising authority 
over the normative state of affairs that governs the use of his car. The dealership has 
no authority over how John’s car is used until John transfers that authority to the 
dealership.  
 In sum, in this section, I have explained each element of my view. 
 
9.3 “Authority to” and “Authority over” 
                                               




In this section, I discuss two important differences between my view and the standard 
theorists. 
A way to discuss the implications of my view is to discuss how it compares to 
the standard view. Hence, I compare my tree to one that resembles the standard 













Some important differences are as follows. 
 









Authority Over. The standard theorists consider “authority over” to be a 
relation over other people. As a result, the standard position discounts 
authority over oneself to be cases of the concept “authority”. In contrast, I 
consider “authority over” to be a relation over a normative state of affairs. 
Furthermore, I count authority over oneself as cases of the concept 
“authority”.  
 
Authority to. Certain notable standard theorists explicitly deny that “authority 
to” cases count as cases of the concept “authority”. In contrast, in my view, 
they do count as cases. 
 
I examine these differences in full detail in the next two sections.  
 
9.3 Authority over 
 
In this section, I compare our positions on “authority over” in full detail.  
The standard position discounts authority over oneself to be cases of the 
concept “authority”. For instance, Raz writes, “Power over others is authority over 
them. There is one exception to this characterization. Sometimes we say that a person 
has authority over himself. This is a degenerate case of authority: an extension by 
analogy from the central cases of authority over others. It is interesting to note that 




grant himself permissions or powers. We never refer thus to one’s power to undertake 
voluntary obligations,” (Raz 2002[1979], 19). 
Raz thinks that authority over himself cases are “degenerate” cases of 
authority. I argue otherwise. Consider the following case. 
 
Vegan: Alex has a liberty to eat a plant-based diet. 
 
I argue that Alex exercises authority while she exercises her liberty to eat a 
plant-based diet. Suppose that Dan dislikes vegans and wants to prohibit Alex from 
eating a plant-based diet. Alex exercises authority while exercising her liberty to eat a 
plant-based diet because only she has authority over a change to her liberty to be a 
vegan. No one else has the authority to change that liberty other than Alex.  
A liberal political view would concur that exercising one’s liberty, where that 
liberty is immune to being changed from others, amounts to an exercise of authority. 
On this liberal political thought, for instance, exercising one’s liberty to express 
oneself amounts to an exercise of one’s authority. That authority does not come from 
simply exercising one’s liberty—rather, it comes from exercising a liberty that no one 
else can takeaway.  
If we continue to think that “authority over oneself” cases cannot be cases of 
the concept “authority”, then we would have to reject this liberal political view. 
However, it seems more reasonable to simply say that we can have authority over 




held liberty—e.g., a liberty to express one’s own opinion when a bully wants to 
silence it. It seems that, in this case, we are exercising our authority in the face of that 
bully through exercising a liberty that he cannot deny us—to express our own 
opinions. 
The other issue to address concerns whether authority over is a relation to 
“other people” or “a normative state of affairs”. I argue that my position is more 
precise than the standard position. 
The standard position is that an authority, e.g., a government, has authority 
over other people, and it exerts its authority over them via the use of commands or 
directives. In contrast, my position is that the person in authority has authority over a 
change to a normative relation. The following example is helpful for understanding 
the difference between our views. 
 
Nancy Pelosi: The Speaker of the House, Nancy Pelosi, disinvites The 
President of the United States, Donald Trump, from giving the State of the 
Union Address at the United States House of Representatives during the 
shutdown. She suggests that he can still give the speech at the Oval Office. In 
return, Donald Trump prohibits Nancy Pelosi from using military planes to 
make an international trip. He suggests that she can still use a commercial 
airline to make the trip. 
 




person’s conduct, Person B. This view entails that Person B does not have authority 
over Person A. However, the standard view can’t make sense of Nancy Pelosi. Nancy 
Pelosi and Donald Trump are both governmental authorities. It would be a mistake to 
say that Nancy Pelosi has authority over Donald Trump or vice versa.  
More precisely, what Nancy Pelosi has authority over is the normative state of 
affairs in which Donald Trump gives the State of the Union Address at the House of 
Representatives. This normative state of affairs consists of a permission to give the 
State of the Union at the House of Representatives, a permission that Donald Trump 
had prior to being disinvited. Nancy Pelosi retains authority over the permission, and 
she may change it to a prohibition to give the speech at the House of Representatives. 
And Nancy Pelosi did just that when she disinvited Trump—she changed a 
permission into a prohibition. 
In addition, Donald Trump does not have authority over Nancy Pelosi. More 
precisely, in this situation, he has authority over Nancy Pelosi’s permission to use 
military planes to make an overseas trip. He may change it to a prohibition to use 
military planes to make the trip. And Donald Trump did just that when he said that 
she can’t use military planes to make the international trip.  
What this example shows is that it is imprecise to say that an authority figure 
has authority over people. Rather, it is more precise to say that the person in authority 
has authority over a change to a normative relation. 
The normative relation has very specific content. That content includes the 




normative relation pertains. Nancy Pelosi has authority over Donald Trump’s 
permission to give the speech at the House of Representatives, but she does not have 
authority over Donald Trump’s permission to give the speech at the Oval Office.  
The upshot is that my account need not reference the people or the domain 
that an authority has authority over. The normative relation has all the content that 
provides the specifics that we need.  
However, Funding, for instance, shows that it is more precise to say that 
persons or entities have authority over normative relations instead of people. The 
department doesn’t have authority over its graduate students. More precisely, it has 
authority over certain normative relations that its graduate students hold, ones that the 
department has the power to change. One of these normative relations includes a 
graduate student’s claim-right to receive funding to attend graduate school. When a 
department extends an invitation to someone to attend graduate school, it extends a 
claim-right to receive funding for attending its program. It retains control over that 
claim-right, instead of control over its graduate students. In particular, the department 
has authority over whether there is a change to a graduate student’s funding offer. 
In sum, I argue that a class of authority over cases, “authority over oneself”, 
does count as cases of the concept “authority”. In addition, I argue that my account of 
“authority over” is more precise than the standard position. 
 





In this section, I defend my position on “authority to” against Raz’s view on 
“authority to”. 
In my view, “authority to” cases count as cases of the concept “authority”. 
Moreover, the root authority to is an essential element of the concept “authority”. The 
best opposition to my view exists in Raz’s (1979[2002]) book The Authority of Law, 
pages 19-20. I quote these pages extensively throughout this section.  
  On page 19, Raz writes, 
We should distinguish between authority over persons and authority to 
perform certain actions. The two overlap but are distinct notions. Everyone 
who is an authority has authority over people, but not everyone who has 
authority is an authority. The difference is not of great philosophical moment, 
but its neglect can be a source of endless confusion. A person is an authority if 
he has relatively permanent and pervasive authority over persons, that is, 
either authority over a large group of people with respect to various spheres of 
activity, or both, (Ibid). 
It is here that Raz first tells us that we should distinguish “authority over” and 
“authority to”.  Raz emphasizes that “authority over” is essential towards 
understanding authority while implicitly saying that “authority to” is not. To make 
this argument, Raz appeals to a type of authority—i.e., ones that have “relatively 
permanent and pervasive authority over persons”.   
However, in most of this paper, I have argued that we should not appeal to 




concept “authority”. We just don’t know whether we have a representative sample to 
confidently assert that we have discovered a conceptual truth about the concept 
“authority”, or whether we have simply discovered a more particular feature of the 
type of case that we are examining. I have argued that it is more likely that the latter 
is happening. 
Further down the same page and continuing on the next page, Raz writes, 
One of the main obstacles to an analysis of authority is the frequent failure to 
distinguish between authority to perform an action and authority over persons. 
A person has authority to perform an action if he has been given permission to 
perform it or has been given power to perform it by somebody who has power 
to do so. Thus, I have authority to open your mail if the censor has given me 
permission to do so, assuming that he has power to do so, (Ibid).  
Raz states a necessary condition for possessing the “authority to perform an action” is 
that the person “has been given permission to perform it.”  He has not given us a 
theoretical reason for accepting this necessary condition but rather he provides a case 
of “authority to” where that necessary condition holds. I have given you the 
permission to open my mail; hence, you have the authority to open my mail. This 
analysis of “authority to” is more particular to the case that Raz is examining rather 
than being applicable to every case of “authority to”. Funding is one counterexample 
to Raz’s necessary condition. The department does not need permission from 
someone else to rescind a graduate student’s funding offer. 




My authority to open your mail is not authority over you. I cannot change 
your normative situation in any way though the censor changed it by giving 
me the authority to open your mail, thereby diminishing your right to privacy, 
(Ibid). 
Raz implicitly states that “authority to” cases do not result in changes to a person’s 
normative situation. That might be true in the case of opening someone else’s mail, 
but it is not true for every case of “authority to”. For instance, in Funding, the 
department changes Jane’s normative situation through a change to one of her 
normative relations—i.e., a claim-right to receive funding to a no-right to receive 
funding. 
In fact, at the center of my account is the claim that a person in authority has 
the authority to change a person’s normative situation. A change is made when there 
is a change to a normative relation that a person holds. Raz’s position, perhaps, is that 
a change to a person’s normative situation occurs where there is a change to a 
person’s reasons for acting.92 In response, I claim that a change to a normative 
relation that a person holds is sufficient to change that person’s normative situation. 
Certainly, a person’s normative situation changes where there is a change to one of 
her normative relations such as Jane’s situation in Funding. 
Raz finishes his analysis of “authority to” with these words, 
One has authority to do only those things that one is given permission to do by 
somebody who has authority over the person whose interests are affected. We 





can now define X has authority to F as: there is some Y and there is some Z 
such that,  
(1) Y permitted X to F or gave him power to do so 
(2) Y has power to do so 
(3) X’s F-ing will affect the interests of Z and Y has authority over Z.  
 
At the end of his analysis, Raz provides an account of “authority to” that has three 
necessary conditions and one of them, the third condition, presupposes an account of 
“authority over”. Through providing this account, he argues that “authority over” is 
more basic than “authority to”. It also serves as Raz’s account of authorization since 
Raz thinks that “authority to” is an authorization to perform some action.93  
 Raz’s account of “authority to” assumes that “authority to” is an authorization 
to perform some action. If so, he seems to be justified in providing a complicated 
account to understand “authority to”.  
Perhaps, we need to a complicated account, one complete with stipulations of 
necessary or sufficient conditions, to understand what an authorization is. But we do 
not need such a complicated account to understand “authority to”. The term 
“authority to” is synonymous with “power to” or “ability to”: to possess the authority 
to perform a certain action is to possess the power to perform that action. My 







response to Raz is that we should not understand “authority to” in terms of an 
authorization. The latter concept is much more complicated than the former.  
A result is that “authority to” does not presuppose “authority over” like Raz 
thinks it does. They are at the same level—i.e., one of them is not more basic than the 
other for understanding the concept “authority”. In fact, I argue for an account of 
authorization that is the combination of authority to and authority over. I provide this 
account in the next section. And it forms the heart of my account of “authority”. 
In sum, I argue that Raz’s objections against accounting “authority to” as an 
essential property of the concept “authority” are ungrounded. He gives us a 
complicated account of “authority to” that presupposes “authority over”, but his 
support comes from features that are more particular to the case that he is examining 
than facts about “authority to”.  
 
10. What difference does “authority” make? 
 
In this section, I discuss the implications between my view and the control view. 
“Authority” makes a difference to our actions. It is controversial what kind of 
difference that “authority” makes. We all think that an act of authority, e.g., making a 
command, results in something happening, such as the creation of a duty, which 
would not have occurred without that act of authority. In this section, I develop this 
thought with greater precision, present my position on the matter, and show where 




An act of authority is an exercise of authority. It is an action that serves as the 
vehicle through which an exercise of authority occurs. I am careful about not saying 
that only authorities commit an act of authority, or exercise authority, because it is 
expressly my view that anyone can exercise authority provided certain conditions 
obtain. On my view, an act of authority occurs only where a person (or thing) is 
authorized to change a normative relation and either changes it or preserves it against 
change.94 
In contrast, the standard theorists develop an account of the concept 
“authority” through examining what allows an authority to have authority. This 
method includes two (seemingly) small assumptions, but I reveal the true magnitude 
of these assumptions. They pinpoint the basis from where my view diverges from the 
standard theorists.  
The first assumption is that “authority” is something that someone has. For 
instance, in explaining what it needed to develop a theory of legitimate authority, Raz 
states, “It must explain what one has when one has authority.”95 Raz’s explanation 
reveals the way that we typically think about authority. It is often thought that 
“authority” is something to be possessed over others.96 
On the other hand, it is my view that “authority” is something that is 
exercised. “Authority” is those set of conditions that allows someone to commit an 
                                               
94 The Refund case is supposed to show a case where someone exercises authority even if she decides 
not to make a change to a normative relation—i.e., Abigail decides not to change Paul’s duty against 
taking money from the register to a liberty to take money from the cash register. I call these cases a 
preservation of a non-change to a normative relation in order to emphasis that the non-change is an 
active act. 
95 Raz, The Authority of Law, 7. This quote is also important because it shows that the standard theorist 
think that “legitimate authority” and “authority” are the same things. 




act of authority or to exercise authority. This distinction is important because, on one 
hand, when someone has authority, it is something that the person has continuously. 
On the other hand, when someone exercises authority, it is something that simply 
occurs at a specific moment in time.  
The second assumption is that “authority” is something that an authority has. 
This assumption, perhaps, has the most influence over how we think about 
“authority”. For it requires us to also have further assumptions about what “an 
authority” is. Raz states, “A person is an authority if he has relatively permanent and 
pervasive authority over persons, that is, either authority over a large group of people 
or with respect to various spheres of activity, or both.”97 Raz believes that an 
authority is one that fits the control model. 
The combination of these two assumptions have an important implication for 
the standard theorist:  
 
“Authority” is the set of conditions that a certain set of people (or things) have 
that others do not have.  
 
Once this implication is combined with the standard analysis of “authority 
over”, we have the result that “authority” is the set of conditions that confers a set of 
people (or things) authority over another set of people. Leslie Green, for instance, 
provides an analysis of “authority” as the relation “authority over”; and he states, “A 
                                               




has authority over B if and only if the fact that A requires B to j (i) gives B a content-
independent reason to j and (ii) excludes some of B’s reasons for not-j-ing.”98 
In contrast, I do not make a distinction between two sets of people: the 
“authority” set and the “non-authority” set. No relation or information about these 
two sets informs my theory of authority. Instead, my theory of authority simply 
discovers the conditions in which an exercise of authority occurs. 
Our respective structures of “authority” differ as follows. 
Two Different Structures of “Authority” 
Standard Theorists: A has authority over Y. 
Authorization View: A exercises authority. 
 
A structure of authority tells us what the basic framework that the concept 
“authority” consists of; in addition, it tells us what essential elements that the concept 
“authority” contains and how those elements are organized.  
The structure of authority that the standard theorists use tells us that the 
concept “authority” has “authority over” as its main essential element within its 
framework. In addition, it tells us that “authority” is a relation between two different 
elements: the set “A” and the set “Y”.  
The structure of authority that I use tells us that what is essential about the 
concept “authority” is simply the determination of whether an act counts as an 
exercise of authority or not. This analysis puts me on a different path than the 
standard theorists. 
                                               




The reason for this conclusion is as follows. From one’s framework of the 
structure of authority, a theorist builds her account of authority via specifying the 
conditions that satisfy her proffered structure. The structure that I use requires that I 
examine the conditions where an exercise of authority occurs. I build an account of 
authority from determining the conditions that satisfy the criteria of whether or not an 
exercise of authority has occurred. 
In contrast, the standard theorists examine the conditions in which “A has 
authority over Y”. This analysis has uniformly led them to consider that the 
conditions for justified or legitimate authority are the conditions for “authority”.  
However, I believe that the standard theorists’ structure of authority captures 
only one type of authority—i.e., the control model. While this type of authority is 
certainly prevalent and conspicuous throughout many societies and the history of our 
world, it is not as pervasive as the ones that fit the structure that I have described. 
People exercise authority all the time without noticing; and when they notice it, it is 
because they usually want to make a point about it. 
 Consider self-determination cases. Jack determines that his life goal is to be a 
successful actor. It is my view that Jack exercises authority when he determines what 
his life goal is. Jack’s friends may try to dissuade him and say that being a successful 
actor is near-to-impossible, considering his odds of making it in Hollywood. Yet, 
Jack may point out that it is his decision to make and not theirs. 
A case that usually goes unnoticed is when we let others borrow something 
that we own. Chris is exercising his authority over who is allowed to borrow his 




title, such as the “Department Chair”, in order to exercise this authority. Anyone can 
let another person borrow a book, and when he does so, he is exercising authority 
over who can have his book for a certain period of time. We do the same with cars, 
clothes, and our favorite pens. 
What I want to say is that exercising authority is a pervasive fact about our 
lives. We exercise authority all the time—sometimes, without even noticing it. And it 
is not just certain people or things that have authority; it is something that we all 
have.  
I affirm that my view is theoretically superior to the standard theorist because 
the structure of authority that I use allows me to develop a theory of authority that is 
flexible, precise, and extensionally robust. Moreover, I provide cases that demonstrate 
that these qualities are the defining virtues for a theory of authority. These cases also 
show that the structure of authority that the standard theorists use is too rigid to build 
a tangible theory of authority upon it. 
Flexibility is needed where authority conflicts exist and we need to understand 
different nuances of “authority” to account for that conflict. Consider the issue of 
abortion within the United States. Alabama’s state legislature recently approved an 
extreme abortion ban that imprisons doctors who perform abortions up to 99 years. In 
response, many females claim that they have autonomy over their body. In addition, 
the context in which this law is enacted is to challenge Roe v. Wade. Multiple 
authority conflict exists; and my theory of authority has the flexibility to account for 




Suppose that Alabama’s state legislature has the authority to come to a 
majority vote which enacts a law within its territory. On my view, what has occurred 
is that Alabama has enacted a prohibition against performing abortions and created a 
liability to be imprisoned for up to 99 years for committing an abortion.  
It is my view that an act of authority occurs where there is an authorized 
change to a normative relation. Alabama’s state legislature is authorized to make 
changes to normative relations that belong to its legal system.99 Alabama authorized a 
change to a specific normative relation: a permission to have an abortion within 
Alabama is changed to a prohibition against having an abortion within Alabama. 
Alabama’s state legislature authorized a change to a normative relation within a 
specific normative system, Alabama’s state legal system.  
It is my view that an act of authority occurs where a person authorizes the 
preservation of a non-change to a normative relation.100 In response to Alabama’s act 
of enacting an anti-abortion law, female protesters assert the existence of their bodily 
autonomy. What they are asserting is that they are authorizing the preservation of a 
non-change to a normative relation—i.e., their right to choose. This authorization 
preserves a non-change to a normative relation within in a specific normative system, 
the set of rights that makeup one’s bodily autonomy.101 
                                               
99 One might quibble about the fact that Alabama doesn’t have a “legal system”. I address this concern 
in Chapter 4. For now, Alabama has a state legal system. 
100 I have argued for this point in Refund of section 9.2. 
101 It is of course controversial whether a “right to choose” is a right that morality prescribes. We are 
uncertain about what normative relations exist within morality (as a normative system). Nonetheless, 
the point is that female protesters must be asserting a preservation of a non-change to a normative 
relation in order to declare that Alabama’s state legislature is encroaching upon their authority. 
Another issue is that one might object that females cannot change the “right to choose”. My response is 




In sum, female protesters are authorizing a preservation of a non-change to a 
normative relation—i.e., a right to choose—while Alabama is authorizing a change to 
normative relations that exists within its legal system. Female protesters and Alabama 
state legislature are both respectively authorized to preserve and to change a specific 
normative relation within a specific normative system; however, these normative 
systems are different normative systems. As a result, an authority conflict occurs 
because they are both able to assert their authority with an act of authority, and these 
acts of authority entail a practical conflict. 
The view that I prescribe has the flexibility to account for important nuances 
in authority conflicts in order to explain why an authority conflict occurs in the first 
place. In contrast, consider Simmons’s “right to rule” view. Either Alabama’s state 
legislature has the moral right to enact the abortion ban or it does not. If it has a “right 
to rule”, it has authority. If it does not have a “right to rule”, it does not have 
authority.  
Suppose that Alabama has a moral right to enact an abortion ban. In this case, 
the female protesters, at least, the ones living in Alabama, are morally bound to obey 
its laws. If so, in this case, an authority conflict is non-existent.  
Suppose, on the other hand, Alabama does not have a moral right to enact an 
abortion ban. In this case, an authority conflict does not occur because Alabama’s 
state legislature does not have authority in the first place.  
The conclusion is that Simmons’s view cannot account for an important 
authority conflict between Alabama and the female protesters. An objection is that 




moral right to rule. But this response would betray the experience that many women 
face when it comes to anti-abortion laws. It is not due to Alabama’s act of enacting an 
anti-abortion law that it lacks the power to enact which encroaches upon a female’s 
bodily autonomy. But rather, what encroaches upon their authority is Alabama’s 
power to enact an extreme abortion ban that conflicts with a female’s authority over 
her bodily autonomy. 
The reason that Simmons’s view is unable to account for this authority 
conflict is due to the structure of authority that Simmons uses. It is too rigid: One set 
of people has authority over another set of people; and either the first set of people 
has authority or it does not. These binary conditions for “authority” cannot account 
for nuanced facts about “authority”. On the other hand, once we see that the concept 
of “authority” is something that is exercised rather than something that a set of people 
continuously has over another set of people, we can account for these important 
nuances. 
Precision is another defining virtue of a theory of authority. A theory of 
authority is precise when it is able to locate the difference that “authority” makes. 
What results from an act of authority?  
One problem is that multiple events may result from an act of authority. In 
response to this issue, I stipulate that a theory of authority is maximally precise when 
it is able to locate the exact difference that “authority” makes. That is, it is able to tell 
us the exact result from an act of authority. An event is the exact result of an exercise 




Consider Raz’s view that an act of authority creates a protected reason for 
acting. A protected reason is the combination of a reason to act and a reason not to 
act upon an excluded reason.102 Suppose an authority commands that I turn in a report 
on Monday. On Raz’s view of protected reasons, I have a reason to turn in the report 
on Monday, and a reason not to act on any reasons that would disallow me from 
turning the report in on Monday.103 
Raz has provided us some important and interesting insights about the 
dynamics of reasons. However, the creation of a protected reason for acting is not the 
exact result of an exercise of authority.  
A creation of a protected reason, if one is created at all, is the result of a 
change to a normative relation instead. In other words, authorities do not change 
one’s reasons for acting. They change a normative relation that in turn changes one’s 
reasons for acting. 
Consider Funding again. The graduate department has committed an act of 
authority from rescinding a graduate student’s funding offer. It has exercised its 
authority to determine which graduate students are qualified to receive funding. 
Certainly, the department has the authority to make this determination. In rescinding 
                                               
102 Let’s assume that Raz is correct about the claim that reasons are facts. Hence, reasons exist 
externally to our mental states. This supposition gives Raz the room to claim that a change has 
occurred, a protected reason has been created, even if a person’s mental states is not aligned with that 
protected reason. That is, even if a person does not recognize that an authority has created a protected 







the funding offer, it has changed the graduate student’s claim-right to receive funding 
into a no-right to receive funding. 
 Raz’s theory of protected reason applies only when an authority gives a 
command. But, in this case, the department does not make a command at all. The 
department did not command the graduate student to leave the university. Rather, the 
department notified the graduate student that his funding offer has been rescinded 
with a letter. 
It is immaterial to the defense of my account whether a change to a normative 
relation changes a person’s reasons for acting.104 The pertinent point is that an 
exercise of authority does not change a person’s reasons for acting. 
Raz’s theory of protected reasons is most appropriate in command cases. 
However, even in command cases, Raz’s theory is imprecise about what occurs as a 
result of that command. A command is a performative utterance that one’s liberty to 
j, an optional action, has changed into a duty to j, a requirement, or a duty to refrain 
from j-ing, a prohibition.105 What immediately occurs from an utterance of a 
command is a change to a normative relation, not a change to a person’s reason for 
acting.106 
The problem is that Raz’s theory of protected reasons only makes sense in the 
context of commands, duties, prohibitions, and requirements. For instance, it is not 
clear how an immunity gives a person a protected reason for acting. An immunity 
                                               
104 My guess is that it probably does. 
105 J.L. Austin, How to Do Things with Words, Oxford: Clarendon Press. 1962. 
106 A creation of a protected reasons may occur from an exercise of authority. To demonstrate this 
conclusion, a theorist would need to make a connection between normative relations and reasons for 
acting. Raz has requirements about a need to be in a correct epistemic position in order to be a 




against self-incrimination doesn’t give a person a protected reason for acting. Hence, 
a change to one’s reasons for acting does not occur in all cases where an exercise of 
authority has occurred. In other words, a change to a person’s reason for acting may 
be a result from an exercise of authority, but an exercise of authority does not cause a 
change to a person’s reasons for acting.107 
The last defining virtue of a theory of authority is that it is extensionally 
robust. A theory of authority qualifies as being extensionally robust if it is able to tell 
us all the cases where an exercise of authority has occurred. 
In my view, a person exercises authority where she authorizes a change to a 
normative relation or authorizes a preservation of a non-change to a normative 
relation. The normative relations that I explicitly include in my theory of authority are 
the following sets. 
Deontic relation: {permission, prohibition, requirement};  
Hohfeldian relation: {claim-right, duty, liberty, no-right, power, liability, 
immunity, disability}; 
I assert that my view is extensionally robust in comparison to the standard 
theorists because they explicitly talk about only rights, duties, and commands (or 
directives) as part of their conceptual framework of authority.108 Consider, for 
example, Simmons’s view that “a state’s (or government’s) legitimacy is the complex 
moral right it possesses to be the exclusive imposer of binding duties on its 
subjects.”109  
                                               
107  
108 Raz talks about a power to change reasons.  
109 Simmons, “Justification and Legitimacy,” 746. One may object that Simmons is simply talking 




A command (or a directive) is performative utterance that states that a certain 
action is required or prohibited. The result is that the notion of a command 
incorporates an understanding of all the deontic relations {permission, prohibition, 
requirement} but only a subset of the Hohfeldian relations {right, duty, liberty, no-
right}. 
Simmons’s theory of political authority is subject to the same conclusion. It 
can incorporate an understanding of only a subset of Hohfeldian relations—namely, 
the relations that are the jural correlative and jural opposites of a right and a duty. The 
implication is that the following set of Hohfeldian relations are left out of an 
entitlement view of authority: {power, disability, liability, immunity}.110 Moreover, 
Hohfeld pointedly argued that a “right” does not entail a “power”.111 
H.L.A. Hart’s famous critique of John Austin’s command theory of law is that 
the notion of a command cannot account for the variety of law.112 I assert that an 
entitlement theory of authority commits a similar conceptual mistake: it cannot 
account for the variety of exercises of authority. The reason that Hart’s critique was 
so damaging yet illuminating is that, once we are able to see what exists beyond the 
notion of a command, a rich and expansive variety of legal rules becomes clear.  
Moreover, Hart demonstrates that an expansive vocabulary of the different 
kinds of legal rules is crucial to our understanding of legal systems and institutions. 
                                               
110 Simmons has used the word “power” in certain places, but he has clarified that he means a “moral 
right to rule”. He does not mean a Hohfeldian “power”.  
111 Hohfeld, Wesley Newcomb & Cook, Walter Wheeler (ed.): Fundamental Legal Conceptions as 
Applied in Judicial Reasoning and Other Legal Essays (Yale University Press, 1919). 




For instance, Hart has shown that a system of rules is static unless it includes a rule of 
change.  
I think that the same point applies to a full understanding of the concept 
“authority”. An imposition of a duty upon another person does not exhaust the variety 
of exercises of authority that may occur. In my view, an exercise of authority involves 
an authorized change to a normative relation. This result allows us to see the variety 
of ways in which an exercise of authority may occur. 
From this analysis, we can see that the structure “A has authority over Y” is 
indeed too limiting of a structure for the concept “authority”, where “Y” is another 
person. However, once we change “Y” to a normative relation instead of a person, the 
result is a structure of authority is aligned with my view.113 It states that “A has 
authority over a change to a normative relation”. This structure means that A has the 
authorization to change the normative relation in question and that it cannot be 
changed unless a change is authorized.  
Consider Sex Refusal. Jane has authority over the permission of who can 
have sex with Jane. No one else but Jane is authorized to change this “permission” 
into another normative relation such as a “right” to have sex with Jane. And, even if 
Jane is part of a forced marriage, cultural dictates have not changed that normative 
relation for Jane. Jane may refrain from exercising authority if she coalesces with her 
arranged husband’s demands for sex with Jane against her wishes. But she also may 
                                               
113 In control cases, it is more precise to say that an authority has authority over a change to a 
normative relation, i.e., the imposition of a duty, than a person. The authority may effectively control 
the other person’s behavior via an imposition of a duty. However, what the authority most precisely 




silently exercise of authority if she refuses to recognize that her arranged husband has 
a right to have forced sex with Jane.  
 In this section, I have argued that my theory of authority is theoretically 
superior to the standard theorists on the grounds that it is more precise, flexible, and 
extensionally robust. In the next section, I discuss two important implications of this 
discussion. 
   
10.1. Resolving two important debates on “authority” 
 
A foundational debate on authority considers what kind of question is “what is 
authority?” asking. Lukes claims it could be asking two different questions.   
 
The question is, on the face of it, at least two questions. It could be the 
analytical question: what are the elements of the concept of authority and how 
are they structured? What are the criteria by which we may recognize the 
possession, exercise, and acceptance of authority? How is it distinguished 
from other forms of influence over persons and from, say, persuading, 
threatening, advising, and requesting? Or it could be the normative question: 
what is legitimate authority? What is it that renders authority legitimate? What 
justifies the claims of authority as being worthy of acceptance? When should 
utterances be treated as authoritative?114 
 
                                               




Analytical Question: What are the elements of the concept authority? How 
are they structured? 
 
Normative Question: What is legitimate authority? What makes authority 
justified? 
 
The debate is over whether the analytical question is separate from the normative 
question. The standard theorists think that they are the same questions.115  
  
 My discussion demonstrates that the underlying reason why most theorists 
think that these questions are the same is due to the structure of authority that they 
standardly use to build an account of authority: A has authority over Y, where Y is a 
different person or set of people from A. It is cases of authority that have this 
structure, i.e., the control model, where justification and legitimacy become a 
concern.   
I have provided an extensive set of arguments showing that it is a mistake to 
think that they are the same questions because the normative question only applies to 
a limited amount of cases—i.e., the ones that fit the control model. 
                                               
115 Lukes is an exception. He develops an account of authority where an identification of authority 
occurs from multiple perspectives. “More particularly, I claim that every way of identifying authority 
is relative to one or more perspectives and is, indeed, inherently perspectival, and that there is no 





Another foundational debate on “authority” considers whether there are 
multiple grounds for authority. The theory of authority claims that there are multiple 
grounds for authority because multiple normative systems exist.  
These two foundational debates on “authority” are linked in an important way. 
In the past, theorists who defend the position that the analytical question is separate 
from the legitimacy question have argued that different grounds for authority 
exists;116 hence, the essential elements of the concept “authority” are separate from 
the conditions that makes an authority legitimate since one set of conditions stays 
fixed and the other varies. 
 In response, Raz argues that these questions must not be separate. Raz 
provides the criticism that to separate these questions is to “relativize the notion of 
authority…which severs the connection between authority and practical reason.”117 
Raz holds the view that a theory of authority that allows different grounds of 
authority to exist is a relativistic conception of “authority”.  
For Raz, a relativistic theory of authority cannot show what difference that 
authority makes to our practical reasoning. The idea that “authority” must make a 
difference to our practical reasoning is ubiquitous within legal theory. In response, I 
have argued that a change to one’s reasons for acting is not the exact the result of an 
act of authority. Instead, an act of authority results in a change to a normative relation 
and that change in turn (may) change one’s reasons for acting. Hence, Raz’s objection 
is misguided.  
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As a result, Raz’s objection is no longer a reason to reject the view that 
multiple grounds for authority exist. It is an implication of my view that multiple 
grounds for authority can exist. And I believe that they in fact do. 
What my theory provides is a conceptual structure for understanding the 
essential elements of the concept “authority”. On my account, the concept of 
“authority” involves the exercise of an authorization that consists of a certain power, 
immunity, and disability; “authority” is a status that authorizes a person to change a 
certain normative relation or to preserve it against change from another person. My 
account demonstrates that the analytical question should be separated from the 
legitimacy question. It does not provide the grounds for this power, immunity, and 
disability for all authorities.  
 It is also my view that multiple grounds for authority indeed exists. The 
reason is because the respective power, immunity, and disability is in relation to 
normative relations with only very specific content. Consider my power to change 
Abigail’s prohibition from using my car into a permission to use my car. The ground 
for this power is different from the one that establishes Abigail’s power to refuse 
giving a refund to Paul.  
Multiple grounds for authority allows us to have a variety of different types of 
“authority”. A woman may still retain authority over her bodily autonomy even when 
a state legislature declares otherwise. A woman in a forced marriage still retains 
authority over the exercise of her consent to have sex. The CEOs of corporations 
exercise a certain kind of authority when they make decisions for their corporation to 




authorities have different grounds for their authority (e.g., Nancy Pelosi versus 
Donald Trump). An account of the concept “authority” that can account for these 
different types of authorities is more persuasive than accounts that cannot because we 





In this essay, I have developed a definition for the concept “authority”. I have argued 
that authority is a status that authorizes a person or entity to change one’s normative 







Chapter 4: Law’s Function as a Decision-Procedure  
 
 
1. Introduction  
 
In this essay, I argue that the law’s essential function is a decision-making function. 
More specifically, I argue that the law’s function is to enable humans to make 
decisions for a group of people under conditions of uncertainty and disagreement in 
order to solve practical problems.  
To start, that is an essential function must be explained. Legal theorists 
explain an essential property of law as one that is not only a necessarily true 
proposition about the law, as opposed to a contingently true one, but also one that is a 
constitutive feature of law (Dickson 2001, ch 1). It makes a legal system is what it is. 
A legal system cannot exist without it. Hence, I claim to be specifying a function that 
makes a legal system is what it is. This view entails that a rule system that does not 
have a decision-making function cannot be a legal system.  
That it is an essential function must also be explained. My view of the law’s 
function is built upon an understanding of law as fundamentally a tool of human 
creation, or a human artifact.118 Consider what makes a chair what it is. It gains its 
identity as a tool that is designed and created for the purpose of having something to 
sit on. A boulder may perform this function too; however, it only accidently performs 
this function as a result of human usage. The chair is demarcated from other objects 
                                               





that people can sit on due to its artifactual nature that is self-consciously designed 
(Ehrenberg 2016).  
Hence, I claim to be specifying a function that humans self-consciously design 
legal systems to serve. It is one that serves a human need, for we create tools to serve 
our needs. I identify a need that certain human groups have. Since legal systems exist 
all over the world, especially in modern times, it must be a ubiquitous need that 
human groups have once they reach a certain population threshold. That need is the 
ability to make decisions under the conditions of uncertainty and disagreement in 
order to respond to practical problems, or so I argue. On my view, the decision-
making function that legal systems perform is an enabling one. They enable humans 
to make decisions in the face of uncertainties and disagreements.  
I argue that this deciding function is an essential function by way of 
grounding two desiderata that I claim that any theorist who gives an account of the 
law’s function must satisfy. Each explains why a function is an essential function 
differently.  
One desideratum is that a theorist must demonstrate that her candidate 
function explains the existence and purpose of all the other essential properties of 
law. If we create a tool to cut other things, we would expect it to have features that 
enable us to cut other things. A function is precisely the purpose for why humans 
create a legal system when it explains the existence and purpose of its other essential 
properties. I call this desideratum the “precision desideratum”. It states that a function 




The other desideratum is that a theorist must demonstrate that her candidate function 
explains the existence of every occurrence of a legal system in all possible human 
worlds closest to this one.119 I call this desideratum the “robustness desideratum”. It 
states that a function of law is an essential function when it is true in every occurrence 
of a legal system.  
 
2. Theories on the Function of Law or Political Societies 
 
In this section, I provide a description of competing views of the law’s function. The 
purpose of this section is to provide the reader an understanding of where my account 
is situated among other accounts on the function of law. 
 The question “what is the function of government?” within political theory is 
a similar question to “what is the function of law?” within legal theory.120 The 
difference is that political theorists provide an answer that is usually more value-
laden. They build their account with background theories about “moral 
permissibility”, “legitimacy”, “justice”, “liberty” and so on. In contrast, legal theorists 
study the characteristics and components of a legal system in order to develop an 
answer. I build an account of the law’s function that is more within the legal theorist 
tradition.  
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 Nevertheless, within both traditions, the most common answer is that political 
society is created with the intention of maintaining social order. This answer includes 
a grouping of functions that involve solving coordination games, such as the 
prisoner’s dilemmas (Hobbes Leviathan XIII, Morris 1998, 82-92), the stag hunt 
(Hume Treatise Book III, Pt. II, Sec. III, Rosseau Discourse Pt. II, para 9), assurance 
games (Simmons 1999, 745), and trust dilemmas (Locke, Second Treatise, ch. 9). 
These accounts aim to show that players receive a higher payoff from engaging in 
cooperation than from defecting, which is individually rational to do. Other accounts 
discuss how political authorities have achieved social order through a belief in its 
legitimacy (Weber 1968) or through a claim of authority (Green 1988, ch 1, Raz 
2002[1979]), ch 2). And yet, other accounts discuss the importance of social 
conventions for coordinating behavior (Postema 1982). In general, the maintenance of 
social order is the most popular answer to why political societies exist.  
 Another cluster of accounts on the law’s function identify some important 
value that is the target of the proper function of law. For instance, Ronald Dworkin 
(Dworkin 1986, 93) argues that legal systems have the function of justifying coercion. 
John Finnis (Finnis 2011, 334-336) argues that the law’s function is to pursue the 
common good.  
One of the most salient capabilities that governments have is the ability to 
distribute goods and values. Another cluster of theorists develop a theory of the 
function of government upon its distribution abilities. Some argue for a just 
distribution of goods (Nozick 1974, Rawls 1985) and others argue that a state’s 




 Another important grouping of theorists observe that political societies exist to 
control violence among its members and outside threats (Hobbes, Weber). It also 
includes a long list of theorists who examine the coerciveness of law (e.g., Ripstein 
2003). 
 Raz (1979 [2002], ch 9) provides a list of four main functions of law which 
are grounded upon its ability to regulate human behavior. This list includes 
preventing undesirable behavior and securing desirable behavior, providing facilities 
for private arrangements between individuals, the provision of services and 
redistribution of goods, and settling unregulated disputes.  
 One of the most important accounts on the function of law comes from Hart 
(Hart 1994 [1961], 249) who argues that legal systems have a guidance function. Hart 
argues that the transition from pre-legal society to legal society is the creation of a 
rule of recognition which determines membership criteria for the category “law”.  
 In section 8, I provide a full response to Hart. And I respond to all the other 
theorists in section 10. 
 
3. The Decision-Making Authority Account of Law 
 
 
In this section, I lay out foundational claims regarding my account of the law’s 
decision-making authority. In section 3.1, I describe the human reasoning process and 
why humans often reach a state of indecision. In section 3.2., I show how decision-




section 3.3., I present an account of the normativity of decision-procedures. In section 




In this section, I describe the deliberation process that people engage in when making 
decisions. I then explain how people may reach a state of indecision when they reason 
about what to do. 
 A person is faced with a decision when more than one available option exists. 
A person makes a decision when she intentionally undertakes a course of action, C, 
and does not intentionally undertake any other course of action that conflicts with C 
at time t. Importantly, she stops deliberating about the merits of C at time t and 
undertakes C. Making a decision results in an action. 
 Reasons stand in the relation “in favor of” to actions.121 To make a decision, 
people sometimes deliberate about the reasons for choosing one option over another. 
Deliberation involves weighing and assessing the relative strengths of the reasons for 
choosing competing options.122 Value theorists often argue that the option with the 
greater weight should be selected.123 
 Given human uncertainty and disagreement, herein lies the problem: Conflict 
among these reasons can be resolved only through a process of weighing and 
assessing the relative strength of reasons. However, if someone is uncertain about 
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what the relative strengths of the reasons in favor of an action are, she cannot assess 
which set of reasons carry the greater weight. Moreover, if we disagree about the 
relative strengths of reasons for and against an act, we cannot arrive at a conclusion 
about what ought to be done as a group. 
 A ubiquitous fact about humans is that we place different priorities on values 
and different weights on reasons all the time; this is a common source of group 
disagreement. Moreover, we have often have cognitive limitations that generate 
normative uncertainty about what we ought to do and epistemic uncertainty about 
empirical facts that we need to know in order to make decisions. Our conflicting 
value systems and cognitive limitations cause us to remain indecisive about what to 
do in many decision-making contexts. 
 Sometimes we may remain indecisive because what’s at stake doesn’t matter 
much to us at all. But, in many cases, what’s at stake does matter a lot to us, and we 
feel compelled to make a decision in that situation. In what follows, I analyze a 
device that enables humans to make decisions despite the conflicts that practical 
deliberation produces for humans. 
 
3.2. What are Decision-Procedures  
 
In this section, I explain the logic of decision-procedures. 
Decision-procedures are a set of decision-rules that enable humans to settle 




Decision- procedures have the aim of stopping deliberation and resulting in an action 
for their users.  
Decision-rules are rules of the form A→B. The first statement of a decision 
rule is the premise, and the second statement of a decision rule is the conclusion. 
Hence, the premise of A→B is A, and the conclusion of A→B is B.  
The premise of a decision-rule maps to an easily identified empirical event in the 
world. For example, the Red Sox won the World Series or the coin landed “heads” or 
the vote passed a two/thirds threshold. It is important that the premise of a decision- 
procedure maps to an easily identified empirical event in the world because it cannot 
be an item that leaves any opening for further deliberation.  
A decision-rule is triggered when an event in the world (e.g., the coin lands on 
heads) entails that its premise has the value of true. Given the decision-rule A→B, if 
an event in the world entails the value of true for A, then we conclude B.  
The conclusion of a decision-rule maps to an action-outcome that is made in the form 
of a command (e.g., stay at a hotel or drive home). If an event in the world entails the 
value of true for the premise of a decision-rule, then we conclude that the action-
outcome in the conclusion is required.  
The logic of decision-procedures is that they produce a mechanism for making 
decisions through refraining from making a reference to any of the reasons or facts 
that caused a state of indecision. If a decision-procedure referred to those facts or 










In this section, I provide an example of how a decision-procedure works. In addition, 
I provide an account of the normativity of decision-procedures.  
Consider the following case.  
 
The Rescuer: Two lifeboats are sinking. A girl occupies the first lifeboat. A 
boy occupies the second lifeboat. A rescuer is able to reach only one of the 
lifeboats in time in order to save its inhabitants. The rescuer is in an 
unenviable position. He doesn’t know what to do; he has to make a decision 
quickly while under enormous pressure; and children’s lives are at stake. 
Moreover, if the rescuer does not make a decision at all, then both children 
will die when he could have saved one of them.  
 
 
The rescuer has a (.5) credence that he should save the boy, given the boy’s claim to 
be saved, and a (.5) credence that he should save the girl, given the girl’s claim to be 
saved. Since the reasons for saving each child creates a tie, he is in a state of 
indecision.  
Given the urgency of the situation, the rescuer flips a coin to settle what to do. 
He stipulates the following decision rules: If the coin lands on “heads”, save the girl. 
If the coin lands on “tails”, save the boy. These decision rules can be represented as 
H→G and T→B.  
The rescuer’s decision-procedure consists of two decision-rules and the use of 
a mechanism that triggers only one of them. The rescuer flips the coin, and it lands on 
“heads.” What difference does the coin-flip make the rescuer’s practical reasoning? I 





(required-action outcome): save the girl  
(cannot-act-upon): acting on any reasons against saving the girl124  
(internalize): a reason to forgo deliberation and to just save the girl  
 
Decision-procedures enable a person to decisively act on the triggered 
decision rule in virtue of certain normative background conditions that we internalize 
when agreeing to use a decision-procedure.  
The first background condition is a requirement. I shall call it “required 
action-outcome”. A user of a decision-procedure is required to perform the action-
outcome of the triggered decision-rule. This requirement is independent of the 
reasons for saving the girl. Instead, it is a normative conclusion that is derived from 
the aim of escaping a state of indecision.  
The second background condition is a prohibition. I shall call it “cannot-act-
upon”. A user of a decision-procedure is prohibited from acting on a reason against 
the action-outcome of the triggered decision-rule. Since the reasons for each course of 
action are completely taken out of consideration through the creation of decision-
rules, they become immaterial to which course of action should be undertaken. A 
reference to those reasons would reintroduce the state of indecision that led the use of 
a decision-procedure. Given this logic, another normative conclusion is that the 
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rescuer cannot act on any conflicting reasons against the action-outcome of the 
triggered decision-rule.125  
The final norm is an instrumental reason. I shall call it “internalize”. A user 
of a decision-procedure has an instrumental reason to internalize the two other norms 
required-action outcome and cannot-act-upon. If required action-outcome were not 
properly internalized, then the decision-procedure would not result in an action for an 
uncommitted decision-maker.  
In general, the strength of this reason is contingent on how badly people want 
to escape a state of group indecision. In some cases, people face a suboptimality from 
not making decision at all. The degree of the need to escape a state of indecision 
depends on how worse-off they perceive facing that suboptimality would be. 
On the other hand, a person cheats from not properly internalizing the norms 
of the decision-procedure. If I play the game “rock, paper, and scissors” with a friend 
to decide who gets the last cookie, I may very well run off with the cookie if I lose. I 
have not internalized required action-outcome and cannot consider because I want 
the cookie more than being a good sport. 
However, extenuating circumstances can strengthen the instrumental reason 
internalize. The rescuer faces a grave suboptimality if he doesn’t make a decision at 
all: both children will die when he could have saved one of them. In this situation, it 
is crucial that the rescuer internalizes required action-outcome and cannot consider 
to avoid this suboptimality.  
 
 
                                               






3.4. Group Decision-Making with Decision-Procedures  
 
In this section, I explain how decision-procedures enable human groups to make 
decisions.  
Suppose that a group must decide whether to legalize abortion or not. Suppose 
further that (.51) of the group support legalizing it and (.49) of the group support 
outlawing it. This group of individuals cannot act as a group to legalize abortion 
because (.49) of the group disagree. Conversely, they cannot act as a group to outlaw 
abortion because (.51) of the group support legalizing it.  
How can they act as a group without a consensus or the use of force? They 
need a common-framework that enables them to accept the same action-outcome 
notwithstanding their persistent disagreements. Decision-procedures provide such a 
common-framework.  
If this group unanimously agrees to using a set of decision-rules in which the 
premises of those decision-rules specify an empirical condition that is more easily 
satisfied than reaching a consensus (e.g., majority rules), one that can also be 
indisputably satisfied, then they are creating a common-framework to make decisions.  
In the rest of this section, I demonstrate how the properties of decision-procedures 
create this common-framework, which in turn allows me to explain what a common-
framework for group decision-making is.  
The first two properties of decision-procedures promote a consensus for their 




issues. Successfully achieving this consensus entails that each member accepts the 
framework in order to make decisions as a group.  
 
First: Building a consensus over using a decision-procedure is achievable because the 
conclusions of its decision-rules map to an action-outcome that each member of the 
group wants. The decision-procedure offers each member of the group a chance that 
her desired action-outcome is pursued–e.g., hiring candidate A or candidate B. I claim 
that a common-framework for group decision-making is one in which it is possible 
that each member obtains her desired action-outcome.  
 
Second: Since the premises of the decision-rules do not reference the same reasons 
that lead to conflicting beliefs about whether abortion should be legal or not (e.g., life 
begins at conception), decision-procedures are able to achieve a consensus for their 
use through setting those substantive issues aside.  
 
The third property of decision-procedures promotes group cohesion around 
their results regardless of what those results are. A common-framework for group 
decision- making is one in which group cohesion forms a group commitment to the 
results.  
 
Third: Decision-procedures create a reliable commitment to their results from the 
losing side. As I have argued, decision-procedures have normative background 




These normative background conditions include a requirement to act on the triggered 
decision-rule and a prohibition against acting on any non-triggered decision-rules.  
Hence, decision-procedures create norms that participants automatically endorse at 
their use. That is, they provide the setup. And external circumstances often reinforce 
group commitment to the results of a decision-procedure.  
External circumstances can create a strong motivation for participants to 
internalize the normative background conditions of decision-procedures. For instance, 
the need for governance engenders those circumstances for many groups. If 
legislators think they must come to a decision about whether to make an action 
legally permissible or not, they have already agreed that it would be suboptimal not to 
make decisions at all. The group would fail to be a functioning decision-making body 
without the ability to make decisions.  
Other external sources of group commitment are the normative expectations 
of each member of the group. The winning side expects the losing side to be 
committed to the result notwithstanding a loss. The losing side expects the winning 
side to be committed to the result in the counterfactual situation where the actual 
winning side loses. These expectations form a group commitment to the results of the 
decision- procedure regardless of what those results are.  
In summary, I not only explain how decision-procedures enable groups to 
make decisions, but I also argue that they possess underlying properties that build a 
consensus for their use and other normative properties that form their participants’  
commitment towards carrying out their results. Finally, I have argued that the 




group decision-making in which persistently disagreeing individuals are able to act as 
a group. That is, they explain the basis on which individuals are enabled to accept the 
same action-outcome despite their persistent disagreement.  
 
4. Normative Systems 
 
In this section, I change the topic of discussion to normative systems. A legal system 
is a normative system. A normative system is a system of norms or rules that govern 
behavior of individuals within groups and societies. We must understand the 
components of all or many normative systems in order to understand the kind of 
normative system that the law is. This purpose of this section is to accomplish this 
aim. 
The overall argument of this paper is that my account of decision-procedures 
applies to an understanding of the law’s essential function. In particular, I argue that 
the law’s decision-making authority is essential to the performance of its function; 
and the law’s essential function is to make conclusive decisions about normative 
relations within society. The law’s decision-making authority consists of certain 
components that no other normative system has. These components are constitutive 
elements of the law’s decision-making authority. In addition, they are elements that 
distinguish the law from other normative systems. 
 The first step of this argument is to show what components that all or most 
normative systems share. This issue is the subject-matter of section 4.1-4.2. In section 




systems. I am able to deliver the rest of the argument about the law’s decision-making 
authority in subsequent sections. 
 
 
6.1. Normative relations  
 
Normative systems consist of rules, and rules contain normative relations. An 
understanding of normative relations is needed to understand the components that 
makeup a normative system. 
 The first type of normative relations that rules contain are deontic relations. 
Deontic relations are prescriptions about what the normative status of an action is. 
The normative status of an act can be forbidden, permitted, obligatory. The following 
set is a basic set of deontic relations.  
   
Deontic relation: {permitted, forbidden, required} 
 
Here are some examples. 
 
(1) It is forbidden to go into the theater without a ticket. 
(2) Catholics are required to confess their sins. 
(3) Drivers are permitted to park their cars on the street. 
 
The second type of normative relations come from the scholarship of Wesley 




in general and the concept of rights in particular. He introduced terminology to 
uncover and remove serious ambiguities in the term “rights”. The following are the 
eight terms that he introduced.126  
 
Hohfeldian relation: {claim-right, duty, liberty, no-right, power, liability, 
immunity, liberty} 
 
Hohfeldian relations have three parts: two agent and a content. Consider the 
statement that Evelyn has a claim against Abigail that Abigail not drive Evelyn’s car. 
The two agents are Evelyn and Abigail. Evelyn is the subject of the claim and Joshua 
is the object of the claim. The content of this relation is “that Abigail not drive 
Evelyn’s car.” The content of an Hohfeldian relation is the act with respect to which 
one has a claim, duty, liberty, etc. 
Rules consists of either a deontic relation or a Hohfeldian relation. Some 
normative systems have rules that consists of only deontic relations, such as the ten 
commandments. Some normative systems have rules that consists of both deontic 
relations and Hohfeldian relations, such as rules of etiquette or games. 
 
6.2 Rule-configurations  
 
                                               




In this section, I discuss the next level of sophistication that a normative system may 
have. Normative systems consist of rules, and those rules can be different types of 
rules.  
Elinor Ostrom and Vincent Ostrom (2014, p. 76) state that there are seven 
types of rules that configure our choice situation in an institutional context.127 Those 
seven types of rules are as follows.    
 
(r1) entry and exist rules: “affect the number of participants, their attributes and 
resources, where they can enter freely, and the conditions they face for leaving”  
 
(r2) scope rules: “delimit the potential outcomes that can be affected and, working 
backward, the actions linked to specific outcomes”   
 
(r3) authority rules: “assign sets of actions that participants at particular nodes must, 
may, or may not take” 
 
(r4) position rules: “establish positions in the situation” 
 
(r5) aggregation rules: “affects the level of control that a participant in a position 
exercises in the selection of an action at a node” 
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(r6) information rules: “affect the knowledge contingent information sets of 
participants”  
 
A rule-configuration is a combination of rules (r1) to (r7).128  A rule 
configuration is needed to structure the collective actions of a set of individuals to 
produce an outcome. For instance, collective decisions about which person should 
hold a certain political office are made through the use of rule-configurations. The 
conditions to be an eligible voter for an election is determined through entry and exit 
rules. In the United States, for instance, a voter must be a citizen and over the age of 
eighteen. In addition, aggregation rules determine how the votes are to be aggregated 
to produce a final collective decision. The combination of the aggregation rule and 
the entry and exit rule is a rule-configuration that structures individual actions in 
order to produce a collective action. 
 
6.3 How Are Legal Systems Different from Other Systems? 
 
In this section, I describe the components that distinguish a legal system from other 
normative systems. 




                                               






  Moral system: {Utilitarian Theory, Ten Commandments} 
  Cultural system: {Japanese food etiquette} 
Games: {Tennis, Backgammon} 
  Corporations: {Walmart, Amazon} 
  Universities: {University of Maryland} 
  Markets: {capitalism, socialism} 
  Stationary Bandits: {gang of robbers} 
  Local legal systems: {states} 
  Nation-wide legal systems: {United States, Peru, Nepal} 
 
All normative systems have rules that contain either deontic relations or 
Hohfeldian relations or both. Many normative systems also contain rule-
configurations. 
 Normative systems that have rule-configurations are distinguished from 
normative systems without rule-configurations with respect to the fact that the former 
kind of normative systems are able to self-generate more rules, including nested rules 
or rules about rules, or are able to change or modify rules within its normative 
system. 
What distinguishes a legal system from other normative systems is that a legal 
system is authorized to change any normative relation within society. In contrast, 
other normative systems, e.g., universities, corporations, and even local legal systems, 












The result is that legal systems have the following components that no other 
normative systems have. (These components come from my theory of “authority” 
from Chapter 3). 
Distinguishing Components of Legal Systems 
1. a power to change any normative relation within society 
2. an immunity against others changing that normative relation 
3. others have a disability against changing that normative relation 
 
I have completed my argument about what components distinguish legal systems 
from other normative systems. In subsequent sections, I argue that these 
distinguishing components are essential the law’s decision-making authority; and the 
law’s decision-making authority is essential to the performance of its function.  
 
 
7. Precision Desideratum  
 
In this section, I argue that a desideratum for anyone who gives an account of the 
law’s function is that her account must demonstrate the truth of F1.  
 
F1: The law’s function explains the existence and purpose of each essential 
characteristic of legal systems.  
 
If there were a view of the law’s function that necessitates every element in its 
set of essential characteristics, it would explain precisely for what purpose the law 




essential feature, then a view of the law’s function that necessitates each essential 
feature is the most precise explanation of the law’s function. Hence, I call this 
desideratum the “precision desideratum”.  
To argue for this desideratum, I start with a defense of the following claim: 
The law’s function plays an essential role in determining what other essential 
properties of the law are. I state this claim more precisely as follows.  
 
Let E = {x | x is an essential property of the law} 
 
The function of law determines whether x is an element of set E in virtue of relation 
R in the following statement. 
 
x ∈ E only if ⟨x,y⟩ ∈ R 
 
According to this statement, x is an element of E only if x stands in relation R with y. 
Where y is the law, the function of law restricts the relation between x and the law to 
the following R-terms.  
 
R1: x is necessary for the law to fulfill its overall function. 
R2: x contributes to the law’s performance of its overall function in a characteristic  
way.129  
                                               






I justify R1 as follows: Presumably, theorists who give an account of the law’s 
function think that its function is an essential property of the law. If the law’s function 
is an essential property of the law, then what’s necessary for the law to fulfill its 
function must also be an essential property of the law. A theorist who makes a claim 
about law’s function rejects R1 on pain of incoherence, for it is incoherent to claim 
that the law has a function but deny that a feature that is needed for it to fulfill its 
function is essential.  
I justify R2 as follows: If the law’s function is an essential property of law, 
then whatever contributes to the law’s performance of that function in a way that 
demarcates the law from other normative systems must also be an essential property 
of the law. A theorist who makes a claim about the law’s function rejects R2 on pain 
of incoherence, for it is incoherent to claim that the law has a characteristic function 
that demarcates it from other objects but deny that a feature that is needed for it to 
fulfill its characteristic function is essential.  
Some clarifications are necessary. A legal system is a type of a social 
institution. It may share the same function as other social institutions, e.g., common 
law systems, and even other objects, e.g., decision-making algorithms. The function 
that it has in common with other objects is its overall function. However, legal 
systems are designed in a different context than other social institutions. Hence, they 
have different necessary conditions that enable them to perform their overall function 
in that context. The necessary conditions for a person to make a decision using a coin- 




make decisions in other contexts. Hence, we must examine the contexts for which 
people designed legal systems to determine what that purpose is and what features 
about legal systems allow them to fulfill that purpose in such contexts.  
In addition, we must explain how the law performs its function in a 
characteristic way. For instance, Hart argues that the law’s characteristic guidance 
function is to tell us which rules are legal rules. If we were able to satisfy our needs 
with an object that has the same overall purpose as the law (e.g., coin-flips), we could 
not explain the need to design legal systems.  
Finally, we should expect that not only is the law’s function a determiner of 
which elements are in the set E, but it should also explain how each element satisfies 
a R-term. A set of bristles is part of the design of a broom, for instance, because 
something is needed to pick up dirt. The broom’s function explains that brooms need 
a set of bristles and why brooms need a set of bristles. Analogously, the law’s 
function explains the membership of each essential element of the law. Hence, my 
desideratum is vindicated.  
In sum, I have argued that a burden for any theorist who gives an account of 
the law’s function is that they must satisfy the precision desideratum.  
 







In the last section, I have argued that we may discover the law’s essential function 
through determining which feature is essential to the performance of the law’s 
function. I identify that feature to be the law’s unique decision-making authority. 
 The law’s unique decision-making authority can be characterized through 
three features: it is open, supreme, and comprehensive (Raz 1975 [2002], 152-153).130 
These three features provide the law its ability to have a decision-making authority 
over all other normative systems. 
I now argue that the distinguishing components that I have provided are necessary 
and sufficient to explain the law’s open, supreme, and comprehensive authority.  
Raz explains the law’s open authority as follows:  
 
open authority – “A normative system is an open system to the extent that it contains 
norms the purpose of which is to give binding force within the system to norms which 
do not belong to it,” (Raz, 1975 [2002], 152-153). 
 
 For Raz, the law’s open authority allows it to bind any norms that are external 
to a legal system. I describe the open quality of the law’s authority in a different way: 
The law has the power to decide that any normative relation with respect to any act 
for any subject within a legal system is a valid legal rule. 
                                               
130 In Raz’s analysis of the law’s authority, he includes the conceptual element that the law claims 
authority. I do not include this conceptual element within my analysis. The reason that Raz thinks that 
the law claims authority is that he thinks that the law is often wrong about its claim to authority. I do 





 I use the following case to explain what I mean. Consider Riggs v. Palmer 
(1889).131 Palmer executed a will that left his estate to his daughter and grandson 
upon his death. The grandson poisoned Palmer and was convicted of the crime. The 
daughter brought a claim to a district court to void the grandson’s share in the estate. 
The court denied the claim stating that voiding the grandson’s share would punish the 
grandson twice for the same crime. The appeals court repealed the lower’s court 
decision with the claim that a person cannot benefit from his own crime. 
In this case, we have two competing rules: One rule does not void the 
grandson’s claim to Palmer’s estate. The other rule does void the grandson’s claim to 
Palmer’s estate. Each rule consists of a normative relation with a subject and a 
content that specifies an action to which the subject has a duty, liberty, requirement, 
immunity, and so on. Those competing rules are as follows: 
 
Cannot-be-punished-twice: The government is prohibited against punishing 
someone twice for the same crime. 
 
Cannot-benefit-from-one’s-crime: Citizens are prohibited from obtaining benefits 
for a crime that they have committed. 
 
 The open quality of the law’s decision-making authority means that it has the 
power to determine that either of these rules are valid legal rules within a legal 
system. That is, it has the power to self-generate a valid rule within a legal system 
                                               




that corresponds to either of these two competing rules. In other words, the open 
quality of the law’s authority enables it to self-generate a valid rule within a legal 
system that corresponds to any normative relation with respect to any act for any 
subjects within a legal system. 
 An important implication is that the law has the open authority to determine 
that even evil rules can be valid legal rules within a legal system. This conclusion is 
the subject-matter of a historical debate within legal theory.132 It is the view of legal 
positivism, a view that I champion, which is the view that no moral criteria need to be 
included in the conditions for legality. 
Other theorists believe that there is a fact of the matter that determines which 
rule is a legal rule—i.e., validity conditions. The lower court has determined that 
Cannot-be-punished-twice is a valid legal rule; and the appeals court has determined 
that Cannot-benefit-from-one’s-own-crime is a valid legal rule. They are two 
conflicting rules that two different courts concluded were valid. To explain this 
conflict, many legal theorists believe that there is a fact of the matter that determines 
which rule is a valid legal rule; and it is a court’s role to discover which rule is legally 
valid. 
It is my view that neither rules are valid legal rules prior to a court’s decision. 
Given certain rule-configurations, the lower court validated the rule Cannot-be-
punished-twice as a legal rule within the legal system. In my view, the appeals court 
did not discover that Cannot-be-punished twice is not a valid legal rule when it 
                                               
132 A claim that natural law lawyers used to champion is the following: “If it is a legal rule, then it is 
moral.” The implication of this claim is that there is no valid legal rule that is immoral. Legal 
positivism started as a view that denounced this core claim made by natural law theory because it is 




overturned the lower court’s decision; instead, it invalidated Cannot-be-punished 
twice as a legal rule and validated Cannot-benefit-from-one’s-own-crime as a legal 
rule.  
In addition, it is the combination of a position rule and an authority rule, or a 
rule-configuration, that allows the appeals court to invalidate a rule that a lower court 
has validated. That is, it is a position rule that confers the power to invalidate a lower 
court’s ruling to an appeals court (or overturn a lower court’s ruling). 
It is not the case that one rule is legally valid and that the other rule is not 
legally valid prior to the lower court’s decision. In other words, it is not a court’s role 
to discover which rule is legally valid. Instead, it is a court’s role is to make decisions 
about competing rules.  
As we can see, the law’s power to self-generate a valid rule that corresponds 
to any normative relation with respect to any action for any subject, including the 
government itself, within a legal system enables the law to perform a decision-
making function. Suppose that moral criteria legally validated one of the legal rules 
and not the other. In this case, the law discovers valid legal rules rather than makes 
decisions about which rules are legally valid.133 
 Raz describes the law’s comprehensive authority as follows: 
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necessary nor possible for moral criteria to be included in the conditions for legality. I have just argued 
that if moral criteria were included, the law discovers legally valid rules instead of decides which rules 
are legally valid. But this conclusion would vitiate the law’s open authority (or in Raz’s words, the 




comprehensive authority: the law “claims the authority to regulate any kind of 
behaviour,” (1975 [2002], 150-151).134 
 To explain the law’s comprehensive authority, I argue that the law’s 
possession of a power to change any normative relation within a legal system is both 
necessary and sufficient to establish the law’s comprehensive authority.  
It is necessary because it would lack comprehensive authority if it could not 
change the normative relation of all persons within its society. Walmart’s employee 
rules lack comprehensive authority because it applies to only Walmart employees.  
It is often stated that the law establishes its comprehensive authority over all 
within its society. However, it is more precise to say that it establishes a decision-
making authority over the status of all normative relations within society. The reason 
is because the content of a normative relation already includes a subject of that 
normative relation. For instance, in the statement “John is required to vote”, “John” is 
the subject of the requirement. Hence, in determining the status of a normative 
relation, the law already determines who is subject of that normative relation. 
It is sufficient because the power to change any normative relation is 
sufficient to regulate any kind of behavior. The reason is because the content of a 
normative relation already specifies which action is under regulation. Hence, for the 
regulation of any behavior, it is sufficient to control the normative relation. 
                                               
134 I do not include the conceptual element that the law claims authority within my analysis. The reason 
that Raz thinks that the law claims authority is that he thinks that the law is often wrong about its claim 




An implication of this conclusion is that the law does not use coercion to 
regulate behavior. More precisely, it uses coercion to regulate instances of a behavior 
or to lower the expected frequency of future instances of a behavior. 
This distinction is important. The use of a power to change a normative 
relation in an authorized way entails that the law is exercising authority. But the use 
of coercion to regulate a behavior entails that it is simply using coercion to regulate 
behavior; it is not exercising authority in this situation. Hence, it is more precise to 
say that the use of coercion regulates instances of a behavior or the expected 
frequency of future instances of that behavior instead. 
Finally, Raz describes the law’s supreme authority in the following way. 
 
supreme authority: the law claims “the authority to prohibit, permit, or impose 
conditions on the institution and operation of all the normative organizations to which 
members of its subject-community belong,” (Raz, 1975 [2002], 151-152). 
 
 The respective power, disability, and immunity that I have described are 
necessary and sufficient for explaining the law’s supreme authority. The law forms its 
supreme authority in a competitive environment. That is, it establishes its supreme 
authority through eliminating competition. 
 Suppose that the law competes with other persons and religious institutions, 
for instance, with respect to determining which marriage privileges that certain 
couples have. First, it has the power to determine every couple’s marriage privileges 




makes a decision, it also has an immunity from others changing its decisions. In 
addition, other people and institutions have a disability against changing that decision 
in any unauthorized ways. This discussion shows that these components are both 
necessary and sufficient for the law to eliminate competition from other normative 
systems regarding the normative status of an act. 
 In sum, I have shown that the respective power, immunity, and disability that I 
have described are both necessary and sufficient for explaining the law’s open, 
comprehensive, and supreme authority. Therefore, they are necessary and sufficient 
to explain the full range and magnitude of the law’s authority.  
 As a result, I have argued that the respective power, immunity, and disability 
is necessary for the law to fulfill its overall function of having open, comprehensive, 
and supreme decision-making authority. These components stand in R1 relation to the 
law for explaining its overall function. 
 
7.2 The Law’s Characteristic Way of Making Decisions 
 
In this section, I argue that rule-configurations are essential elements of legal systems 
because they allow legal systems to make decisions in a characteristic way. The law’s 
characteristic way of making decisions is that it has the capacity to evolve, or self-
generate complex rule-configurations, in order to respond to human uncertainty and 
disagreement about which decisions should be made.  
Rule-configurations and rules (r1) to (r7) are essential elements of legal 




First, we need to structure joint actions and process what outcome is achieved 
by the aggregate of human interactions. Rule-configurations provide this structure. In 
contrast, the general picture that comes out of the current literature (and goes as far 
back as John Austin’s (1832) command theory of law) is that political authorities 
make rules that they claim citizens must obey, and political authorities use coercive 
measures to enforce these rules. This picture is oversimplified. Human groups need a 
rule system to configure the joint actions that they intend to commit. When a large 
number of humans are in close proximity to each other, they interact with each other 
and want to perform certain actions as a group. For human groups, this aim is prior to 
making rules and enforcing them.  
Second, we do not have to look any further than Hart’s rule of change to see 
that rule configurations as essential elements of the law. Hart argues that a rule of 
change allows legal systems to be more dynamic than rule systems that do not have 
such a rule (e.g., pre-legal societies that have just primary rules). But what exactly is 
a rule of change? I argue that a rule of change is a rule-configuration—i.e., a 
combination of (r1) to (r7) rules.  
For one thing, an authority rule is needed to specify who is allowed to change 
which rules. For example, the current President can change an executive order; 
however, people who held the office in the past cannot. Furthermore, scope rules are 
needed to specify the allowable changes. The President can annul an executive order 
from a past President; however, she cannot change the Senate’s agenda-setting rules. 
A rule of change ought to be understood in terms of rule-configuration. If a rule of 




In this section, I argue that a characteristic function of legal systems is that 
they enable human groups to mitigate their uncertainties and to resolve disagreements 
in order for decisions to be made with respect to governance. Furthermore, I argue 
that this characteristic function necessitates rule-configurations as being part of law.  
Governance refers to all the processes of interaction and decision-making among the 
actors involved in a decision-making framework that lead to the creation or 
enforcement of orders, rules, policies of a social institution.135 At the core of 
governance is the ability to make decisions. One governance system may use the 
Pope and the Bible to govern their affairs. However, a group must first make a 
decision about whether this system is what they want to use to govern society. They 
must make decisions about what affairs are governed, the constitution of the system, 
and the scope of its power. The rule system that they put in place to govern their 
affairs is a legal system. 
However, people disagree about these issues and are uncertain about how 
much they should trust each other to make good decisions. These uncertainties and 
disagreements provide the context for which human groups produce a system that 
governs society. Given this uncertainty and disagreement, large human groups cannot 
make these decisions if they must reach a consensus to make those decisions.  
On my account, uncertainty regarding governance concerns identifying suboptimal or 
unexpected outcomes that are a result of poor or wrong decisions136—e.g., people 
choose a bad leader, the leader proves to be unfit for office, legislators who make the 
                                               
135 Human groups do not need legal systems to govern. 




rules are unresponsive to their constituency. This kind of uncertainty asks “What if 
these situations happen? How do we design a decision-making framework that is able 
to prevent these situations from happening or allows us to mitigate their bad effects if 
they do happen?” This kind of thinking produces stress-tests for determining the 
effectiveness and stability of a governance system.  
Consider, for example, the uncertainty of picking a President who later proves 
to be unfit to serve office. Given that we are uncertain that we will always choose a fit 
candidate as President, we ought to develop an exit strategy in case this situation 
arises. However, we are also uncertain about giving political parties too much power 
to impeach a President on simply political grounds.  
To build responses to these uncertainties, the designers of governance systems must 
use a rule-configuration which includes, e.g., exit rules, procedural rules, and position 
rules. In the U.S., for example, the House must initiate the impeachment process with 
a majority vote and the Senate must decide whether to impeach or not with a two- 
thirds vote. Hence, we have a decision-procedure for impeaching the President where 
the decision is constrained by a number of different actors that balance each other’s 
power to form an aggregate decision. Given this decision structure, the aggregate 
decision must pass a high barrier in order to be successful. The decision-rule for 
impeachment is the following: the vote for impeachment passes the House with a 
majority vote and passes the Senate with a two-thirds vote. This decision-rule is 
established by a number of different interconnecting rule-configurations (e.g., one 




how investigations occur in the House, one that establishes the impeachment 
process).  
My account of the law’s characteristic function necessitates rule-
configurations. This is because decisions-procedures, such as the procedure for 
impeaching the President, consists of a number of rule-configurations. For instance, 
the premise of U.S.’s described as anything more than the Pope has de facto power 
over others. 
Hence, I argue that my account of the law’s function necessitates rule-
configurations since they stand in R2 relation to the law. In sum, I have given an 
argument about the law’s function that necessitates each component of legal systems, 
including the components that distinguish legal systems from other normative 
systems.  
Before continuing on, I take a moment to summarize my argument so far. I 
have argued that the law’s essential function tells us the existence and purpose of 
each essential feature of the law. I have argued that the law’s unique decision-making 
authority is essential to the law’s performance of its function. In addition, I have 
argued that the components that I have given to distinguish legal systems from other 
normative systems are both necessary and sufficient to establish the law’s unique 
decision-making authority. These components are necessary to the law’s performance 
of its overall function—to have an open, comprehensive, and supreme decision-
making authority over all normative relations within society. In addition, I have 
argued that they are sufficient to explain its open, comprehensive, and supreme 




law’s authority. Finally, I have argued that rule-configurations are needed to explain 
the law’s performance of fulfilling its function in a characteristic way—i.e., to 
respond to human uncertainty and disagreement through an evolution of complex 
decision-making rules. In the completion of this argument, what I have shown is that 
my account of the law’s function explains the existence and purpose of every 
essential feature of legal systems. 
 
8. H.L.A. Hart’s Guidance Function 
 
 
My argument in the previous section entails that the rule of recognition is not an 
essential feature of the law. However, it is a consensus among legal positivists that 
Hart’s rule of recognition is essential feature of the law. In this section, I argue that 
they are wrong. The arguments in this section also show that Hart is wrong about his 
views on the law’s guidance function. 
One can claim that Hart (1994, [1961]) changed the landscape of legal theory 
with his seminal book The Concept of Law. Hart’s rule of recognition is considered to 
be one of the law’s essential features.  
Hart’s explanation for the existence of the rule of recognition is as follows: In 
the pre-legal world, there are only primary rules, or rules that govern conduct. And 
they can come from many different sources. Sometimes disputes over which primary 
rules are binding occur. Hence, in the pre-legal world, according to Hart, we lack 
guidance over which rules to follow. For Hart, the introduction of a rule of 




The key to this transition is the rule of recognition’s ability to settle 
uncertainty over which rules are legally binding. To perform this function, Hart 
argues that the rule of recognition solves the validity regress problem. It is stated as 
follows: Of any legal rule, we may ask “Why is that rule legally valid?” We then refer 
to a higher legal standard to validate the lower legal standard. For example, to 
validate the legal validity of New York’s state laws, we refer to New York’s 
Constitution; and to validate New York’s Constitution, we may refer to the federal 
Constitution. However, what validates the federal Constitution? A validity regress 
problem ensues, according to Hart, unless we come to Hart’s ultimate rule, which 
validates but is not itself validated. Instead, its existence is formed through certain 
widespread practices among legal officials.  
In sum, what Hart is saying is that the law has a very specific guidance 
function; its guidance function is to tell us which rules within society are binding 
through a recognition of legally valid rules. And the law serves this guidance function 
with the rule of recognition. For instance, the rule of recognition is supposed to 
provide guidance about which of the following rules is legally valid: Cannot-be-
punished-twice or Cannot-benefit-from-one’s-crime. 
Here is the upshot: if the rule of recognition cannot guide conduct, then the 
law doesn’t have a guidance function in the way that Hart says that the law does. The 
reason is because Hart explains the law’s ability to guide conduct through the rule of 
recognition.  
 To vindicate that the rule of recognition can guide conduct, the following 





Burden of Proof: It must be shown that the rule of recognition is identifiable.  
 
 According to Hart, we identify legally valid rules through an identification of 
a legal system’s rule of recognition. Hence, a legal system’s rule of recognition must 
be identifiable in order for it to guide conduct. 
A problem with its identification, however, is that we must rely upon legal 
experts to identify it. Hart argues that the rule of recognition is not stated, for the most 
part, “but its existence is shown by the way in which particular rules are identified 
either by courts or other officials or private persons or their advisors”.137 
Hart claims that legal experts identify the rule of recognition with statements 
made from the internal point of view, statements where a participant of a practice 
conveys her acceptance of it. Hart’s example of such a statement is as follows: “It is 
the law that...” But these statements do not distinguish the rule recognition from legal 
rules validated by the rule of recognition, for all legally valid rules can be stated from 
the internal point of view.  
Moreover, if the rule of recognition is identifiable, then we should be able to 
identify its basic conceptual properties. Unfortunately, the basic conceptual properties 
of the rule of recognition is one of the most contested and puzzling subjects within 
legal theory. Legal theorists dispute the basic form of the rule of recognition and are 
even confused about Hart’s initial description of it.  
                                               




For example, Shapiro writes, “What is the basic form of the rule of 
recognition? Astonishingly, Hart was vague on this critical point.”138 In addition, 
Hart’s initial characterization of it makes it sound like it’s simply a list of criteria of 
validity. But Stephen Perry demonstrates the problem with this characterization: “A 
list, however, is not a rule...a list, considered simply as a list, has no normative 
character at all.”139  
In addition, legal theorists are unable to gain conceptual clarity over its 
content. They cannot agree whether it can include moral criteria or not. This is the 
subject of the internal debate between inclusive legal positivists and exclusive legal 
positivists. The former position states that it is possible to include moral criteria 
within the conditions for legality, but it is not necessary. The latter position states that 
it is neither necessary nor possible to include moral criteria within the conditions for 
legality. 
In the Postscript of the 1994 version of his book The Concept of Law, Hart 
sides with inclusive legal positivists. However, as I have argued in section 7.1, this 
position entails that the law is discovering which rule is legally valid instead of 
deciding which rule to validate as legally valid.  
This result is problematic: We are back to the state of indecision in cases where there 
is uncertainty and disagreement about which moral rule should be assigned greater 
weight when deliberating about what to do. If so, then the rule of recognition cannot 
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guide conduct under conditions of uncertainty and disagreement. However, Hart’s 
initial reason for positing the existence of the rule of recognition was that it solved 
problems with respect to uncertainty and disagreement in the pre-legal world.  
This result should force us to drop the existence of the rule of recognition. If it 
cannot perform its guidance function, then its existence and purpose can be neither 
justified nor explained. What’s more is that Hart claims that we must rely on legal 
experts to identify the rule of recognition. But legal theorists are in longstanding 
disputes about basic properties that would allow us to identify it. Furthermore, if it 
were identifiable, then Hart should have been able to provide a clearer description of 
it. 
In contrast, what my account shows is that the law doesn’t provide guidance 
under the conditions of uncertainty and disagreement, rather it enables human groups 
to make decisions about which rule to validate as a member of the category “law” in 
contested conditions; and it can only do so with membership criteria that is 
empirically verifiable given the properties of decision-rules. In other words, in order 
for legal systems to fulfill its decision-making function, moral criteria cannot be part 
of the membership criteria for legality. This conclusion puts me squarely within the 
exclusive legal positivist camp.  
 





In this section, I argue that a desideratum for anyone who is giving an account of the 
law’s function is that her account must demonstrate the truth of F2. In addition, I 
argue that my account satisfies this desideratum.  
 
F2: The law’s function explains the existence of every legal system.  
In order to justify that proposition P is a claim about the law, a theorist is required to 
show that P must be true of every actual and possible legal system.  
 
Hence, any theorist who makes a claim about the law’s function must show 
that her candidate function is true in every occurrence of a legal system. She must 
show that her explanation is robust. Hence, I call this desideratum the “robustness 
desideratum”.  
I have explained why a theorist’s claim about the law’s function must be a 
claim that is true about every legal system. But why must it explain the existence of 
every legal system? Consider the following premise.  
 
Premise 1: Law is a tool that humans have created for a specific purpose.  
Humans invent tools for a specific purpose in mind, and the law is a human artifact 
that is a tool.140 The purpose for which a tool is invented explains why it was 
invented. Its purpose explains why it exists. Hence, I vindicate the robustness 
desideratum.  
                                               






How should we explain the existence of a tool? Humans invent tools to fulfill 
a specific need. Hence, to explain its existence, we must examine the human need for 
inventing that tool.  
Humans may invent different varieties of a tool that fulfill the same essential 
need. Although, it may satisfy it in a different way or in a different context, each 
variety of the tool still satisfies the same need. Moreover, each variety may fulfill 
other purposes too. I claim that if we look at every variety of a tool, if it has a 
function in common with each instantiation of that tool, that function is its essential 
function. It is helpful to illuminate these issues formally.  
Consider two possible worlds: W1 is a world where every legal system has at 
least one function in common. W2 is a world where no legal system has a function in 
common. Each world has n number of legal systems as follows L1, L2, L3, L4...Ln. 
Each legal system has a n number of functions since I do not assume that legal 
systems have only one function. Let lower-case letters a, b, c... represent the functions 
of a legal system.  
 
W1: { L1(a,b,c...), L2(a,e,f...), L3(a,h,i...), L4(a,k,l...)... } 
W2: { L1(a,b,c...), L2(d,e,f...), L3(g,h,i...), L4(j,k,l..)... } 
 
If each cutting tool (e.g., scissors, butter knives, shears, steak knives, axe, chef 
knives) has a function that it shares with other tools of its kind, that function is its 




than other varieties of cutting tools. For example, we cannot use a pair of scissors to 
cut a branch down, for the branch is too tough. Instead, in this context, shears is more 
appropriate to use. Each variety may also have other functions. For example, butter 
knives are used to cut butter, and steak knives are used to cut steaks. However, each 
cutting tool has a function that it shares with all the other varieties. That function is its 
essential function, for it demarcates it from other tools such as hammering tools.  
If I can demonstrate that each occurrence of a legal system has a function that it 
shares with the other instantiations of a legal system, and if I can demonstrate that  
that function is a decision-making function, I satisfy the robustness desideratum. The 
task is to rule out W2 and argue that a consists of a decision-making function. In 
particular, a decision-making function that consists of enabling human groups to 
make decisions about practical matters in the face of disagreements and uncertainties.  
To rule out W2, consider the following premise. 
 
Premise 2: If every legal system has essential features, every legal system has an  
essential function.  
 
Most legal theorists think that every legal system has essential features. It is 
beyond the purview of this paper to argue for this claim. If a theorist does not believe 
that every legal system has essential features, then my arguments do not address that 
theorist.  
On an understanding of legal systems as human artifacts that are tools, I argue 




that it has an essential function and tell us what its function is. For example, brooms 
have the essential feature of a handle and a set of bristles. Their essential features 
enable them to satisfy a function. And if their essential features demarcate brooms 
from other tools, such as hammering tools, the purpose for which they are invented 
demarcate them from other tools too. Hence, I am able to rule out W2.  
The remaining task is to argue that a is a decision-making function. I perform this 
task by way of examining the human groups that create each instantiation of a legal 
system. I deduce a need that each of these human groups have.  
Humans are complex and diverse beings; but, given our common physical, 
biological, and psychological makeup, we converge on having the same needs. 
Humans have convergent needs out of natural necessity. For example, all human 
groups need to create things that cut other things, for we do not have hands or teeth 
that can cut. And so, divergent human groups all converge on creating objects with 
which to cut things. Moreover, their shared need to cut things explains the existence 
of cutting tools across different societies. These statements stand on empirical facts 
about humans.  
I state another widespread empirical fact about human groups: they possess 
many uncertainties, stemming from their emotions and cognitive limitations, and 
disagreements, stemming from having different value systems and results in 
reasoning, about how they should govern themselves. These empirical facts are based 
on widespread psychological facts about humans.  
In addition, all human groups need to make decisions about societal and other 




to settle them. Furthermore, they are unable to make a decision as a group about these 
issues, given their uncertainties and disagreements, without the use of decision- 
procedures. In the statements that I have made so far, I have made claims about the 
human groups that makeup L1, L2, L3, L4...Ln.  
I have already defended statements about L1, L2, L3, L4...Ln themselves. I 
have argued that the essential feature of every legal system are rule-configurations. In 
addition, I have argued that rule-configurations enable humans to make decisions.  
Now, I shall make an argument about the law’s function that fits the following 
structure: All human groups share a need to cut things. They invent tools to serve 
their needs. They are unable to cut (most) things without a cutting tool. All cutting 
tools (e.g., scissors, butter knives, steak knives, chef knives, shears) share an essential 
feature—a sharp edge—that enables humans to cut things. On an inference to the best 
explanation, for explaining the existence of each cutting tool across different human 
societies, I conclude that each human who has invented a cutting tool has done so for 
serving the purpose of cutting things.  
All human groups share a need to make decisions on practical matters. Once 
they reach a certain population, they are unable to make decisions as a group. All 
legal systems have an essential feature—rule-configurations—that enables humans to 
make decisions. On an inference to the best explanation, for explaining the existence 
of each legal system, I conclude that each group creates a legal system to serve the 
purpose of making decisions in the face of uncertainties and disagreements about 




9.1 Other Normative Systems and Social Order 
 
 
In this section, I respond to the other views on the law’s function. 
In “Authority and Convention,” Leslie Green (1985) argues that 
conventionalist views about the law’s authority cannot justify its authority. The basis 
of his argument is that the law’s authority does not uniquely solve coordination 
problems, for other normative systems can solve coordination problems too.  
The response that I give to the other theorists builds upon the logic of Green’s 
argument. The claim of this paper is that I have identified the law’s essential function. 
This claim is consistent with the view that the law has multiple other functions. But 
the law’s essential function is the one that only the law can uniquely fulfill.  
Most of the theorists that I have cited think that the law’s function is to create 
social order. In response, I ask the following questions: Can other normative systems 
(or a combination of other normative systems) maintain social order? If the answer is 
the affirmative, then legal systems do not uniquely fulfill this function. The result is 
that the maintenance of social order does not uniquely justify the existence of legal 
systems. If so, I argue that the maintenance of social order does not explain the 
existence and purpose for which legal systems were created.  
Instead, the maintenance of social order justifies the existence and purpose of 
normative systems in general. Suppose that a human group created a legal system to 
maintain social order, that legal system still does not maintain social order alone. 
Social order is maintained within a society through a combination of multiple 




For instance, we need normative systems that make prescriptions about the act 
of lying in order to motivate people not to lie; people usually do not lie because they 
are sufficiently motivated by the prescripts of morality. Or, perhaps, people do not lie 
because there is a well-established social convention about not lying. Nevertheless, it 
would be unfeasible for a legal system to enforce a rule about lying. What’s more is 
that sufficiently low rates of lying is needed within a society in order for other kinds 
of social cooperation to be possible, such as keeping promises and upholding 
contracts. If so, the law doesn’t maintain social order alone. But rather, the 
maintenance of social order is accomplished through an assortment of normative 
systems.141  
 One might object that, even if social order is maintained through a variety of 
normative systems, nonetheless, it is the state’s function to provide collective goods, 
and the most critical collective good is the basic security of person and possessions. 
For instance, Christopher Morris writes, 
 
The basic security of person and possessions is to a great extent a collective 
good… an important part of the service provided by public police and systems 
of criminal justice generally is to deter potential violators from harming 
people. And this deterrence is an indivisible, nonexcludable good. Insofar as 
social order is a collective good, we may predict that it will not be efficiently 
produced in a competitive market, even if all the other conditions of perfect 
competition are satisfied, (Morris 1998, 66). 
                                               





Morris is skeptical that a perfectively competitive market can adequately supply the 
collective good of security of person and possessions since it is rational for people to 
be free riders in a competitive market. Hence, Morris’s response is that the 
maintenance of social order falls largely upon legal systems—i.e., they are needed to 
supply collective goods where it is rational for an individual person to defect. 
 The weight of Morris’s argument sits on the claim that it is practically 
improbable that certain collective goods, ones that are crucial to a happy human life, 
could be supplied through other normative systems, such as the free market, without a 
legal system. A legal system is critical to the success of obtaining these collective 
goods.  
 The mistake that Morris and all the other theorists make comes from too much 
of an emphasis upon the law’s ability to regulate human behavior. I certainly do not 
deny that the legal systems are very effective at helping human groups obtain 
collective goods from solving the free-rider problem. Nonetheless, the law’s effective 
ability to regulate human behavior cannot be distinguished from the use of coercion.  
Consider normative systems that stationary bandits create. Bandit rationality 
induces a ruler to provide a peaceful order and other public goods so that people 
make enough investments where the economy grows and to tax at a rate where the 
ruler’s wealth is maximized in comparison to all the members within society (Olson 
1993). The bandit keeps the rate of investment at a certain level so that no one can 




normative systems that feudal lords, kings, and Chinese warlords have created in the 
past. 
 I have argued in Chapter 3 that “authority” is something much different from 
the use of coercion. It isn’t the “justified” or “legitimate” use of coercion either. 
Rather “authority” is a status that authorizes a person or thing to change a normative 
relation or preserve a non-change to a normative relation. Hence, the ruler of bandit 
societies can create laws that make prescriptions about the normative status of acts, 
but they do not exercise authority when they make these laws. Rather, they make laws 
that are valid within their own normative systems. 
 In contrast, the law’s authority is essential to the performance of its 
function.142 That is, even when the law regulates human behavior, it precisely does so 
through an exercise of authority rather than through the use of coercion. To deny that 
the law’s authority is essential to the performance of its function is to claim that its 
authority is non-essential to its existence. The result is a normative system that is no 
different from ones that stationary bandits create.  
A stationary bandit doesn’t tax people through an exercise of authority, a 
stationary bandit taxes people through an exercise of coercion. The exercise of 
authority is non-essential to the bandit’s collection of taxes. That is, a stationary 
bandit is effective at functioning, i.e., extracting wealth from members within society, 
without the use of authority. The distinction between legal systems and old feudal 
                                               
142 Raz also makes this observation through his view that the law claims authority, but he thinks that it 




systems is that the former type of normative systems exercise authority in order to 
fulfill their function.  
The second mistake that political and legal theorists make is that they do not 
account for the evolution of institutions. A legal system is a kind of institution, and all 
institutions have rule-configurations.143  
Consider a normative system that corresponds to one that a stationary bandit 
creates. A stationary bandit gives commands that people follow through the effective 
use of coercion and control. It consists of rules that contain mostly deontic relations, 
i.e., a set of behaviors that are permitted, required, or prohibited. This normative 
system is no different from a set of commands.  
The normative system that Simmons’s account creates also lacks the 
sophistication of an institution. Simmons argues that “authority” is not the use of de 
facto power over others, but rather it is an exercise of a “right to rule” which is 
correlated with a “duty to obey”. This normative system consists of rules that contain 
only deontic relations or Hohfeldian relations. Every law is an imposition of a duty, 
and every duty is owed to the authority in question. This normative system is no 
different from a set of promises made between people.144 It doesn’t explain the law’s 
unique authority. 
There is a clear distinction between normative systems with rule-
configurations and normative systems without rule-configurations. Normative 
systems with rule-configurations are able to self-generate a complex and rich set of 
                                               
143 Ostrom claims that all institutions have the broad types of rules that she has listed. 
144 This result isn’t surprising given that “authority” on Simmons’s framework is based upon the 




nested rules, or rules about a rule. That is, it is able to generate nested rules of (r1) - 
(r6). I have argued that this pattern is important for the formation of decision-
procedures. In section 7.2, I have argued that the law’s characteristic way of making 
decisions is that it has the capacity to evolve, or self-generate complex rule-
configurations, in order to respond to human uncertainty and disagreement. 
Hence, evolving modern legal institutions have a much higher complexity and 
richer set of nested rules or rule-configurations. My account of the law’s function is 
able to explain this pattern. If the law’s essential function is the maintenance of social 
order or to distribution of public goods, it would not explain the evolution of modern 
legal systems because these functions could be fulfilled through normative systems 
that resemble a set of commands or a set of promises. But legal systems should be 
distinguished from these other normative systems. 
I have argued that what distinguishes legal systems from other normative 
systems is that legal systems have a power to change any normative relation within 
society, an immunity to its decisions from being changed, and others have disability 
against changing its decision. I have argued that these distinguishing components are 
necessary and sufficient for explaining the law’s unique authority—i.e., its open, 
supreme, and comprehensive decision-making authority. 
In sum, I have provided an account of the law’s function which explains the 
existence and purpose of each of its essential components. In addition, I have shown 
how the law’s decision-making authority is essential to the performance of its 




group disagreement about all sorts of normative relations that are in competition or 
conflict within society. 
 
6. Conclusion  
 
In this paper, I have developed an account of the law’s function. I claim that it has 
a deciding function. It has this function because humans possess many cognitive 
limitations and differing value systems. Humans create legal systems to enable 
themselves to make decisions in the face of their uncertainties and disagreements. I 
argue that my account satisfies the precision desideratum and the robustness 
desideratum. Satisfying these desiderata places my view of the laws function at the 
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